Mon, 08 Sep 2014 22:09
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Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
In the Matter of))Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet)GN Docket No. 14-28))))NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING
Adopted: May 15, 2014
Released: May 15, 2014
Comment Date: July 15, 2014Reply Comment Date: September 10, 2014
By the Commission: Chairman Wheeler and Commissioner Clyburn issuing separate statements;Commissioner Rosenworcel concurring and issuing a statement. CommissionersPai and O'Rielly dissenting and issuing separate statements.TABLE OF CONTENTS
Para.I. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................. 1II. BACKGROUND.................................................................................................................................. 11III. DISCUSSION ...................................................................................................................................... 25A. The Continuing Need for Open Internet Protections ..................................................................... 251. An Open Internet Promotes Innovation, Competition, Free Expression, andInfrastructure Deployment ...................................................................................................... 252. Broadband Providers Have the Incentive and Ability to Limit Openness............................... 39B. Scope of the Rules ......................................................................................................................... 54C. Transparency Requirements to Protect and Promote Internet Openness ....................................... 631. The 2010 Transparency Rule................................................................................................... 632. Enhancing Transparency to Protect and Promote Internet Openness...................................... 663. Compliance and Enforcement ................................................................................................. 87D. Preventing Blocking of Lawful Content, Applications, Services, and Nonharmful Devices ........ 891. The 2010 No-Blocking Rule ................................................................................................... 912. Proposal to Adopt a No-Blocking Rule................................................................................... 943. Establishing the Minimum Level of Access under the No-Blocking Rule ............................. 974. Application of the No-Blocking Rule to Mobile Broadband ................................................ 1055. Applicability of the No-Blocking Rule to Devices ............................................................... 109Federal Communications Commission
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E. Codifying an Enforceable Rule to Protect the Open Internet That Is Not CommonCarriage Per Se ............................................................................................................................ 1101. The 2010 No Unreasonable Discrimination Rule ................................................................. 1132. Proposed Elements of an Enforceable Legal Rule ................................................................ 1163. Potential Conduct That Is Per Se Commercially Unreasonable............................................ 1374. Potential Safe Harbors........................................................................................................... 139F. Legal Authority............................................................................................................................ 1421. Section 706............................................................................................................................ 1432. Title II.................................................................................................................................... 1483. Other Sources of Authority ................................................................................................... 1564. Constitutional Considerations ............................................................................................... 159G. Other Laws and Considerations................................................................................................... 160H. Enforcement and Dispute Resolution .......................................................................................... 1611. Background ........................................................................................................................... 1612. Designing an Effective Enforcement Process ....................................................................... 1623. Complaint Processes, Enforcement, and Additional Forms of Dispute Resolution.............. 172IV. PROCEDURAL MATTERS.............................................................................................................. 177A. Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis ............................................................................................. 177B. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis......................................................................................... 178C. Comment Filing Procedures ........................................................................................................ 179D. Ex Parte Rules.............................................................................................................................. 181E. Contact Person ............................................................................................................................. 182V. ORDERING CLAUSES..................................................................................................................... 183APPENDIX A'--Proposed RulesAPPENDIX B'--Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis2Federal Communications Commission
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I.
INTRODUCTION
1.The Internet is America's most important platform for economic growth, innovation,competition, free expression, and broadband investment and deployment. As a ''general purposetechnology,'' the Internet has been, and remains to date, the preeminent 21st century engine for innovationand the economic and social benefits that follow. These benefits flow, in large part, from the open, end-to-end architecture of the Internet, which is characterized by low barriers to entry for developers of newcontent, applications, services, and devices and a consumer-demand-driven marketplace for theirproducts. As the Commission explained in its 2010 Open Internet Order, the Internet's open architectureallows innovators and consumers at the edges of the network ''to create and determine the success orfailure of content, applications, services and devices,'' without requiring permission from the broadbandprovider to reach end users.1 As an open platform, it fosters diversity and it enables people to buildcommunities.2.We start with a fundamental question: What is the right public policy to ensure that theInternet remains open? This Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Notice), and the comment process thatfollows, will turn on this fundamental question.3.Today, there are no legally enforceable rules by which the Commission can stopbroadband providers from limiting Internet openness. This Notice begins the process of closing that gap,by proposing to reinstitute the no-blocking rule adopted in 2010 and creating a new rule that would barcommercially unreasonable actions from threatening Internet openness (as well as enhancing thetransparency rule that is currently in effect).4.The goal of this proceeding is to find the best approach to protecting and promotingInternet openness. Per the blueprint offered by the D.C. Circuit in its decision in Verizon v. FCC, theCommission proposes to rely on section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.2 At the same time,the Commission will seriously consider the use of Title II of the Communications Act as the basis forlegal authority. This Notice seeks comment on the benefits of both section 706 and Title II, including thebenefits of one approach over the other. Under all available sources of legal authority (including alsoTitle III for mobile services), the Commission seeks comment on the best ways to define, prevent andpunish the practices that threaten an open Internet. We emphasize in this Notice that the Commissionrecognizes that both section 706 and Title II are viable solutions and seek comment on their potential use.5.It is important to always remember that the Internet is a collection of networks, not asingle network. And that means that each broadband provider can either add to the benefits that theInternet delivers to Americans'--by maintaining Internet openness and by extending the reach ofbroadband networks'--or it can threaten those benefits'--by restricting its customers from the Internet andpreventing edge providers from reaching consumers over robust, fast and continuously improvingnetworks. This is a real threat, not merely a hypothetical concern.6.In its 2010 Order, the Commission found that providers of broadband Internet accessservice had three types of incentives to limit Internet openness. First, broadband providers may haveeconomic incentives to block or disadvantage a particular edge provider or class of edge1 Preserving the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52, Report and Order, 25 FCC Rcd17905, 17910, para. 13 (2010) (Open Internet Order or Order), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part subnom. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Among other examples, the Commission cited Sir TimBerners-Lee, who'--25 years ago'--needed neither permission nor approvals from network operators to invent theWorld Wide Web using existing Internet layer and transport protocols. Id.2 Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 706, 110 Stat. 56, 153 (1996) (1996Act), as amended in relevant part by the Broadband Data Improvement Act (BDIA), Pub. L. No. 110-385, 122 Stat.4096 (2008), is now codified in Title 47, Chapter 12 of the United States Code. See 47 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.3
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providers.3 Second, broadband providers may have incentives to increase revenues by charging edgeproviders for access or prioritized access to the broadband provider's end users.4 In particular, excessivefees could reduce edge provider entry, suppress innovation, and depress consumer demand.5 Third, ifproviders could profitably charge edge providers they would have an incentive ''to degrade or decline toincrease the quality of service they provide to non-prioritized traffic.''67.Those threats are even more important today because Americans and Americanbusinesses have become even more dependent on the Internet. For example, according to the PewResearch Internet Project, as of January 2014, 87 percent of Americans used the Internet, compared to14 percent in 1995.7 And it is a critical route of commerce, supporting an e-commerce marketplace thatnow boasts U.S. revenues of $263.3 billion.88.Of particular concern are threats to American innovation. In ''the end-to-end architecture,different economic actors can independently choose their innovation projects.''9 Innovation is the chiefdriver of American economic growth, which means that all Americans lose if the opportunity to innovateis curbed. For example, an economic study originally released in February 2012 and updated in July 2013reported that the app economy is responsible for roughly 752,000 jobs in the United States, which is anincrease from zero in 2007 when the iPhone was introduced.10 But equally important are the jobs thatcould be'--but might not be'--created if edge innovation and investment were to be chilled by doubt thatthe Internet will remain open or, even worse, if openness were defeated.9.Although the Commission has emphasized for almost a decade the importance of legallyenforceable standards, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has twiceinvalidated the Commission's attempts, most recently in Verizon v. FCC, decided this January.11 It is inthe absence of these protections for the open Internet that the Commission must act to ensure that newlegally enforceable rules are put in place. That is a gap that must be closed as quickly as possible.10.The remainder of the Notice proceeds as follows. First, we generally propose to retainthe definitions and scope of the 2010 rules. Second, we tentatively conclude that the Commission shouldenhance the transparency rule that was upheld by the D.C. Circuit so that the public and the Commissionhave the benefit of sunlight on broadband provider actions and to ensure that consumers and edge3 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17919, para. 21; see Writers Guild of America East Comments at 2-3. In theOpen Internet Order, the Commission defined ''end user'' as any individual or entity that uses a broadband Internetaccess service and sometimes used ''subscriber'' or ''consumer'' to refer to those end users that subscribe to aparticular broadband Internet access service. ''Edge provider'' was defined as referring to content, application,service, and device providers, because they generally operate at the edge rather than the core of the network. Theseterms were not mutually exclusive. See Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17907, para. 4 n.2.4 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17919, para. 24; see Writers Guild of America East Comments at 2-3.5 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17919-20, para. 25.6 Id. at 17922, para. 29.7 Pew Research Internet Project, Internet Use Over Time, http://www.pewinternet.org/data-trend/internet-use/internet-use-over-time/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2014).8 See U.S. Census Bureau, Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales, 4th Quarter 2013.http://www.census.gov/retail/mrts/www/data/pdf/ec_current.pdf.9 Barbara Van Schewick, Internet Architecture and Innovation 301 (2010).10 See Michael Mandel, 752,000 App Economy Jobs on the 5th Anniversary of the App Store, Progressive PolicyInstitute Blog (July 8, 2013), http://www.progressivepolicy.org/2013/07/752000-app-economy-jobs-on-the-5th-anniversary-of-the-app-store/; Michael Mandel, Where the Jobs Are: The App Economy 1, TechNet (Feb. 7, 2012),http://www.technet.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/TechNet-App-Economy-Jobs-Study.pdf.11 Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014).4
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providers'--indeed, the Internet community at large'--have the information they need to understand theservices they are receiving and to monitor practices that could undermine the open Internet. Third, wetentatively conclude that the Commission should adopt the text of the no-blocking rule from the OpenInternet Order with a revised rationale, in order to ensure that all end users and edge providers can enjoythe use of robust, fast and dynamic Internet access. Fourth, and where conduct would otherwise bepermissible under the no-blocking rule, we propose to create a separate screen that requires broadbandproviders to adhere to an enforceable legal standard of commercially reasonable practices, asking howharm can best be identified and prohibited and whether certain practices, like paid prioritization, shouldbe barred altogether. Fifth, we propose a multi-faceted dispute resolution process to provide effectiveaccess for end users, edge providers, and broadband network providers alike and the creation of anombudsperson to act as a watchdog to represent the interests of consumers, start-ups, and smallbusinesses. Sixth, and finally, we ask how either section 706 or Title II (or other sources of legalauthority such as Title III for mobile services) could be applied to ensure that the Internet remains open.II.
BACKGROUND
11.Today's Notice rests upon over a decade of consistent action by the Commission toprotect and promote the Internet as an open platform for innovation, competition, economic growth, andfree expression. At the core of all of these Commission efforts has been a view endorsed by fourChairmen and a majority of the Commission's members in office during that time: That FCC oversight isessential to protect the openness that is critical to the Internet's success. In recognition of this, theCommission has demonstrated a steadfast commitment to safeguarding that openness.12.In 2004, former Chairman Michael Powell first articulated basic guiding principles forpreserving Internet freedom in an address at Silicon Flatirons. Chairman Powell recognized that''consumers' hunger for an ever-expanding array of high-value content, applications, and devices''12fueled investment in broadband networks as the ''impressive generators of economic growth, innovation,and empowerment.'' He explained that ''ensuring that consumers can obtain and use the content,applications and devices they want . . . is critical to unlocking the vast potential of the broadbandInternet.''1313.A year later, reinforcing Chairman Powell's guidance, the Commission unanimouslyapproved the Internet Policy Statement setting forth four general Internet policy principles intended ''[t]oencourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and interconnected nature of theInternet.''14 Specifically, subject to ''reasonable network management,''15 the principles entitle consumersto (1) ''access the lawful Internet content of their choice;'' (2) ''run applications and use services of theirchoice, subject to the needs of law enforcement;'' (3) ''connect their choice of legal devices that do not12 Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, Preserving Internet Freedom: GuidingPrinciples for the Industry 3, Remarks at the Silicon Flatirons Symposium (Feb. 8, 2004),http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-243556A1.pdf (Preserving Internet Freedom).13 Id. at 3.14 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities; Review of RegulatoryRequirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecommunications Services; Computer III Further RemandProceedings: Bell Operating Company Provision of Enhanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Reviewof Computer III and ONA Safeguards and Requirements; Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the InternetOver Cable and Other Facilities Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling; Appropriate Regulatory Treatment forBroadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities, GN Docket No. 00-185, CC Docket Nos. 02-33, 01-33,98-10, 95-20, CS Docket No. 02-52, Policy Statement, 20 FCC Rcd 14986, 14987-88, para. 4 (2005) (InternetPolicy Statement).15 Id. at 14988 n.15.5
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harm the network;'' and (4) enjoy ''competition among network providers, application and serviceproviders, and content providers.''1614.The Commission incorporated these open Internet principles in a series of mergerproceedings. In 2005, the Commission conditioned approval of the SBC/AT&T and Verizon/MCImergers on the merged entities' compliance with the Internet Policy Statement.17 Although theCommission did not adopt any formal open Internet conditions on the Adelphia/Time Warner/Comcasttransactions, the Commission made clear that its Internet Policy Statement ''contains principles againstwhich the conduct of Comcast [and] Time Warner . . . can be measured.''18 So too, in 2006, theCommission accepted the AT&T and BellSouth commitment to ''maintain a neutral network and neutralrouting in [the merged entity's] wireline broadband Internet access service,'' as a formal condition of themerger.19 Likewise, in the 2011 Comcast-NBCU merger, the Commission adopted the commitments ofthe merged entity to not ''prioritize affiliated Internet content over unaffiliated Internet content . . . [or]treat affiliated network traffic differently from unaffiliated network traffic'' as well as to comply with theCommission's open Internet rules, regardless of the effect of ''any judicial challenge'' affecting thoserules.2015.The Commission likewise incorporated openness principles for mobile services, adoptingan open platform requirement for licensees in the Upper 700 MHz C Block in 2007.21 Specifically, therules require Upper 700 MHz C-Block licensees to allow customers, device manufacturers, third-partyapplication developers, and others to use or develop the devices and applications of their choice for Upper16 Id. at 14988, para. 4.17 SBC Communications, Inc. and AT&T Corp. Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, WC Docket No.05-65, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 FCC Rcd 18290, 18392, para. 211 (2005) (SBC/AT&T Transfer ofControl Order); Verizon Communications Inc. and MCI, Inc. Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control,WC Docket No. 05-75, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 FCC Rcd 18433, 18537, para. 221 (2005)(Verizon/MCI Transfer of Control Order). The SBC/AT&T condition remained effective until November 2007, andthe Verizon/MCI condition until January 2008, two years following the respective closing dates of each merger. SeeSBC/AT&T Transfer of Control at Appx. F; Verizon/MCI Transfer of Control Order at Appx. G.18 Applications for Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of Licenses, Adelphia CommunicationsCorporation, (and Subsidiaries, Debtors-In-Possession), Assignors, to Time Warner Cable Inc. (Subsidiaries),Assignees, Adelphia Communications Corporation, (and Subsidiaries, Debtors-In-Possession), Assignors andTransferors, to Comcast Corporation (Subsidiaries), Assignees and Transferees, Comcast Corporation, Transferor,to Time Warner Inc., Transferee, Time Warner Inc., Transferor, to Comcast Corporation, Transferee, MB DocketNo. 05-192, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 FCC Rcd 8203, 8299, para. 223 (2006).19 See AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation Application for Transfer of Control, WC Docket No. 06-74,Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 FCC Rcd 5662, 5663, para. 2 (2007) (AT&T/BellSouth Merger Order); seealso SBC/AT&T Transfer of Control Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 18392, para. 211.20 Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company and NBC Universal, Inc. for Consent to AssignLicenses and Transfer Control of Licenses, MB Docket No. 10-56, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 26 FCC Rcd4239, 4275, para. 94 & n.213 (2011).21 Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands; Revision of the Commission's Rules to EnsureCompatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Systems; Section 68.4(a) of the Commission's RulesGoverning Hearing Aid-Compatible Telephones; Biennial Regulatory Review-Amendment of Parts 1, 22, 24, 27,and 90 to Streamline and Harmonize Various Rules Affecting Wireless Radio Services; Former NextelCommunications, Inc. Upper 700 MHz Guard Band Licenses and Revisions to Part 27 of the Commission's Rules;Implementing a Nationwide, Broadband, Interoperable Public Safety Network in the 700 MHz Band; Developmentof Operational, Technical and Spectrum Requirements for Meeting Federal, State and Local Public SafetyCommunications Requirements Through the Year 2010; Declaratory Ruling on Reporting Requirement underCommission's Part 1 Anti-Collusion Rule, WT Docket Nos. 07-166, 06-169, 06-150, 03-264, 96-86, PS Docket No.06-229, CC Docket No. 94-102, Second Report and Order, 22 FCC Rcd 15289, 15359 (2007) (700 MHz SecondReport and Order); 47 C.F.R. § 27.16.6
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700 MHz C-Block networks, provided those devices and applications meet all applicable regulatoryrequirements and comply with reasonable conditions related to management of the wireless network (i.e.,do not cause harm to the network). Further, the Commission prohibited Upper 700 MHz C-Blocklicensees from disabling features or functionality in handsets where such action is not related toreasonable network management and protection, or compliance with applicable regulatory requirements.2216.Also in 2007, the Commission unanimously adopted the Broadband Industry PracticesNotice of Inquiry, explaining that vigilance and a willingness to act were necessary to keep the Internetopen.23 The Broadband Industry Practices Notice specifically sought comment on whether the InternetPolicy Statement should be amended or expanded.2417.Meanwhile, the Commission applied open Internet principles in the context of particularenforcement proceedings. Just before the Commission adopted the Internet Policy Statement, theEnforcement Bureau had entered into a consent decree with Madison River Communications, a telephonecompany and provider of digital subscriber line (DSL) service, arising from complaints by Vonage thatMadison River was blocking ports that were typically used by Vonage customers to make Voice overInternet Protocol (VoIP) telephone calls.25 The consent decree required Madison River to stop blockingVoIP ports and refrain from otherwise inhibiting customers from using the VoIP applications of theirchoice.2618.In 2007, several parties filed complaints with the Commission alleging that Comcast wasinterfering with its customers' use of peer-to-peer applications in violation of the Internet PolicyStatement.27 Such applications allow users to share large files directly with one another without goingthrough a central server, but also can consume significant amounts of bandwidth. In response, Comcastasserted that its conduct was a reasonable network management practice necessary to ease congestion.28The Commission disagreed and, in a 2008 Order, concluded that the company's practice ''contravene[d]. . . federal policy'' by ''significantly imped[ing] consumers' ability to access the content and use theapplications of their choice.''29 As the Commission explained, Comcast's ''practice unduly squelch[ed]22 See id. at 15365, para. 206; 47 C.F.R. § 27.16.23 See Broadband Industry Practices, WC Docket No. 07-52, Notice of Inquiry, 22 FCC Rcd 7894, 7901 (2007)(Broadband Industry Practices Notice) (Statement of Chairman Kevin J. Martin: ''The Commission is ready,willing, and able to step in if necessary.''); id. at 7909 (Statement of Commissioner Robert M. McDowell: ''[W]emust remain vigilant against possible market failure or anticompetitive conduct that would hamper the fulldevelopment of the Internet and related services being provided to consumers.'').24 Id. at 7898, para. 10. It asked whether and, if so, how the Commission should add non-discrimination andtransparency principles to the four principles adopted in 2005. Id. at 7897-98, paras. 8-9. Concerned about thelimited transparency of broadband Internet access providers' practices, the Commission asked ''whether providersdisclose their [network management and pricing] practices to their customers, to other providers, to applicationdevelopers, and others.'' Id.25 Madison River Communications, File No. EB-05-IH-0110, Order, 20 FCC Rcd 4295 (Enforcement Bur. 2005)(Madison River Order).26 See id. at 4297, para. 5.27 Complaint of Free Press & Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp., File No. EB-08-IH-1518 (filed Nov. 1,2007); Petition of Free Press et al. for Declaratory Ruling, WC Docket No. 07-52 (filed Nov. 1, 2007).28 Comcast Comments, WC Docket No. 07-52, at 14 (filed Feb. 12, 2008).29 See Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly DegradingPeer-to-Peer Applications; Broadband Industry Practices; Petition of Free Press et al. for Declaratory Ruling thatDegrading an Internet Application Violates the FCC's Internet Policy Statement and Does Not Meet an Exceptionfor ''Reasonable Network Management,'' File No. EB-08-IH-1518, WC Docket No. 07-52, Memorandum Opinionand Order, 23 FCC Rcd 13028, 13054, 13057, paras. 44, 49 (2008) (Comcast Order).7
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the dynamic benefits of an open and accessible Internet,'' harm that was further compounded byComcast's failure to disclose its practice to its customers.30 In the Comcast Order, the Commissionasserted ancillary jurisdiction under Title I of the Communications Act and concluded that it couldresolve the dispute through adjudication rather than rulemaking.3119.Comcast challenged that decision in the D.C. Circuit, arguing (among other things) thatthe Commission lacked authority to prohibit a broadband Internet service provider from engaging indiscriminatory practices that violate the four principles the Commission announced in 2005.32 On April 6,2010, the D.C. Circuit granted Comcast's petition for review and vacated the Commission's enforcementdecision. As to section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the court noted that the agency hadpreviously interpreted section 706 as not constituting a grant of authority and held that the Commissionwas bound by that interpretation for purposes of the case.3320.While the Comcast case was pending, the Commission issued a Notice of ProposedRulemaking seeking comment on whether the Commission should codify the four principles stated in theInternet Policy Statement, plus proposed nondiscrimination and transparency rules, all subject toreasonable network management. 3421.In December 2010, the Commission released the Open Internet Order, adopting threebasic rules grounded in the Commission's prior decisions and broadly accepted Internet norms.35 First,the Order imposed a transparency rule, requiring both fixed and mobile providers to ''publically discloseaccurate information regarding the network management practices, performance, and commercial terms''of their broadband Internet access service.36 The rule specified that such disclosures be ''sufficient forconsumers to make informed choices regarding the use of such services and for content, application,service, and device providers to develop, market, and maintain Internet offerings.''37 Second, the Order adopted anti-blocking requirements. The rule barred fixed providers from blocking ''lawful content,applications, services, or non-harmful devices subject to reasonable network management.''38 Itprohibited mobile providers from blocking ''consumers from accessing lawful websites,'' as well as''applications that compete with the provider's voice or video telephony services,'' subject to ''reasonablenetwork management.''39 Third, the Order adopted an anti-discrimination rule for fixed providers, barringthem from ''unreasonably discriminat[ing] in transmitting lawful network traffic,'' subject to ''reasonablenetwork management.''4030 See id. at 13028, para. 1.31 Id. at 13033-50, paras. 12-40.32 See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).33 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 658-60.34 See Preserving the Open Internet et al., GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52, Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 24 FCC Rcd 13064, 13067-68, 13100-15, paras. 10, 16, 88-141 (2009) (Open Internet NPRM).Although the Open Internet NPRM recast the Internet Policy Statement principles as rules rather than consumerentitlements, protecting and empowering end users remained a central purpose of open Internet protections35 See Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd 17905, para. 1.36 47 C.F.R. § 8.3.37 Id.38 47 C.F.R. § 8.5.39 Id.40 47 C.F.R. § 8.7.8
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22.Verizon challenged the Open Internet Order in the D.C. Circuit on several grounds.41 Itargued that the Commission lacked statutory authority to adopt the rules, that the blocking and non-discrimination rules violated the Communications Act by imposing common carriage regulation on aninformation service, that the Order was arbitrary and capricious, and that the rules violated the First andFifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.23.On January 14, 2014, the D.C. Circuit ruled on Verizon's challenge to the Open InternetOrder.42 As discussed further below, the court upheld the Commission's reading that sections 706(a) and(b) of the Telecommunications Act grant the Commission affirmative authority to encourage andaccelerate the deployment of broadband capability to all Americans through, among other things,measures that promote competition in the local telecommunications market or remove barriers toinfrastructure investment.43 The court further held that the Commission could utilize that section 706authority to regulate broadband Internet access service.44 It concluded that the Commission hadadequately justified the adoption of open Internet rules by finding that such rules would preserve andfacilitate the ''virtuous circle'' of innovation, demand for Internet services, and deployment of broadbandinfrastructure and that, absent such rules, broadband providers would have the incentive and ability toinhibit that deployment.45 The court therefore rejected Verizon's challenge to the transparency rule.46However, the court struck down the ''anti-blocking'' and ''anti-discrimination'' rules, explaining that theCommission had chosen an impermissible mechanism by which to implement its legitimate goals.Specifically, the court held that the Commission had imposed per se common carriage requirements onproviders of Internet access services.47 Such treatment was impermissible because the Commission hadclassified fixed broadband Internet access service as an information service, not a telecommunicationsservice, and had classified mobile broadband Internet access service as a private mobile service ratherthan a commercial mobile service.48 The court remanded the case to the Commission for furtherproceedings consistent with its opinion.24.Today, we respond directly to that remand and propose to adopt enforceable rules of theroad, consistent with the court's opinion, to protect and promote the open Internet. As the above historydemonstrates, our action builds on the foundation begun under Chairman Powell, continued underChairmen Martin and Genachowski, and reinforced by a decade of Commission policy.41 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant Verizon, Verizon v. FCC, No. 11-1355 (D.C. Cir. July 2, 2012).42 Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir.2014).43 Id. at 635-42. In the Open Internet Order, the Commission explained its understanding that section 706(a)''authorizes the Commission . . . to take actions . . . that encourage the deployment of advanced telecommunicationscapability by any of the means listed in the provision.'' Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17969, para. 119; seealso id. at 17969 n.370. The Verizon court agreed with the Commission's interpretation and found that ''theCommission's current understanding of section 706(a) as a grant of regulatory authority represent[s] a reasonableinterpretation of an ambiguous statute.'' Verizon, 740 F.3d at 637.44 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 642.45 Id. at 644-46.46 Id. at 659.47 See id. at 656-59.48 Id. at 651.9
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III.
DISCUSSION
A.
The Continuing Need for Open Internet Protections
1.An Open Internet Promotes Innovation, Competition, Free Expression, andInfrastructure Deployment
25.In the Open Internet Order, the Commission reiterated the conclusion underlying its priorpolicies'--that the Internet's openness promotes innovation, investment, competition, free expression andother national broadband goals.49 The Commission also found that the Internet's openness is critical to itsability to serve as a platform for speech and civic engagement and can help close the digital divide byfacilitating the development of diverse content, applications, and services.50 Further, the Order found thatthe benefits of Internet openness'--increased consumer choice, freedom of expression, and innovation'--applied to end users accessing the Internet using mobile services as well as fixed services.5126.In the Open Internet Order, the Commission specifically found that the Internet'sopenness enabled a ''virtuous circle of innovation in which new uses of the network'--including newcontent, applications, services, and devices'--lead to increased end-user demand for broadband, whichdrives network improvements, which in turn lead to further innovative network uses.''52 For example, theCommission explained that innovative streaming video applications and independent sources of videocontent have spurred end-user demand, which, in turn, has led to network investments and increasedbroadband deployment.53 By contrast, the Commission reasoned, ''[r]estricting edge providers' ability toreach end users, and limiting end users' ability to choose which edge providers to patronize, would reducethe rate of innovation at the edge and, in turn, the likely rate of improvements to networkinfrastructure.''54 As discussed further below, the Commission found that, despite the advantages of thevirtuous circle, broadband providers have short-term incentives to limit openness, generating harms toedge providers and users, among others.55 Thus, the risk of broadband provider practices that may rewardthem in the short term but over the long run erode Internet openness threatens to slow or even break thevirtuous circle'--chilling entry and innovation by edge providers, impeding competition in many sectors,dampening consumer demand, and deterring broadband deployment'--in ways that may be irreversible orvery costly to undo. Also, innovation that does not occur due to lack of Internet openness may be hard todetect.49 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17909-15, paras. 13-19; see Vonage Comments at 1; Voices for InternetFreedom Comments at 1-2. On February 19, 2014, the Wireline Competition Bureau released a Public Noticeannouncing the establishment of a new docket to consider how the Commission should proceed following theVerizon v. FCC opinion. See New Docket Established to Address Open Internet Remand, GN Docket No. 14-28,Public Notice, 29 FCC Rcd 1746 (Wireline Comp. Bur. 2014). Unless otherwise noted, all citations to comments inthis Notice refer to comments filed in response to the Public Notice released by the Wireline Competition Bureau inGN Docket No. 14-28.50 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17912-15, paras. 15-18; see Letter from Free Press et al., to ThomasWheeler, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, GN Docket No. 14-28, at 2 (filed Mar. 20, 2014) (FreePress Ex Parte Letter) (stating that ''[f]ree speech depends upon access to open and nondiscriminatory platforms forthat speech'').51 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17956, para. 93.52 Id. at 17910-11, para. 14.53 Id. at 17910-11, 17914, paras. 14, 17.54 Id. at 17910-11, para.14.55 See infra Section III.A.2.10
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27.The Open Internet Order acknowledged that there were tradeoffs to consider in adoptingthe 2010 rules.56 The Commission concluded, however, that any small costs of imposing the rules wereoutweighed by the positive effect on network investment from the preservation of the openness that drivesthe virtuous circle, as well as the increased certainty in continued openness under the rules.5728.The D.C. Circuit held that ''the Commission [had] more than adequately supported andexplained its conclusion that edge provider innovation leads to the expansion and improvement ofbroadband infrastructure.''58 The court also found ''reasonable and grounded in substantial evidence'' theCommission's finding that Internet openness fosters the edge provider innovation that drives the virtuouscircle.5929.We believe that these findings, made by the Commission in 2010 and upheld by thecourt, remain valid. If anything, the remarkable increases in investment and innovation seen in recentyears'--while the rules were in place'--appear to have borne out much of the Commission's view.60 Bothwithin the network and at its edges, investment and innovation have flourished while the open Internetrules were in force.30.According to a June 2013 report by the White House Office of Science and TechnologyPolicy, for example, nearly $250 billion in private capital has been invested in U.S. wired and wirelessbroadband networks since 2009.61 USTelecom reports that broadband capital expenditures have risensteadily, from $64 billion in 2009 to $68 billion in 2012.62 Wireline providers alone invested $25 billionin 2012.63 And venture capital financing of ''Internet-specific'' businesses has doubled in the past fouryears, from $3.5 billion in 2009 to $7.1 billion in 2013.64 Annual investment in U.S. wireless networksgrew more than 40 percent between 2009 and 2012, from $21 billion to $30 billion, and exceedsinvestment by the major oil and gas or auto companies.6531.Whole new product markets have blossomed in recent years, and the market forapplications has both diversified and exploded. A total of $8.33 billion has been raised since 2007 onmobile media ventures, a majority of the funds ($4.7 billion) to companies that provide software services,including mobile Web development, carrier-backend software, app development, and cloud-based56 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17928, para. 39.57 Id. at 17927-31, paras. 38-42.58 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 644.59 Id. 60 But see AT&T Comments at 17 (''[A]ny broadband access provider that prevents innovative new content andapplications from using its platform would inflict considerable harm on itself given that most consumers couldswitch to a different provider that does not engage in such self-defeating behavior.'').61 See White House Office of Science and Technology Policy & The National Economic Council, Four Years ofBroadband Growth 5 (2013) (Four Years of Broadband Growth),http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/broadband_report_final.pdf.62 See USTelecom, Historical Broadband Provider Capexhttp://www.ustelecom.org/broadband-industry-stats/investment/historical-broadband-provider-capex (last visited May 8, 2014); Patrick Brogan, Updated CapitalSpending Data Showing Rising Broadband Investment in Nation's Information Infrastructure 1, USTelecom (Nov.4, 2013), http://www.ustelecom.org/sites/default/files/documents/103113-capex-research-brief-v2.pdf (UpdatedCapital Spending Data Report).63 Updated Capital Spending Data Report at 2.64 PricewaterhouseCoopers and National Venture Capital Association, Total U.S. Investments by Year Q1 1995-Q42013 (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=1033&Itemid=317(select ''Internet-Specific Companies'' tab).65 Four Years of Broadband Growth at 2.11
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services in the United States. In April 2010, Apple released the first version of the iPad, which launchedthe tablet market.66 The number of tablet users in the United States has increased from 9.7 million in2010 to almost 70 million by the end of 2012, and is projected to grow to more than 160 million(approximately 50 percent of the U.S. population) by 2016.67 In 2013, over $1 billion in venture capitalfunding was invested in mobile media startups,68 and overall app use in 2013 posted 115 percent year-over-year growth.69 According to CTIA, in 2012 there were more than 20 independent non-carrier mobileapplication stores, offering over 3.5 million apps for 14 different operating systems.70 The Wall StreetJournal reported in March 2013 that Apple and Google each offered about 700,000 apps, and thatapplication sales were approaching $25 billion.7132.Finally, we have seen tremendous growth in the online voice and video markets. Thenumber of hours Americans spend watching video over the Internet has grown 70 percent since June2010.72 Between 2010 and 2013, revenues from online video services grew 175 percent, from $1.86billion to $5.12 billion.73 Real-time entertainment (that is, programming that is viewed as it is delivered,such as video streamed by Netflix and Hulu) grew from 42.7 percent of the downstream fixed accesstraffic at peak time (generally 8:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.) in 2010 to 67 percent of the downstream fixedaccess traffic at peak time by September 2013.74 VoIP usage has similarly continued to increase. Thenumber of global over-the-top mobile VoIP subscribers increased by 550 percent in 2012.7533.We have also, however, witnessed a growing digital divide that threatens to undo thework of the Commission's open Internet policies. As certain cities get connected with fiber or other66 Apple, Apple-history/iPad, http://apple-history.com/ipad (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).67 SNL Kagan, Media Trends Actionable Metrics, Benchmarks & Projections for Major Media Sectors 262 (2013)(SNL Kagan Media Trends).68 Id. at 278.69 Flurry Analytics, Mobile Use Grows 115% in 2013, Propelled by Messaging Apps, Flurry Blog (Jan. 13, 2014),http://blog.flurry.com/bid/103601/Mobile-Use-Grows-115-in-2013-Propelled-by-Messaging-Apps.70 Letter from Scott K. Bergmann, Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, CTIA '' The Wireless Association, to ThomasWheeler, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, WT Docket No. 13-135, GN Docket No. 09-51, at 2(filed Nov. 13, 2013).71 Jessica Lessin and Spencer Ante, Apps Rocket Toward $25 Billion in Sales, Wall Street Journal Tech (Mar. 4,2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323293704578334401534217878.72 See Nielsen, Three Screen Report 4, tbl.4 (June 2010), http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/reports-downloads/2010-Reports/Three-Screen-Report-Q1-2010.pdf (estimating that during the second quarter of2010, about 134.5 million Americans watched 3 hours and 10 minutes of video over the Internet per month, andabout 20 million Americans watched 3 hours and 37 minutes of video on a mobile phone per month); Nielsen, ALook Across Media The Cross Platform Report 10, tbl.3 (Dec. 2013), http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/reports-downloads/2013%20Reports/The-Cross-Platform-Report-A-Look-Across-Media-3Q2013.pdf (estimating that during the third quarter of 2013, about 147.7 million Americans watched 6 hours and40 minutes of video over the Internet per month, and about 53.1 million Americans watched 5 hours and 48 minutesof video on a mobile phone per month). 73 This includes revenues from subscription services as well as sales and rentals of full-length television programsand movies. See SNL Kagan Media Trends at 158.74 Sandvine Intelligent Broadband Networks, Global Internet Phenomena Report 5, fig.1 (2H 2013),https://www.sandvine.com/downloads/general/global-internet-phenomena/2013/2h-2013-global-internet-phenomena-report.pdf; Sandvine Intelligent Broadband Networks, Fall 2010 Global Internet Phenomena Report 11,fig.7 (2010).75 Press Release, Infonetics Research, Infonetics Research Raises VoLTE Forecast; Over-the-top Mobile VoIPSubscribers Nearing 1 Billion Mark (July 8, 2013), http://www.infonetics.com/pr/2013/Mobile-VoIP-Services-and-Subscribers-Market-Highlights.asp.12
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technologies capable of providing broadband speeds of 25 Mbps up to 1 Gigabit, rural America and evensome parts of urban America are falling farther and farther behind. Recent data suggest that a majority ofAmericans living in urban areas (64 percent) have access to at least 25 Mbps/10 Mbps service, while onlya substantial minority of Americans residing in rural areas (only 21 percent) have access to that same 25Mbps/10 Mbps service.76 We are similarly concerned as to whether advanced networks are beingdeployed to all Americans in urban areas, as the construction of new networks, especially competitivenetworks, is an outcome that must be encouraged.34.In light of developments in the Internet ecosystem since 2010, we wish to refresh therecord on the importance of protecting and promoting an open Internet. We seek comment on the currentrole of the Internet's openness in facilitating innovation, economic growth, free expression, civicengagement, competition, and broadband investment and deployment. Particularly, we seek comment onthe role the open Internet rules have had in investment in the broadband marketplace'--networks and edgeproviders alike. We are similarly interested in understanding the role that the open Internet may play inthe promotion of competition or in identifying barriers to infrastructure investment that an open Internetmay eliminate or lessen. We also seek comment on the role that the open Internet has for publicinstitutions, such as public and school libraries, research libraries, and colleges and universities.7735.Additionally, we seek comment on the impact of the openness of the Internet on freeexpression and civic engagement. For example, the percentage of Americans who use the Internetreached 87 percent in 2014'--an increase of 8 percent from 2010, the year in which the Open InternetOrder was adopted'--marking ''explosive adoption'' that has had ''wide-ranging impacts on everythingfrom: the way people get, share and create news . . . the way they learn; the nature of their politicalactivity; their interactions with government; the style and scope of their communications with friends andfamily; and the way they organize in communities.''78 In light of the important role that the Internet nowplays as a vehicle for communication of all sorts'--both for consumers and content providers'--howshould we consider the potential impact on social and personal expression of an Internet whose opennesswas not protected? For example, would there be particular impacts on political speech, on the ability ofconsumers to use the Internet to express themselves, or on the Internet's role as a ''marketplace of ideas''that serves the interests of democracy in general, serving even the interests of those Americans who listeneven if they do not actively speak?79 Are there other ways in which we should understand free-expressioninterests and whether they may be impaired by a lack of openness?8076 We estimate broadband deployment by relying on the broadband deployment data collected by NationalTelecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and the states, in coordination with the Commission,as part of the State Broadband Initiative (SBI) and called ''SBI Data.'' Department of Commerce, NTIA, StateBroadband Data and Development Grant Program, Docket No. 0660-ZA29, Notice of Funds Availability, 74 Fed.Reg. 32545 (July 8, 2009), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/fr_broadbandmappingnofa_090708.pdf.77 See, e.g., Letter of Emily Sheketoff, ALA Washington Office, et al. to Thomas Wheeler, Chairman, FederalCommunications Commission (filed Feb. 13, 2014).78 Susannah Fox & Lee Rainie, The Web at 25 in the U.S. 4, Pew Research Internet Project (2014)http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/02/PIP_25th-anniversary-of-the-Web_0227141.pdf. The Pew ResearchInternet Project also reports that 73% of Internet users say that it would be somewhat hard or very hard to give upthe Internet and that 56% of users say that ''they have seen an online group come together to held a person or acommunity solve a problem.'' Id. at 7, 22.79 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes. J., dissenting) (''The ultimate good desired isbetter reached by a free trade in ideas'--that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself adopted inthe competition of the marketplace.'').80 See, e.g., Marvin Ammori, First Amendment Architecture, Wisconsin L. Rev., Vol. 2012, No. 1 (2012).13
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36.At the same time, we are mindful of the possible tradeoffs the Commission recognized atthe time it adopted the Open Internet Order.81 When it adopted the rules in 2010, the Commission'sprimary focus was on the market between broadband providers and their end-user subscribers. The recordcontained no evidence of U.S. broadband providers engaging in pay-for-priority arrangements, in whichthe broadband provider would agree with a third party to directly or indirectly prioritize some traffic overother traffic to reach the provider's subscribers.82 As such, the Commission found that such arrangementswould be a ''significant departure from historical and current practice.''8337.In the years since, this second side of the market'--between broadband providers andedge providers or other third parties'--has gotten increasing attention. In its arguments challenging theOrder, Verizon expressed interest in pursuing commercial agreements with edge providers to govern thecarriage of the edge providers' traffic.84 We also note that such arrangements between broadband andedge providers have begun to emerge. In January 2014, for example, AT&T launched a new sponsoreddata service, in which an edge provider enters an agreement with AT&T to sponsor and pay for datacharges resulting from eligible uses of the sponsor's content by an AT&T mobile subscriber.8538.We seek comment on the potential for, and development of, new business arrangementsin the market between broadband providers and edge providers. What does the multi-sided market looklike, and what are its effects on Internet openness? Do some types of broadband and edge providerarrangements (or aspects of such arrangements) raise greater concerns about Internet openness thanothers?862.Broadband Providers Have the Incentive and Ability to Limit Openness
39.The Open Internet Order found that broadband Internet providers had the incentives andability to limit Internet openness, and that they had done so in the past.87 And the D.C. Circuit found thatthe Commission ''adequately supported and explained'' that absent open Internet rules, ''broadbandproviders represent a threat to Internet openness and could act in ways that would ultimately inhibit thespeed and extent of future broadband deployment.''88 As discussed further below, we seek to update therecord to reflect marketplace, technical, and other changes since the 2010 Open Internet Order wasadopted that may have either exacerbated or mitigated broadband providers' incentives and ability to limitInternet openness. We seek general comment on the Commission's approach to analyzing broadbandproviders' incentives and ability to engage in practices that would limit the open Internet, as well as moretargeted comment as addressed below.81 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17910-11, 17928-29, paras. 14, 39-40.82 Id. at 17947-48, para. 76; see also Verizon and Verizon Wireless Comments, GN Docket No. 09-191, WC DocketNo. 07-52, at Attach. C (filed Jan. 14, 2010) (Verizon Topper Declaration) (discussing the potential for a two-sidedmarket but stating that ''[u]nder current pricing arrangements, broadband providers charge only the consumer side ofthe market for the delivery of content of applications.'').83 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17947-48, para. 76; see also Verizon Topper Declaration.84 In its brief, Verizon argued that allowing broadband providers to enter into ''arrangements (such as advertiser-supported services) . . . would help recover the costs of building and maintaining broadband networks.'' See JointReply Brief of Appellants/Petitioners Verizon and MetroPCS at 7-8, Verizon v. FCC, No. 11-1355 (D.C. Cir.Dec. 21, 2012).85 See News Release, AT&T, AT&T Introduces Sponsored Data for Mobile Data Subscribers and Businesses (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.att.com/gen/press-room?pid=25183&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=37366&mapcode.86 See infra paras. 96, 126, 138.87 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17915-26, paras. 20-37.88 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 645.14
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40.As noted above, the Commission has pursued policies to safeguard Internet openness forover a decade. Thus, while the number of existing cases has been relatively few, we believe this to beprimarily due to the fact that the Commission has had policies in place during the period in question thatit has been ready to enforce.89 This is different from the experience under the European legal framework,which for the most part has not contained rules or policies prohibiting blocking and discriminatorypractices like the Commission's open Internet regulatory policies.90 In the absence of such rules andpolicies, commenters note more instances of broadband providers engaging in some level of restriction inEurope than the Commission has witnessed in the United States under its open Internet policies.91 Forexample, a survey conducted by the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications(BEREC) shows that European Internet service providers reported engaging in specific restrictions suchas traffic degradation as well as blocking and throttling when accessing ''specific applications (such asgaming, streaming, e-mail or instant messaging service) and, to a much lesser extent, when [accessing]specific content and application providers.''92 We seek comment on this analysis and ask whether there issome other explanation to account for this phenomenon.41.We also note that concerns related to the open Internet rules and norms have continued tooccur. For example, in 2012, the Commission reached a $1.25 million settlement with Verizon forrefusing to allow tethering apps on Verizon smartphones, based on openness requirements attached to89 See Letter from Barbara van Schewick to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission,GN Docket Nos. 09-191, 14-28, at 2 (filed Mar. 4, 2014) (Barbara van Schewick Ex Parte Letter) (stating that''instances of blocking and discrimination in the US market for wireline broadband Internet access occurred in thepresence of strong regulatory policies supporting network neutrality''); Alissa Cooper Comments at 3, 168 (notingthat in the United Kingdom, notwithstanding competition between ISPs, discrimination still occurs). But see CEAComments at 2-3 (arguing that the competitive marketplace obviates the need for additional open Internet rules).90 Alissa Cooper Comments at 167 (''Where regulatory threat is present and internalized by ISPs, it fundamentallyshapes traffic management, while its absence has an equally strong effect.''); Barbara van Schewick Ex Parte Letterat 2.91 Barbara van Schewick Ex Parte Letter at 2 & Attach. A at 13, fig. 2 (discussing evidence of blocking anddiscrimination as noted by several sources, including the Body of European Regulators for ElectronicCommunications (BEREC), that shows the relative frequency of broadband providers reporting some level ofrestriction). The European Parliament voted to adopt net neutrality rules in April 2014 that will now be consideredby the 28 European Union Member States in order to become binding regulation. To date, among Europeancountries only the Netherlands and Slovenia have net neutrality regulations. See Zack Whittaker, EU Passes NetNeutrality Law, Votes to End Throttling, Site Blocking, Between the Lines Blog, ZD Net (Apr. 3, 2014),http://www.zdnet.com/eu-net-neutrality-passes-vote-7000027998/.92 Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications, A View of Traffic Management and OtherPractices Resulting in Restrictions to the Open Internet in Europe 8-9 (2012), available athttp://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7521087926 (discussing several instances where operators gavepreferential treatment to select over-the-top traffic). Additionally, there is evidence that the second largest FrenchISP was automatically blocking ads in Internet traffic delivered to subscribers in January 2013. While the ISPultimately removed the block following government intervention, press reports indicate that the block was motivatedto pressure Google into compensating the ISP for the traffic generated by YouTube. Barbara van Schewick ExParte Letter s at 3; Cyrus Farivar, France's Second Largest ISP Suspends Ad Blocking For Now (Jan. 7, 2013),ArsTechnica, http://arstechnica.com/business/2013/01/frances-second-largest-isp-suspends-ad-blocking-for-now/.Furthermore, the Voice on the Net (VON) Coalition Europe released a report identifying restrictions on Internetaccess by mobile networks based mainly on the operators' terms and conditions. The report noted that in 2012, aU.K.-based mobile Internet access service provider contractually limited users from using services not affiliatedwith the ISP, including Internet-based streaming services, voice, peer-to-peer file sharing, or Internet-based video.VON Europe, Non-exhaustive Identification of Restrictions on Internet Access by Mobile Operators 17 (2012),http://www.scribd.com/doc/98641591/VON-Europe-Non-exhaustive-Indentification-of-Restrictions-on-Internet-Access-by-Mobile-Operators.15
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Verizon's Upper 700 MHz C-Block license.93 In the same year, consumers also complained when AT&Trefused to permit Apple's FaceTime iPhone and iPad application to use its mobile network, restricting itsuse to times when the end user was connected to Wi-Fi and thus to another broadband provider, althoughthe Commission did not conclude whether such a practice violated our open Internet principles.94 Weseek identification of, and comment on, actions taken by broadband providers'--both domestically andinternationally'--since the adoption of the Open Internet Order that have threatened or could potentiallythreaten the Internet's openness. How should such incidents inform how we craft our rules on remand?a.Economic Incentives and Ability
42.In the Open Internet Order, the Commission found that providers of broadband Internetaccess service had multiple incentives to limit Internet openness. The Order concluded that the threat ofbroadband provider interference with Internet openness would be exacerbated by'--but did not dependon'--such providers possessing market power over potential subscribers in their choice of broadbandprovider. However, the Commission found that most residential customers have only one or two optionsfor wireline broadband Internet access service, increasing the risk of market power, and found the futureof mobile Internet access service as a competing substitute remained unclear.95 Moreover, theCommission emphasized that customers may incur significant costs in switching from one provider toanother, thus creating ''terminating monopolies'' for content providers needing high-speed broadbandservice to reach end users.9643.The D.C. Circuit found that the Commission's assessment of broadband providers'incentives and economic ability to threaten Internet openness was not just supported by the record butalso grounded in ''common sense and economic reality.''97 It affirmed the Commission's conclusions thatvertically integrated broadband providers have incentives to interfere with competitive services and thatbroadband providers generally have incentives to accept fees from edge providers.98 And the court citedwith approval the Commission's conclusion that a broadband provider would be unlikely to fully accountfor the harms resulting from such practices.99 The court also upheld the agency's conclusion that suchincentives could ''produce widespread interference with the Internet's openness in the absence ofCommission action.''100 Finally, the court agreed that the Commission need not engage in a market poweranalysis to justify its rules, explaining that broadband providers' ability to block or disadvantage edgeproviders depended on ''end users not being fully responsive to the imposition of such restrictions,'' not93 News Release, Federal Communications Commission, Verizon Wireless to Pay $1.25 Million to SettleInvestigation into Blocking of Consumers' Access to Certain Mobile Broadband Applications (July 31, 2012),http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-315501A1.pdf.94 See David Kravets, AT&T Holding FaceTime Hostage is No Net-Neutrality Breach, Wired.com (Aug. 22, 2012),http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/08/facetime-net-neutrality-flap/; see also Open Internet AdvisoryCommittee, 2013 Annual Report (Aug. 20, 2013), at 39-46, http://transition.fcc.gov/cgb/oiac/oiac-2013-annual-report.pdf (2013 OIAC Annual Report).95 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17923-24, paras. 32-33; Data Foundry et al. Comments at 1-2 (arguing thatISPs are able to leverage market power over transmission facilities into the logically separate Internet accessmarket).96 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17924-25, para. 34.97 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 644 (''The Commission's finding that Internet openness fosters the edge provider innovationthat drives this 'virtuous cycle' was likewise reasonable and grounded in substantial evidence.'').98 Id. at 645-46.99 Id. at 646 (discussing ''negative externalities'' resulting from broadband provider behavior).100 Id. at 649 (internal quotations omitted).16
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on ''the sort of market concentration that would enable them to impose substantial price increases on endusers.''10144.We seek to update the record underlying the Open Internet Order's conclusion thatbroadband providers have incentives and the economic ability to limit Internet openness in ways thatthreaten to weaken or break the virtuous circle. How have changes in the marketplace or technologysince 2010 affected broadband providers incentives and economic ability to engage in such practices? Towhat extent do broadband providers today have economic incentives and mechanisms to block ordisadvantage a particular edge provider or class of edge providers? To what extent do verticallyintegrated providers have particularized incentives to discriminate'--on price, quality, or other bases'--infavor of affiliated products? What are broadband providers' incentives to increase revenues by chargingedge providers for access or prioritized access to the broadband provider's end users? Are there featuresof the Internet ecosystem that facilitate or impede a broadband provider's ability to internalize the harmscaused by practices that limit openness? Are there justifications for charging fees to edge providers thatwere not present in 2010? We seek comment on these and other economic incentives and abilities thatbroadband providers may have to limit openness.10245.We generally seek comment on what economic tools broadband providers utilize tomanage traffic on their networks. Broadband providers may address traffic management throughcommercial terms and conditions on end users, such as pricing for different levels of throughput orthrough the use of ''data caps.'' To what extent and in what ways do broadband providers use such toolsto manage traffic, such as by excluding certain content from such an end user data cap?103 Might thesetools be used to exploit market power or reduce competition?46.In addition, we seek comment on end users' ability to switch providers if a particularbroadband service does not meet their needs. What is the extent of switching costs, and how do switchingcosts affect the incentives and economic ability of providers to limit Internet openness?104 As discussedin the Open Internet Order and affirmed by the D.C. Circuit, both edge providers seeking access to endusers and end users seeking access to edge providers are subject to the gatekeeper effect of a retailbroadband provider.105 Absent multi-homing, an end user has only one option to reach a given edgeprovider's content.106 To reach any given end user, an edge provider must ensure that it or its broadbandprovider can reach the end user's broadband provider. Terms and conditions, price, or lack of otherbroadband providers, among other factors, can raise switching costs to the point where switching isinefficient, infeasible, or even impossible.107 We seek comment on these conclusions. To what extent do101 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 648.102 See, e.g., Public Knowledge and Common Cause Comments 4-7 (stating that data caps limit Internet openness).103 See News Release, AT&T, AT&T Introduces Sponsored Data for Mobile Data Subscribers and Businesses (Jan.6, 2014), http://www.att.com/gen/press-room?pid=25183&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=37366&mapcode; 2013OIAC Annual Report; see also Public Knowledge & Common Cause Comments at 6-9 (arguing that, by creating a''special lane for affiliated content,'' data caps have the potential to negatively impact the open Internet and the longterm growth of the network).104 See Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17921, para. 27; Vonage Comments at 5.105 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17919, para 24. But see AT&T Comments at 17 (''[A]ny broadband accessprovider that prevents innovative new content and applications from using its platform would inflict considerableharm on itself given that most consumers could switch to a different provider that does not engage in such self-defeating behavior.'').106 In this context, we use ''multi-homing'' to refer to a customer that subscribes to more than one Internet serviceprovider, noting the subscriber may be either an end user or an edge provider. See, e.g., Christiaan Hogendorn,Broadband Internet: Net Neutrality versus Open Access 15, Wesleyan University Economics Department (2007),http://chogendorn.web.wesleyan.edu/oa.pdf.107Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17921, para 27.17
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consumers face significant switching costs in choosing to change broadband access providers? Whichservices, if any, are most vulnerable to a broadband provider's market power because of the inability toeffectively reach subscribers through other means? To the extent that such switching costs exist, to whatextent, if any, are they exacerbated by additional factors, such as the difficulty consumers may have ineffectively monitoring the extent to which edge providers have difficulty reaching them, the number ofeffective substitutes a consumer may have among broadband providers, or the impact of bundled pricingand switching costs attached to the purchase or use of bundled services, such as a combined offering ofbroadband access along with video services and voice telephony? Would all likely alternatives havesimilar incentives to limit openness, possibly for a different set of services? We also seek comment on anend user's ability to switch broadband providers in response to specific broadband provider practice, forexample a broadband provider's decision to charge an edge provider to reach the customer. Areswitching costs relevant to an edge provider's interaction with a broadband provider and, if so, how?Finally, what are the implications when consumers have no ability to switch providers because there isonly one provider offering service to the consumer's location?47.We also seek comment on the state of competition in broadband Internet access service,and its effect on providers' incentives to limit openness. We seek comment on the appropriate view ofwhether broadband services with substantially different technical characteristics are competitivesubstitutes. For example, how should we regard the ability of DSL service with speeds of, for example,3 Mbps downstream and 768 kbps upstream to constrain conduct by a provider of high-speed broadbandwith speeds of, for example, 25 Mbps downstream and 3 Mbps upstream (or higher)? How should weregard the geography of broadband competition? From an end user's point of view, do national practicesor market shares have any impact on edge providers, without regard to the definition of a geographicmarket?48.In the fixed broadband context, we have seen evidence of limited choice betweenbroadband providers in many areas of the country. As the speed threshold increases to 6 Mbpsdownstream and 1.5 Mbps upstream, the number of households that are located in census tracts with atleast three providers that report serving customers at those higher speeds dips down to a mere34 percent.108 In many areas of the country, with respect to fixed Internet access, consumers may haveonly limited options, i.e., one or two fixed providers available.109 We seek comment on the extent towhich commercial practices differ in places where consumers have only one choice of a wirelinebroadband provider, two choices, or more than two choices. We therefore also seek comment as towhether increased spectrum availability and technological developments in the mobile broadbandmarketplace, e.g., growth in 4G/ LTE availability, would affect the market power of fixed broadbandproviders. 11049.We further seek general comment on our approach towards analyzing broadband providerincentives. Under the Commission's reading, which the court upheld, our section 706 authority is not108 Industry Analysis and Technology Division, Federal Communications Commission, Internet Access Services:Status as of December 31, 2012 62, Map 4 (2013), http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2013/db1224/DOC-324884A1.pdf (Internet Access Services Report). The map shows the number of providers offixed connections by census tract but does not necessarily reflect the number of choices available to a particularhousehold nor does it measure competition.109 NTIA and Federal Communications Commission, National Broadband Map, www.broadbandmap.gov (lastvisited Apr. 8, 2014).110 Within the mobile sector, providers are in the process of deploying 4G/LTE networks. LTE subscribers havegrown from 215,000 at year end 2010 to almost 100 million by 2013. LTE subscribers in the U.S. are expected togrow to almost 200 million by year end 2016. The number of 4G-connected LTE devices in the U.S. marketincreased 158% since 2012. Sixteenth Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respectto Mobile Wireless, Including Commercial Mobile Services, WT Docket No. 11-186, Report, 28 FCC Rcd 3700,3857, para. 248 (2013).18
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predicated on a finding of market power, specifically, that broadband providers need not be found to be''benefiting from the sort of market concentration that would enable them to impose substantial priceincreases on end users.''111 Nor do we believe that the open Internet concerns described above solelyarise in markets where broadband providers possess market power over subscriber prices. We recognize,however, that the presence or absence of market power'--over broadband subscriptions, over end usersonce they have chosen a broadband provider, and over content providers who wish to reach those endusers'--may inform an understanding of a broadband provider's behavior in the Internet marketplace andits incentives to engage in practices that limit Internet openness. Thus, we seek comment on whether theCommission should engage in a market power analysis with respect to broadband providers and, if so,how we should go about that analysis.50.We further seek comment on whether there are other economic theories that theCommission should consider to better understand and assess broadband providers' incentives to engage inpractices that affect the Internet's openness. For example, do broadband providers have an incentive toextract rents from upstream services whose price significantly exceeds the marginal cost of deliveringthose services to an additional customer? Are there positive network effects from widespread adoption ofbroadband services by consumers that we should recognize?112 Do edge providers that incur significantsunk costs in the delivery of their output face ''lock-in'' problems if they become dependent on aparticular pathway to their current or potential users? In the absence of open Internet protections, wouldthose edge providers face uncertainty that would hamper their ability to attract capital? Does the trendtowards the caching of content closer to end users either increase such lock-in problems or, separately,limit the number of pathways by which an edge provider's output can effectively reach current orpotential end users? We seek comment on whether and how other theories and new evidence maysupplement or supplant the original Open Internet Order analysis.b.Technical Ability
51.The Open Internet Order likewise found that broadband providers have the technicalability to limit Internet openness. As the Order explained, increasingly sophisticated networkmanagement tools enable providers to identify and differentiate the treatment of traffic on their ownbroadband Internet access service networks.113 The D.C. Circuit agreed, finding ''little dispute thatbroadband providers have the technological ability to distinguish between and discriminate against certaintypes of Internet traffic.''114 We seek comment on this general conclusion and on how this ability toimpose restrictions on edge providers and end users has increased or decreased with further developmentsin technology or business practices since the Open Internet Order. We also seek comment on providerabilities that were not identified in the Open Internet Order or elsewhere in this Notice, including111 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 648.112 One such model is ''Metcalfe's law'' a rough empirical description of the value of a communications network,where n is the number of users in a network, the total value of the network is equivalent to n(n-1) or roughly n2 whenn is large. Carl Shapiro, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy 184 (1999). The preciseequation has been called into question, see Bob Briscoe et al., Metcalfe's Law is Wrong, IEEE Spectrum 26-31(2006) (proposing a valuation equation of n log(n)), and we do not rely on the precise mathematical formulation ofthe effects that it predicts.113 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17923, para. 31. We recognize that broadband providers also have theability to impact traffic and congestion in ways that go beyond the management of traffic within their networks. Inparticular, we understand that broadband providers also manage traffic in the context of their relationships withother autonomous networks. For example, traffic and congestion may be affected by interconnection arrangementsfor the exchange of Internet traffic between two networks as well as CDN-type arrangements in which third partiesplace equipment in or adjacent to the providers' network. As discussed in section III.B, the rules we propose todayreflect the scope of the 2010 Open Internet Order, which applied to broadband provider conduct within its ownnetwork.114 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 646.19
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identifying the particular ability and its relevance to this proceeding. For example, one commenter hasexpressed concern about broadband providers offering prioritized service in a manner that may harm ruralor minority end users.115 Is it technically feasible for a broadband provider to block or degrade based onthe location or neighborhood of the end user? Is it likely that it would do so? If so, how should our rulesaddress this concern?52.We seek comment on broadband providers' ability to limit Internet openness throughmanagement of traffic on their own networks and limitations imposed on their end users. Providersgenerally have the ability to manage traffic and congestion on their own networks and have developed anumber of techniques to do so. 116 For example, a provider can use technical methods like packetclassification, admission control and resource reservation, rate control and traffic shaping, as well aspacket dropping and packet scheduling to identify and manage traffic on its network.117 Such techniquesmay provide additional ability to discriminate in a way that is largely opaque to edge providers and endusers.118 We seek comment on the technical tools broadband providers can and do use to manage trafficon their networks.53.The Open Internet Order found that providers had in fact used their ability to limitopenness, citing several instances where broadband providers had been subject to Commissionenforcement proceedings for violating open Internet norms.119 In the Order, the Commission cited theMadison River case, the Comcast-BitTorrent case, as well as various mobile wireless Internet providers'refusal to allow customers to use competitive payment applications, competitive voice applications, andremote video applications.120 The Commission also noted other allegations of blocking or degradingpeer-to-peer traffic, but did not determine whether those specific practices violated open Internetprinciples.121 The D.C. Circuit noted these examples along with the Commission's as persuasivejustification for adopting open Internet rules.122115 See Letter from Harold Feld, Senior Vice President, Public Knowledge, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FederalCommunications Commission, GN Docket No. 14-28, at 4-5 (filed May 2, 2014).116 Broadband Internet Technical Advisory Group Technical Working Group, Real time Network Management ofInternet Congestion (2013), http://www.bitag.org/documents/BITAG_-_Congestion_Management_Report.pdf(BITAG Network Management Report). In addition to technical tools described here, as described above,broadband providers can also employ economic tools to discriminate with respect to traffic on their networks. Seesupra Section III.A.2.117 See BITAG Network Management Report at 20-28. In mobile broadband networks, service providers usingVoice over LTE (VoLTE) technology may use the quality of service (QoS) feature of the IP multimedia subsystem(IMS) to deliver VoLTE traffic with higher priority than other types of traffic sharing the same LTE channel.Indeed, one essential requirement for high quality VoLTE deployment is ensuring the delivery of low latency voicetraffic within the provider's LTE network, which would require traffic discrimination using the QoS feature of theIMS. See Lennart Norell, Eric Parsons, & Per Synnergren, Telephony Services Over LTE End-to-End 36, EricssonReview (2010), http://www.ericsson.com/res/thecompany/docs/publications/ericsson_review/2010/lte_e2e.pdf;Spirent White Paper, VoLTE Deployment and the Radio Access Network The LTE User Equipment Perspective 3-5(Aug. 2012), http://www.spirent.com/~/media/White%20Papers/Mobile/VoLTE_Deployment_and_the_Radio_Access_Network.pdf.118 We note that other forms of discrimination in the Internet ecosystem may exist, but such conduct is beyond thescope of this proceeding. See AAF Comments at 2 (suggesting that edge providers may have the incentive andability to engage in discriminatory conduct).119 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17925-27, paras. 35-37.120 Id. at 17925, para 35 & n.107.121 Id. at 17926, para. 36.122 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 648-49 (''[T]hese incidents . . . buttressed the agency's conclusion that broadband providers'incentives and ability to restrict Internet traffic could produce '[w]idespread interference with the Internet's(continued'...)20
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B.
Scope of the Rules
54.The rules adopted in the Open Internet Order applied to ''broadband Internet accessservice,'' which was defined as:A mass-market retail service by wire or radio that provides the capability to transmit datato and receive data from all or substantially all Internet endpoints, including anycapabilities that are incidental to and enable the operation of the communications service,but excluding dial-up Internet access service. This term also encompasses any servicethat the Commission finds to be providing a functional equivalent of the servicedescribed in the previous sentence, or that is used to evade the protections set forth in thisPart.123The Order defined ''mass market'' to mean a service marketed and sold on a standardized basis toresidential customers, small businesses, and other end-user customers such as schools and libraries,including services purchased with support of the E-rate program.12455.The Verizon decision upheld the Commission's regulation of broadband Internet accessservice pursuant to section 706 and did not disturb this aspect of the Open Internet Order. Thus, thedefinition of ''broadband Internet access service'' remains a part of the Commission's regulations. Wetentatively conclude that we should retain this definition without modification. We seek comment on thatconclusion. The court in Verizon also stated that, apart from the service provided to end users,''broadband providers furnish a service to edge providers, thus undoubtedly functioning as edgeproviders' 'carriers.'''125 We seek comment on whether this should be identified as a separate service and,if so, how we should define that service and what the regulatory consequences are, if any, of thatdefinition.56.We also seek comment on the following issues that arise in connection with the scope ofthe application of the rules we propose today.57.Specifically Identified Services. The Open Internet Order excluded certain categories ofservices from the definition of broadband Internet access service, such as dial-up Internet access service126and multichannel video programming, the latter of which the Commission understood not to meet thedefinition of ''provid[ing] the capability to transmit data to and receive data from all or substantially allInternet endpoints.''127 We tentatively conclude that we would maintain this approach, but seek commenton whether we should change this conclusion.58.Enterprise Services. The Open Internet Order excluded enterprise service offerings,which are typically offered to larger organizations through customized or individually negotiatedarrangements.128 Similarly, the Open Internet Order excluded virtual private network services, hosting,or data storage services. The Commission explained that such services ''typically are not mass marketservices and/or do not provide the capability to transmit data to and receive data from all or substantially(Continued from previous page)openness' in the absence of Commission action. Such a 'problem' is doubtless 'industry-wide.''') (internal citationsomitted).123 47 C.F.R. § 8.11(a); Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17932, para. 44; id. at 17935, para. 51 (finding that themarket and regulatory landscape for dial-up Internet access service differed from broadband Internet access service).124 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17932, para. 45.125 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 653.126 47 C.F.R. § 8.11(a); Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17932, para. 44.127 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17933, para. 47.128 Id. at 17932, para. 45.21Federal Communications Commission
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all Internet endpoints.''129 The Open Internet Order also established that the rules did not apply to:(1) edge provider activities, such as the provision of content on the Internet;130 and (2) premise operators,entities like coffee shops or bookstores, which offer Internet access services to their patrons.131 Wetentatively conclude that we would maintain this approach, but seek comment on whether we shouldchange this conclusion.59.Internet Traffic Exchange. The Open Internet Order explained that its rules did not applybeyond ''the limits of a broadband provider's control over the transmission of data to or from itsbroadband customers.''132 In other words, the Order applied to a broadband provider's use of its ownnetwork but did not apply the no-blocking or unreasonable discrimination rules to the exchange of trafficbetween networks, whether peering, paid peering, content delivery network (CDN) connection, or anyother form of inter-network transmission of data, as well as provider-owned facilities that are dedicatedsolely to such interconnection. Thus, the Order noted that the rules were not intended ''to affect existingarrangements for network interconnection, including existing paid peering arrangements.''133 Wetentatively conclude that we should maintain this approach, but seek comment on whether we shouldchange our conclusion. Some commenters have suggested that we should expand the scope of the openInternet rules to cover issues related to traffic exchange.134 We seek comment on these suggestions. Forexample, how can we ensure that a broadband provider would not be able to evade our open Internet rulesby engaging in traffic exchange practices that would be outside the scope of the rules as proposed?60.Specialized Services. In the Open Internet Order, the Commission recognized thatbroadband providers may offer ''specialized services'' over the same last-mile connections used to providebroadband service. The Commission stated that these services can benefit end users and spur investment,but also noted the potential for specialized services to jeopardize the open Internet.135 Due to theseconcerns, the Commission stated that it would monitor these services, but that its rules would ''notprevent broadband providers from offering specialized services such as facilities-based VoIP.''136 Wetentatively conclude that we should maintain this approach and continue to closely monitor thedevelopment of specialized services to ensure that broadband providers are not using them to bypass theopen Internet rules or otherwise undermine a free and open Internet. We seek comment on this tentativeconclusion. How can we ensure that the specialized services exception is not used to circumvent our openInternet rules? In addition, should specialized services be addressed within the scope of the''commercially reasonable'' rule either as a safe harbor or among the factors for consideration?137 Shouldthe Commission define ''specialized services''?138129 We also note that our rules apply only as far as the limits of a broadband provider's control over the transmissionof data to or from its broadband customers.130 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17934-35, para. 50.131 Id. at 17935-36, para. 52.132 Id. at 17933, para. 47 n.150.133 Id. at 17944, para. 67 n.209.134 See, e.g., Level 3 Comments at 11-13; Cogent Comments at 31-33.135 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17909, 17965-66, paras. 7, 112-14.136 Id. at 17922-23, 17965-66, paras. 39, 112-14.137 See infra para. 139.138 The Open Internet Order did not formally define ''specialized services,'' but described them as ''services thatshare capacity with broadband Internet access service over providers' last-mile facilities.'' Open Internet Order,25 FCC Rcd at 17965, para. 112; cf. 2013 OIAC Annual Report at 66-81 (identifying difficulties with defining''specialized services''). By contrast, the net neutrality rules that the European Parliament voted to adopt in April2014 included a specific definition for ''specialized services'' as ''an electronic communications service optimised(continued'...)22
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61.Reasonable Network Management. Although the Open Internet Order's definition ofbroadband Internet access service did not itself address reasonable network management, the concept wasincorporated into each of the 2010 rules. Specifically, the transparency rule ''does not require publicdisclosure of competitively sensitive information or information that would compromise network securityor undermine the efficacy of reasonable network management practices.''139 The 2010 no-blocking rulewas made expressly subject to ''reasonable network management.''140 And the unreasonablediscrimination rule expressly provided for reasonable network management, which was defined asfollows: ''A network management practice is reasonable if it is appropriate and tailored to achieving alegitimate network management purpose, taking into account the particular network architecture andtechnology of the broadband Internet access service.''141 The Commission further concluded that it would''develop the scope of reasonable network management on a case-by-case basis.''142 We tentativelyconclude that we should continue the same approach. We seek comment on this conclusion as applied toan enhanced transparency rule, our re-adoption of the no-blocking rule, and the proposal to adopt a''commercially reasonable'' standard. How can we ensure that the ability of providers to engage inreasonable network management is not used to circumvent the open Internet protections implemented byour proposed rules?62.Mobile Services. The Open Internet Order also adopted definitions for ''fixed'' and''mobile'' Internet access service. It defined ''fixed broadband Internet access service'' to expresslyinclude ''broadband Internet access service that serves end users primarily at fixed endpoints usingstationary equipment, . . . fixed wireless services (including fixed unlicensed wireless services), and fixedsatellite services.''143 It defined ''mobile broadband Internet access service'' as ''a broadband Internetaccess service that serves end users primarily using mobile stations.''144 The impact of this distinctionvaried by rule. The transparency rule applies equally to both fixed and mobile broadband Internet accessservice. The no-blocking rule applied a different standard to mobile broadband Internet accessservices,145 and mobile Internet access service was excluded from the unreasonable discrimination rule.We tentatively conclude that we should maintain the same approach in today's Notice. We seek commenton this approach, which is discussed in more detail in the context of each of the proposed rules below.We recognize that there have been significant changes since 2010 in the mobile marketplace, includinghow mobile providers manage their networks, the increased use of Wi-Fi, and the increased use of mobiledevices and applications. We seek comment on whether and, if so, how these changes should lead us torevisit our treatment of mobile broadband service. Specifically, we seek comment below on whether the(Continued from previous page)for specific content, applications or services, or a combination thereof, provided over logically distinct capacity,relying on strict admission control, offering functionality requiring enhanced quality from end to end, and that is notmarketed or usable as a substitute for internet access service.'' Proposal for a Regulation of the European SingleMarket for Electronic Communications, at 242, COM (2013) 627 final (Mar. 26, 2014),http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+AMD+A7-2014-0190+237-244+DOC+PDF+V0//EN; David Meyer, European Parliament Passes Strong Net Neutrality Law, Along with MajorRoaming Reforms, Gigaom.com (Apr. 3, 2014), https://gigaom.com/2014/04/03/european-parliament-passes-strong-net-neutrality-law-along-with-major-roaming-reforms/.139 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17937-38, para. 55.140 47 C.F.R. § 8.5.141 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17952, para. 82; 47 C.F.R. § 8.11(d).142 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17952, para. 83.143 47 C.F.R. § 8.11(b).144 47 C.F.R. § 8.11 (c).145 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17959-61, paras. 99-103.23Federal Communications Commission
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no-blocking rule should continue to distinguish between fixed and mobile broadband146 and whether,under the commercially reasonable rule, mobile networks should be subject to the same totality-of-the-circumstances test as fixed broadband.147 In addition, how should the definitions of ''fixed'' and ''mobile''services be applied to a fixed broadband provider's commercially deployed Wi-Fi service that is madeavailable to the provider's fixed broadband customers? How should such changes affect our treatment ofreasonable network management for mobile providers? Similarly, how should we treat mobile servicesthat are deployed and/or marketed as express substitutes for traditional telecommunications or broadbandservices? Finally, have there been changes in technology or the marketplace for the provision of satellitebroadband Internet access service that should lead the Commission to reassess how its rules should applyto such services?C.
Transparency Requirements to Protect and Promote Internet Openness
1.The 2010 Transparency Rule
63.In the Open Internet Order, the Commission concluded that effective disclosure ofbroadband providers' network management practices, performance, and commercial terms of servicepromotes competition, innovation, investment, end-user choice, and broadband adoption.148 To that end,the Commission adopted the following transparency rule:A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service shall publiclydisclose accurate information regarding the network management practices, performance,and commercial terms of its broadband Internet access services sufficient for consumersto make informed choices regarding the use of such services and for content, application,service, and device providers to develop, market, and maintain Internet offerings.14964.The Commission determined that the best approach to implementing the transparencyrule was to allow broadband providers flexibility, while providing guidance concerning effectivedisclosure.150 The Commission stated that ''effective disclosures will likely include'' informationconcerning ''some or all'' of the following topics: (1) network practices, including congestionmanagement, application-specific behavior, device attachment rules, and security measures;(2) performance characteristics, including a general description of system performance (such as speed andlatency) and the effects of specialized services on available capacity; and (3) commercial terms, includingpricing, privacy policies, and redress options.151 In 2011, the Commission's Enforcement Bureau andOffice of General Counsel issued advisory guidance to further clarify compliance with the transparencyrequirements regarding point-of-sale disclosures, service descriptions, security measures, and the extent146 See infra Section III.D.4.147 See infra Section III.E.4.148 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17936, para. 53.149 Id. at 17937, para. 54.150 Id. at 17938-40, paras. 55-57. In so doing, the Commission stated that broadband providers must, at a minimum,prominently display or provide links to disclosures on a publicly available, easily accessible website that is availableto current and prospective end users and edge providers as well as the Commission, and must disclose relevantinformation at the point of sale. Id. In addition, the Commission clarified that the transparency rule did not requirepublic disclosure of competitively sensitive information or information that would compromise network security orundermine the efficacy of reasonable network management practices. Id.151 Id. at 17938-39, para. 56 (noting that this list is not necessarily exhaustive).24
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of required disclosures, while noting that ''these particular methods of compliance are not required orexclusive; broadband providers may comply with the transparency rule in other ways.''15265.The D.C. Circuit's decision in Verizon v. FCC upheld the transparency rule, whichremains in full force, applicable to both fixed and mobile providers.153 In today's Notice, we inquire as toways that the transparency rule can be improved, taking into account changes in the nature of theprovision of broadband services since 2010. We believe we have ample authority not only for ourexisting transparency rule, but also for the enhanced transparency rule we propose today, whether theCommission ultimately relies on section 706, Title II, or another source of legal authority. We seekcomment on whether and how'--if at all'--the source of the Commission's legal authority relied upon toadopt other open Internet rules would affect the authority or authorities that provide the strongest basis forany improvements to the transparency rule or otherwise would inform how we define the goal oftransparency in general.1542.Enhancing Transparency to Protect and Promote Internet Openness
66.''Sunlight,'' as Justice Brandeis has explained, ''is . . . the best of disinfectants.''155 Ifdesigned correctly, disclosure policies are among the most effective and least intrusive regulatorymeasures at the Commission's disposal.156 Applied here, the Commission continues to believe that accessto accurate information about broadband provider practices encourages the competition, innovation, andhigh-quality services that drive consumer demand and broadband investment and deployment.157 Thetransparency rule thereby reflects the ''virtuous circle'' that, in the long term, unites the interests of end152 See FCC Enforcement Bureau and Office of General Counsel Issue Advisory Guidance for Compliance withOpen Internet Transparency Rule, GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52, Public Notice, 26 FCC 9411(2011) (Transparency Compliance PN).153 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 659 (affirming the transparency rule).154 See infra Section III.F.155 L. Brandeis, Other People's Money, Chapter 5 (National Home Library Foundation ed. 1933), available athttp://www.law.louisville.edu/library/collections/brandeis/node/196.156 See, e.g., Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven C. Salop, The Efficient Regulation of ConsumerInformation, 24 J. L. & Econ. 491 at 513 (1981); Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven C. Salop, InformationRemedies for Consumer Protection, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 410 at 411 (Papers & Proceedings, May 1981); AlissaCooper, How Regulation and Competition Influence Discrimination in Broadband Traffic Management: AComparative Study of Net Neutrality in the United States and United Kingdom 47 (Sept. 2013),http://www.alissacooper.com/phd-thesis/ (''A policy of requiring ISPs to publicly disclose the details of their trafficmanagement practices, whether combined with additional regulation or not, has enjoyed widespread support.'')(Cooper Thesis); see also Letter from Kathleen Grillo, Senior Vice President, Federal Regulatory Affairs, Verizon,to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, GN Docket Nos. 12-269, 14-28, at 1 (filedMar. 24, 2014) (arguing that ''the Commission should rely primarily on consumer choice, competition, andtransparency to guide Commission policy'') (emphasis added).157 See, e.g., Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Enhancing Competition inTelecommunications: Protecting and Empowering Consumers 4, Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry,Committee for Information, Computer and Communications Policy (2008),http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/2/40679279.pdf (stating that informed consumers ''are necessary to stimulatefirms to innovate, improve quality and compete in terms of price. In making well-informed choices betweensuppliers, consumers not only benefit from competition, but they initiate and sustain it.''); see also Open MICComments at 4 (asserting that ''the marketplace will function properly only if there is honest and full disclosure ofall corporate policies and practices regarding network management practices''); CompTIA Comments at 3 (statingthat ''the transparency rule is vitally important today, and will play an even more significant role in a world in whichISPs and edge providers have flexibility to bargain with one another''); Consumer Federation of America Commentsat 3 (suggesting that the Commission ''maximize the power of transparency under Section 706 to promotecompetition and provide consumer protection'').25
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users, edge providers, and the broader Internet community. As the Commission explained in the OpenInternet Order, disclosures under the rule: (1) help end users make informed choices regarding thepurchase and use of broadband services and increase end users' confidence in broadband providers'practices; (2) ensure that edge providers have access to broadband providers' network informationnecessary to develop innovative new applications and services; and (3) inform the Internet communityand the Commission about broadband providers' practices and conduct that could impact Internetopenness.158 In today's Notice, we seek comment on the effectiveness of the existing transparency ruleand on whether and, if so, how the rule should be enhanced to meet its goals with respect to end users,edge providers, the Internet community, and the Commission.67.Today, we seek general comment on how well the Commission's existing transparencyrule is working. We are especially interested in comments that describe the current operation, benefits,and shortcomings of the existing rule, how broadband providers are complying with it, and how weshould measure such compliance.159 We are also mindful that the additional rules we propose today toprotect Internet openness consistent with the D.C. Circuit's decision may place even greater importanceon the extent to which information about broadband providers' practices is disclosed to end users, edgeproviders, and the Commission. Taking all of that into account, we tentatively conclude that we shouldenhance the transparency rule to improve its effectiveness for end users, edge providers, the Internetcommunity, and the Commission. We seek comment on this tentative conclusion and on what burdens orcompliance issues may be associated with this approach, including for smaller providers.68.Tailored disclosures. In the Open Internet Order, the Commission stated that broadbandproviders may be able to satisfy the transparency rule through use of a single disclosure, and therefore didnot require different types of disclosures to different parties such as individual end users, edge providers,the broader Internet community, and the Commission.160 We have concerns that a single disclosure maynot provide the required disclosures in a manner that adequately satisfies the informational needs of allaffected parties. For example, some recent research suggests that consumers have difficultyunderstanding commonly used terms associated with the provision of broadband services.161 Edgeproviders, however, may benefit from descriptions that are more technically detailed.162 We thereforetentatively conclude that it would be more effective to require broadband providers to more specificallytailor disclosures to the needs of these affected parties. We seek comment on this tentative conclusion, onthe nature of the disclosures that should be tailored, and on what burdens or compliance issues, if any,may be associated with more targeted disclosures.a.Transparency to End Users
69.Since the Commission adopted the transparency rule, we have received hundreds ofcomplaints from consumers suggesting that, under the rule, broadband providers may not be providingend user consumers the accurate information they need and have a right to receive.163 Of particular158 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17936-37, para. 53.159 We note that an informal review of broadband provider disclosures conducted by Commission staff found thatthe majority are providing some form of disclosure statements, but that many do not appear to provide all theinformation the rule was designed to disclose.160 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17940, para. 58.161 Cooper Thesis at 186-88 (citing a study which found that consumers do not understand basic terminology such as''traffic management''); see also 2013 OIAC Annual Report at 82-88 (noting studies that indicate consumers areconfused when choosing service providers).162 See, e.g., Cogent Comments at 17 (asserting that ''the information provided to date by many broadband providershas been of limited or no utility to end users or edge providers'').163 Our analysis of consumer complaints received since the transparency rule took effect shows a significant numberof consumer complaints about provider speeds, charges, and other commercial practices that the rule was designed(continued'...)26
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concern to many consumers is that the speed of their service falls short of the advertised speed.164 Manyconsumers complain that they have been charged amounts greater than advertised rates, including feesand charges beyond basic rates.165 We have also received a number of consumer complaints raisingquestions about the source of slow or congested services.166 Consumers have also reported surprise atbroadband providers' statements about slowed or terminated service based on consumers' ''excessiveuse.'' Other consumers report confusion about how data consumption is calculated for purposes of datacaps.16770.We seek comment on the extent to which the existing transparency rule is effectivelyinforming end users. We are interested both in what information broadband providers are disclosing toend users and how that information is being disclosed. In addition, we seek comment on the incentivesand ability of broadband providers to provide service at lower quality or higher prices than theirsubscribers expected when they enrolled, and on the incentives and ability of subscribers to choose otheroptions if their broadband providers fail to live up to these expectations. If a subscriber is locked in to aparticular provider, how can transparency rules bring the performance of that provider up to thesubscriber's expectations?71.In light of the consumer complaints discussed above, we also consider enhancements tothe existing rule with respect to the content, form, and method of broadband providers' disclosures to endusers.72.Content and Form of Disclosure. We seek comment on whether there are ways to makethe content and format of disclosures more accessible and understandable to end users. With respect tocontent, should the Commission require the disclosure of specific broadband provider network practices,performance characteristics (e.g., effective download speeds, upload speeds, latency, and packet loss),and/or terms and conditions of service to end users (e.g., data caps)? We are particularly interested inwhether there are network practices, performance characteristics, or commercial terms relating tobroadband service that are particularly essential but not easily discoverable by end users absent effectivedisclosure. With respect to format, both academic research and the Commission's experience withconsumer issues have demonstrated that the manner in which providers display information to consumerscan have as much impact on consumer decisions as the information itself.168 We therefore seek comment(Continued from previous page)to disclose. Excerpts from some of those complaints are included below. In some cases, however, it is difficult todiscern whether the consumer's frustration is with slow speeds or high prices generally, or instead with how theservice as actually provided differs from what the provider has advertised.164 For example, one consumer stated that he ''was promised 50Mbps of Internet speed. At no time during [his]service [had he] ever had this speed of service and the deceptive claim remains on [the provider's] website and inmarketing materials.''165 One consumer complained that actual bill is ''almost 20%'' higher than advertised price due to fees.166 For example, one consumer stated that ''I was sold Internet access, but I believe bandwidth through to Netflix isbeing artificially restricted. I have checked access to other providers and it is greater than 10X that of Netflix.I have contacted Netflix to verify their function. Their equipment is functioning properly.''167 One consumer complained that the vendor stated the file size as 2.1 megabytes (MB), but the provider counteddownload as 144 MB.168 See generally James M. Lacko & Janis K. Pappalardo, Improving Consumer Mortgage Disclosures: AnEmpirical Assessment of Current and Prototype Disclosure Forms, FTC Bureau of Economics Report (June 2007),http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/06/P025505MortgageDisclosureReport.pdf (stating that quantitative consumer testingshows that the form of mortgage cost disclosure affects consumer understanding of mortgage costs); Sumit Agarwal,John C. Driscoll, Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Learning in the Credit Card Market (Feb. 8, 2008)http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/laibson/files/learning_credit_042413.pdf (stating that consumer knowledge aboutcredit card fee plans, including how to avoid late fees, depreciates rapidly over time); see also Eugenio J. Miravete,(continued'...)27Federal Communications Commission
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on best practices for displaying and formatting relevant disclosures for end users, including any potentialcosts and burdens to broadband providers.169 For example, the Open Internet Advisory Committee(OIAC) has proposed the use of a standardized label for Internet service that includes basic informationsuch as performance speed (i.e., upload and download speed), price (i.e., monthly fee averaged over threeyears), and usage restrictions (i.e., any points at which the applicable terms of service change, includingdata usage caps and any charges, speed reductions, or other penalties for exceeding a cap) that consumerscan use to comparison shop for service.170 Are there lessons we can learn regarding effective disclosurepractices from independent consumer research or disclosure in other approaches to standardized labels?171Should the information be made available in a machine-readable format, such as XML, that might allowthe Commission, industry associations, or other organizations to easily access and synthesize informationfor consumers?73.Network Practices. With respect to data caps, should we require disclosures that permitend users to identify application-specific usage or to distinguish which user or device contributed towhich part of the total data usage? Should we require disclosure of any type of traffic exempted from anydata caps, and how end users can find their current consumption levels? Should we require thatdisclosures explain any restrictions on tethering for mobile devices? Should the Commission expand itstransparency efforts to include measurement of other aspects of service such as packet loss, packetcorruption, latency, and jitter in addition to upstream and downstream speed? Should the Commissionrequire the reporting of actual achieved results for each category? If providers offer different tiers ofservice to their end users, should providers be required to make disclosures by tier? What should be therequired timing of any such disclosures? Is it important that network practices be disclosed in advance oftheir implementation?74.Method of Disclosure. The Transparency Compliance PN advised broadband providersthat they can comply with the point-of-sale disclosure requirement by, for instance, ''directing prospectivecustomers at the point of sale, orally and/or prominently in writing, to a web address at which the requireddisclosures are clearly posted and updated.''172 We seek comment on whether that approach is adequateor whether the Commission should consider alternative approaches.(Continued from previous page)Choosing the Wrong Calling Plan? Ignorance and Learning, 93 Am. Econ. Rev. 297 (2003) (stating that consumersselect rationally among telephone calling plans).169 In 2011, the United Kingdom's largest Internet service providers agreed to a voluntary Code of Practice whichrequires each one to produce a comparable table of traffic management information called a Key Facts Indicator(KFI). See, e.g., Ofcom, Improving Traffic Management Transparency,http://consumers.ofcom.org.uk/2011/11/improving-traffic-management-transparency/ (last visited May 12, 2014).170 See 2013 OIAC Annual Report at 82-88 (containing information about the OIAC Label Study); see also NewAmerica Foundation, Broadband Truth-in-Labeling, Open Technology Initiative (2009),http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/NAF_OTI_Broadband_Truth_in_Labeling-09-2009.pdf.171 For example, the Federal Trade Commission's Energy Guide labeling program requires standard labels on certainappliances that disclose estimated yearly operating cost and energy use. See 16 C.F.R. Part 305. The Federal Food,Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) and the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act are the federal laws governing foodproducts under the Food and Drug Administration's jurisdiction. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1461. The FD&C Act was amended by the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, which requires mostfoods to bear nutrition labeling and requires food labels that bear nutrient content claims and certain health messagesto comply with specific requirements. See 21 U.S.C. § 343-1.172 See Transparency Compliance PN, 26 FCC Rcd at 9413-14 (clarifying that the rule does not compel thedistribution of disclosure materials in hard copy or extensive training of sales employees to provide disclosuresthemselves).28Federal Communications Commission
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b.Transparency to Edge Providers
75.As noted above, the Commission also adopted the transparency rule to ensure thatbroadband providers would disclose sufficient information to permit ''content, application, service, anddevice providers to develop, market, and maintain Internet offerings.''173 Some commenters havesuggested that current disclosures provide insufficient information for edge providers.174 We seekcomment on how the existing transparency rule is working and how we can enhance its effectiveness withrespect to edge providers. Should we view some categories of edge providers, such as start-upcompanies, as having distinct needs and, if so, what would be the implications for an enhancedtransparency rule?76.We also seek comment on the extent to which the transparency rule does, or should,disclose useful information to providers who seek to exchange traffic with broadband provider networks.In other words, should we view transit, CDN, or other providers engaged in Internet traffic exchange as aclass of persons whose interests are similar to those of edge providers who wish ''to develop, market, andmaintain Internet offerings,'' perhaps because they may have such edge providers as their customers? Forinstance, many edge providers utilize the services of an intermediary CDN, such as Akamai, EdgeCast,Limelight, or Level 3, or cloud service providers such as Amazon, Microsoft, or RackSpace, whichprovide the servers upon which the applications run and also interconnect directly with broadbandproviders. Other edge providers bypass these networks and interconnect directly with broadbandproviders through peering arrangements. Some edge providers, such as Google or Amazon, may act bothas content providers for their own services and as CDNs or cloud service providers for other services. Weseek comment on whether these subgroups have distinguishable needs for information that could beprovided through disclosure and, if so, what kind of information would be most useful.c.Transparency to the Internet Community and the Commission
77.The Common Interests of End Users, Edge Providers, and the Broader InternetCommunity. We seek comment on the extent to which the existing transparency rule fully reflects the''virtuous circle'' that, in the long term, unites the interests of end users, edge providers, the broaderInternet community, and the Commission. Are there ways to enhance the transparency rule to furtherfacilitate the virtuous circle? What other disclosures might encourage and improve the deployment ofbroadband in the United States?78.We also seek comment'--relevant to all stakeholders'--on whether and, if so, how theCommission should enhance the existing transparency rule to ensure the effectiveness of, and compliancewith, the other rules we propose in today's Notice. For example, to ensure the effectiveness of the no-blocking rule proposed below, should the Commission mandate that broadband providers disclose'--in amore rigorous and consistent way'--the expected performance end users can expect from their broadbandservice?175 To improve information about broadband provider practices for end users, edge providers,and the broader Internet community, we tentatively conclude that broadband providers must disclose in atimely manner to consumers, edge providers, and the public (and, of course, the Commission) when theymake changes to their network practices as well as any instances of blocking, throttling, and pay-for-priority arrangements, or the parameters of default or ''best effort'' service as distinct from any priorityservice.79.Measuring Broadband Performance. The Open Internet Order requires broadbandproviders to disclose accurate information regarding network performance for each broadband servicethey provide.176 The accuracy and availability of such network performance information is a common173 47 C.F.R. § 8.3.174 See, e.g., Cogent Comments at 10-23; Open MIC Comments at 4.175 See infra Section III.D.3.176 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17937-39, paras. 54, 56.29
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linchpin for end users, edge providers, and all stakeholders in the Internet community. As noted in theOrder, the Commission launched a broadband performance measurement project called ''MeasuringBroadband America'' (MBA) to accurately measure key performance metrics, including baselineconnection speed and latency.177 To satisfy their obligations under the transparency rule, all of the12 largest fixed broadband providers chose to participate in the measurement program.178 Last year theCommission expanded its MBA program to include mobile broadband by releasing a Mobile BroadbandSpeed Test App, an open-source, crowdsourcing program to assess mobile broadband networkperformance nationwide.179 The app measures mobile broadband and Wi-Fi network performance anddelivers to consumers an in-depth view of key metrics related to their mobile broadband experience. Weseek comment on the effectiveness of this approach for providing consumers with useful informationregarding the performance of both fixed and mobile broadband networks. We seek comment on whetherparticipation in MBA should continue to satisfy the requirement that actual speeds be disclosed.180 Arethere areas of this program that can be improved to provide more useful information to consumers?18180.More generally, are there more efficient or more comprehensive ways to measurenetwork performance metrics, including for broadband providers not participating in MBA? Forexample, could the ability to measure and report network performance be included in the end user's ownnetwork modem or residential gateway? Do such functionalities currently exist, or are they indevelopment?182 Are there academic or other external research organizations that could assist theCommission in collecting and analyzing information about traffic, congestion, and other features of theInternet?183 Should the Commission mandate the use of monitoring devices, like those used in MBA?How can performance metrics most accurately measure the actual download and upload speeds aconsumer can expect to experience, rather than ''up to'' speeds or ''last-mile'' performance? Should theCommission look to an external advisory group to aid in the development and feasibility of performancemetrics and measurement?81.Congestion. The Open Internet Order highlighted the value of providing end users withinformation about the sources of congestion that might impair the performance of edge-providerservices.184 As the Open Internet Order explained, ''it is often difficult for end users to determine thecauses of slow or poor performance of content, applications, services or devices.''185 At the same time,the Commission recognized that ''congestion management may be a legitimate network management177 Id. at 17940, para. 58 n.188.178 See, e.g., Transparency Compliance PN, 26 FCC Rcd at 9414.179 See News Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Unveils Mobile Broadband Speed Test App toEmpower Consumers (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-unveils-mobile-broadband-speed-test-app-empower-consumers.180 See Office of Engineering and Technology & Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau, FederalCommunications Commission, Measuring Broadband America, http://www.fcc.gov/measuring-broadband-america(last visited May 12, 2014).181 See, e.g., Cogent Comments at 10-17 (suggesting a number ways to improve the MBA program including morelocalized data, more frequent release of ''unaudited'' data, and tests that would allow for comparison of traffic thatoriginates outside a provider's network to that which originates within the network).182 For example, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has started a related standards effort. See InternetEngineering Task Force, Large-Scale Measurement of Broadband Performance,https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/lmap/charter/ (last visited May 12, 2014).183 See, e.g., The Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis, Home, http://www.caida.org/home/ (lastvisited May 12, 2014).184 See Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17938-39, 17944, paras. 56, 70.185 Id. at 17944, para. 70.30
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purpose.''186 But the Commission also emphasized the importance of the disclosure to end users of''descriptions of congestion management practices'' including ''indicators of congestion'' and ''the typicalfrequency of congestion.''18782.Since the 2010 Open Internet Order, some have suggested that sources of congestion thatimpact end users may originate beyond the broadband provider's network or in the exchange of trafficbetween that network and others. An end user's inability to ascertain the source of congestion could leadto confusion, for example, to the filing of an unjustified complaint against a broadband provider (if thesource of the congestion were elsewhere) or a mistaken decision by the end user to purchase additionalbandwidth to improve performance (again, if the source of congestion were elsewhere). Edge providersand other stakeholders also have expressed a need for greater information about network congestion.18883.In light of these concerns, we tentatively conclude that we should require that broadbandproviders disclose meaningful information regarding the source, location, timing, speed, packet loss, andduration of network congestion. We seek comment on this tentative conclusion, including on how toimplement it in a practical manner that provides meaningful information to end users, edge providers, andother stakeholders without causing undue burden on broadband providers. For example, should theinformation to be disclosed be based upon a sampling taken at given points in time, and if so, what wouldbe an appropriate interval for such sampling? We note that Cogent has made suggestions aboutenhancements to the transparency rule along these lines and proposing specific means of implementation,upon which we seek comment.189 In making the foregoing tentative conclusion and seeking comment onhow to implement it, we emphasize that we are positing that the public would be served by additionalinformation concerning the existence and duration of congestion, regardless of its cause, so that there isgreater understanding of the impact of that congestion on the performance of a broadband provider'snetwork, if any. We do not, however, propose to expand the scope of the open Internet rules in anyfashion to regulate traffic exchange, though, as noted above, we ask for public input on this tentativeconclusion.190d.Transparency for Mobile Broadband
84.The Commission currently applies the same transparency requirement to both fixed andmobile providers, reasoning that end users need a clear understanding of ''network management practices,performance, and commercial terms, regardless of the broadband platform they use to access theInternet.''191 We seek comment on how we should assess the effectiveness of the existing rule in themobile broadband context. For example, most mobile broadband plan offerings have generally had lowerdata usage limits than those offered for fixed broadband services. Accordingly, do mobile broadband186 Id. at 17955, para. 91.187 Id. at 17938, para. 56.188 See, e.g., Cogent Comments at 10-17; Level 3 Comments at 3.188 See Cogent Comments at 10-23.188 See supra Section III.C.2.a.189 See Cogent Comments at 10-23.190 See supra Section III.B.191 See Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17958-59, para. 97. The Order also provided certain clarificationsregarding how this requirement applied to mobile broadband providers, specifying that such providers were required''to disclose their third-party device and application certification procedures, if any; to clearly explain their criteriafor any restrictions on use of their network; and to expeditiously inform device and application providers of anydecisions to deny access to the network or of a failure to approve their particular devices or applications.'' Id. at17959, para. 98.31
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subscribers have an enhanced need to understand, monitor, and more flexibly adjust their mobile datausage needs than the fixed broadband users?85.We seek comment on whether and, if so, how enhancements to the transparency ruleshould apply to mobile broadband network providers. Would the enhanced transparency requirementsdescribed herein, or others, help meet the information needs of mobile broadband device and applicationdevelopers as well as the needs of end users? How can we make sure that the disclosure requirementsdiscussed above are appropriate and effective for mobile broadband in view of the many operationalfactors that may influence performance of mobile broadband networks, including the mobile accesstechnology, the weather, the distance to the serving cell site, the number of users in a cell site, and devicecapability?192 Should the nature of disclosure to customers of wireless networks be different if thewireless service is provided by a network as an explicit substitute for copper-based, traditional service,including voice and DSL?e.Burdens of Enhanced Transparency on Broadband Providers
86.We seek comment on the extent to which adopting enhanced transparency requirementswould create particular burdens in either the fixed or the mobile broadband environment and whether andhow such burdens would affect the pace of innovation, investment, and growth. How can we achieve thepublic benefits of enhanced disclosure requirements without imposing unreasonable burdens on thebroadband providers? Are there ways to minimize the costs and burdens associated with any enhanceddisclosure requirements? Are there ways the Commission or industry associations could reduce any suchburdens, for example through the use of a voluntary industry standardized glossary, or through thecreation of a dashboard that permits easy comparison of the policies, procedures, and prices of variousbroadband providers throughout the country?3.Compliance and Enforcement
87.In the Open Internet Order, the Commission noted that a key objective of thetransparency rule is to enable the Commission to collect information necessary to assess, report, andenforce the open Internet rules.193 As discussed further below, we seek comment on how the Commissioncan best design a process for enforcing the transparency rule that provides certainty, flexibility, andaccess for all affected parties.194 Should the Commission permit individuals to report possiblenoncompliance with our open Internet rules anonymously or take other steps to protect the identity ofindividuals who may be concerned about retaliation for raising concerns? We propose that theconsequences of a failure to comply with our transparency rule should be significant and includemonetary penalties. We seek comment on the most effective methods to ensure ongoing compliance withthe transparency rule. How can we ensure that these disclosure requirements are as effective andeffectively enforced as disclosure requirements in other areas of the law, such as disclosures to theSecurities and Exchange Commission? Should the Commission require broadband providers to certifythat they are in compliance with the required disclosures, particularly if the current flexible approach isamended to require more specific disclosures?195 Should we also require broadband providers to submit192 See Transparency Compliance PN, 26 FCC Rcd at 9415 (recognizing that ''measuring performance can be morechallenging for mobile broadband than for fixed'').193 See Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17937, para. 53.194 See infra Section III.H.195 Cf., e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 64.2009(e) (requiring telecommunications carriers to file an annual certification confirmingthat it has established operating procedures adequate to ensure compliance with the customer proprietary networkinformation (CPNI) rules).32
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reports containing descriptions of current disclosure practices?196 If so, should we modify our existingprocess for protecting the confidentiality of competitively sensitive information?19788.We also seek comment on whether the Commission can better promote transparencythrough its own outreach and reporting mechanisms.198 Should the Commission establish and makepublic a list of those broadband providers that block or otherwise limit certain types of traffic? Should theCommission collect and publish information on pay-for-priority arrangements? In what timeframe shouldthe Commission require providers to report such changes in their traffic management policies to theCommission? We invite comment on the merits of these options, and any other suggestions commentersmay deem relevant, to ensure full compliance with the transparency rule, including identification of anyregulatory burdens this might entail for broadband providers.D.
Preventing Blocking of Lawful Content, Applications, Services, and NonharmfulDevices
89.We believe that, as the Commission found in the Open Internet Order, ''the freedom tosend and receive lawful content and to use and provide applications and services without fear of blockingis essential to the Internet's openness and to competition in adjacent markets such as voicecommunications and video and audio programming.''199 The D.C. Circuit acknowledged the validity ofthis policy rationale for the no-blocking rule adopted in the Open Internet Order, but vacated the rulebecause it found that the Commission had failed to provide a legal rationale under which the prohibitionwould not impermissibly subject broadband providers to common carriage regulation.200 To address theongoing concerns with the harmful effects that blocking of Internet traffic would have on Internetopenness, we propose to adopt the text of the no-blocking rule that the Commission adopted in 2010, witha clarification that it does not preclude broadband providers from negotiating individualized,differentiated arrangements with similarly situated edge providers (subject to the separate commercialreasonableness rule or its equivalent). So long as broadband providers do not degrade lawful content orservice to below a minimum level of access, they would not run afoul of the proposed rule. We also seekcomment below on how to define that minimum level of service. Alternatively, we seek comment onwhether we should adopt a no-blocking rule that does not allow for priority agreements with edgeproviders and how we would do so consistent with sources of legal authority other than section 706,including Title II.20190.It is important to understand the relationship between the proposed no-blocking andcommercial reasonableness rules. Although the proposed no-blocking rule only establishes a minimumlevel of service, and thus allows room for individualized negotiations, the proposed commercialreasonableness rule separately applies to any and all conduct, including by asking whether paidprioritization can be barred outright and by asking whether to bar practices that harm competition,consumers, and the free exercise of speech.196 See, e.g., Open Internet NPRM, 24 FCC Rcd at 13111, para. 128.197 47 C.F.R. § 0.459.198 See, e.g., Open MIC Comments at 4 (suggesting that the Commission require ISPs to make available all theirfilings regarding network management practices including those in legal proceedings and with other federalregulatory agencies).199 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17941-42, para. 62.200 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 658.201 See infra Section III.F. For example, to the extent the Commission relies on Title II, would sections 201(b) and202(a) of the Act compel a different result than provision of a minimum level of service? See 47 U.S.C. § 201(b)(prohibiting unjust or unreasonable ''charges, practices, [or] classifications''); 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (prohibiting''unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regulations, facilities, or services'').33
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1.The 2010 No-Blocking Rule
91.2010 Open Internet Order. In the Open Internet Order, the Commission adopted a no-blocking rule to preserve the openness that was and remains a core expectation of end users.202 The OpenInternet Order noted that a no-blocking principle had been broadly accepted since its inclusion in theCommission's 2005 Internet Policy Statement,203 and the Internet Policy Statement itself reflectedexpectations and practices of how the Internet should and did work.204 A more limited variation of therule applied to mobile broadband providers, due to the operational constraints that affect mobilebroadband services, the rapidly evolving nature of the mobile broadband technologies, and the generallygreater amount of consumer choice for mobile broadband services than for fixed.20592.D.C. Circuit Opinion in Verizon v. FCC. The D.C. Circuit struck down the no-blockingrule after finding that the Commission had failed to provide a legal justification that would take the ruleout of the realm of impermissible common carriage.206 The court stated that it was ''somewhat less clear''whether the no-blocking rule constituted per se common carriage regulation than whether theantidiscrimination rule did.207 Nonetheless, the court concluded that the no-blocking rule, at least asdescribed in the Open Internet Order, required broadband providers to serve edge providersindiscriminately.208 The no-blocking rule thereby imposed per se common carriage rules and thusviolated the Communications Act's prohibition on the imposition of common carrier obligations onproviders of information services.20993.The court intimated that the no-blocking rule could pass scrutiny, however, if broadbandproviders could engage in individualized bargaining while subject to the rule. The court reasoned that ''ifthe relevant service that broadband providers furnish is access to their subscribers generally, as opposedto access to their subscribers at the specific minimum speed necessary to satisfy the anti-blocking rules,then these rules, while perhaps establishing a lower limit on the forms that broadband providers'arrangements with edge providers could take, might nonetheless leave sufficient 'room for individualizedbargaining and discrimination in terms' so as not to run afoul of the statutory prohibitions of commoncarrier treatment.''210 Such a practice would allow for individualized bargaining where providers wouldnot be required ''to hold themselves out to serve all comers indiscriminately on the same or standardizedterms.''211 If the Commission's no-blocking rule allowed individualized bargaining above the minimumlevel of service necessary, then the rule might not create per se common carriage obligations.212 Thecourt noted that although the Commission had asserted this interpretation of the rule at oral argument, the202 See Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17941-42, para. 62.203 Id.See generally Internet Policy Statement, 20 FCC Rcd 14986.204 See Press Release, Chairman Kevin J. Martin, Comments on Commission Policy Statement (Aug. 5, 2005) (''Theevidence today is that their Internet access consumers have the ability to reach any Internet content. Indeed, cableand telephone companies' practices already track well the Internet principles we endorse today.''),http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-260435A2.pdf.205 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17956-57, 17959-60, paras. 94-95, 99.206 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 658.207 Id. at 657.208 Id. at 651.209 See id. at 655-58.210 See id. at 658.211 Id.212 See id.; see also id. at 667-68 (Silberman, J., dissenting in part) (''By exceeding the minimum level of service, themajority suggests, the broadband providers would have wide latitude to engage in individualized bargaining.'').34
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court could not consider it as a possible basis for upholding the rule because the Commission had notadvanced this position in the Open Internet Order.2132.Proposal to Adopt a No-Blocking Rule
94.We continue to believe that safeguarding consumers' ability to access and effectively usethe lawful content, applications, services, and devices of their choice on the Internet is an essentialcomponent of protecting and promoting the open Internet. Therefore, we tentatively conclude that weshould adopt the text of the rule that the Commission adopted in the Open Internet Order, whichprovided:A person engaged in the provision of fixed broadband Internet access service, insofar assuch person is so engaged, shall not block lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices, subject to reasonable network management.214A person engaged in the provision of mobile broadband Internet access service, insofar assuch person is so engaged, shall not block consumers from accessing lawful websites,subject to reasonable network management; nor shall such person block applications thatcompete with the provider's voice or video telephony services, subject to reasonablenetwork management.21595.We believe this to be the public policy that will best serve Internet openness. Whilemaintaining this rule text, we propose to make clear that the no-blocking rule would allow individualizedbargaining above a minimum level of access to a broadband provider's subscribers'--the revised rationalethe court suggested would be permissible rather than per se common carriage'--but, also consistent withthe court's analysis, separately subject such practices to scrutiny under the commercially reasonablepractices rule (or its equivalent). We believe that by preserving end users' ability to access the Internetcontent of their choice, reinstating a no-blocking rule would increase demand for broadband services andthus increase investment in broadband network infrastructure and technologies.216 We seek comment onthe proposed no-blocking rule and its potential effect on broadband investment and deployment, includingwhether and under what circumstances broadband providers have incentives to block content. We alsoseek comment on possible approaches other than adopting the text of the 2010 rule. Should we modifythe text of the rule to explicitly address the minimum level of access required, as discussed below?96.Alternatively, we seek comment on whether we should adopt a no-blocking rule thateither itself prohibits broadband providers from entering into priority agreements with edge providers oracts in combination with a separate rule prohibiting such conduct.217 As discussed below, the record inthis proceeding reflects numerous public concerns about the potential for priority agreements to harm anopen Internet.218 How could we address such concerns in the context of the no-blocking rule? If the213 Id. at 658-59 (quoting the Commission counsel's statement at oral argument that ''it's not common carriage tosimply have a basic level of required service, if you can negotiate different levels with different people'').214 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17942, para. 63. Consistent with the 2010 rule, the phrase ''content,applications, services'' in the proposed rule for fixed broadband service ''refers to all traffic transmitted to or fromend users of a broadband Internet access service, including traffic that may not fit cleanly into any of thesecategories.'' Id. at 17942, para. 64 & n.200.215 Id. at 17959, para. 99.216 See, e.g., CompTIA Comments at 3 (explaining that following the striking down of the no-blocking rule, ''anumber of CompTIA's member companies, all of which were small edge providers, voiced concern that ISPs wouldnow charge them for access to their customers and block them if they refused to pay'').217 See infra paras. 126, 138.218 See infra n.250.35
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Commission were to proceed down this alternative path, how should the Commission define ''priority''?Are ''priority'' agreements broader than ''pay-for-priority,'' possibly including the exchange ofconsideration other than money? Are there other arrangements between broadband providers and edgeproviders that have the potential to harm Internet openness and should be addressed within the no-blocking rule? Commenters should address the legal bases and theories, including Title II, that theCommission could rely on for such a no-blocking rule, and how different sources of authority might leadto different formulations of the no-blocking rule.3.Establishing the Minimum Level of Access under the No-Blocking Rule
97.As noted above, the D.C. Circuit suggested that the Commission's 2010 no-blocking rulecould be interpreted as requiring broadband providers to ''furnish . . . access to their subscribersgenerally'' while ''establishing a lower limit on the forms that broadband providers' arrangements withedge providers could take'''--and that under that interpretation the rule might not impose common carrierstatus on broadband providers.219 Consistent with the court's ruling, we tentatively conclude that therevived no-blocking rule should be interpreted as requiring broadband providers to furnish edge providerswith a minimum level of access to their end-user subscribers.220 We tentatively conclude that ourproposed no-blocking rule would allow broadband providers sufficient flexibility to negotiate terms ofservice individually with edge providers, consistent with the court's view that we must permit providersto ''adapt . . . to individualized circumstances without having to hold themselves out to serve all comersindiscriminately on the same or standardized terms.''221 We reiterate that, as discussed further below,under the proposed rules contained herein such individualized arrangements for priority treatment wouldbe subject to scrutiny under the proposed commercial reasonableness rule and prohibited under that rule ifthey harm Internet openness. We seek comment on these tentative conclusions.98.Requiring this minimum level of access under the no-blocking rule will ensure that allusers have access to an Internet experience that is sufficiently robust, fast, and effectively usable.222 Thisincludes both end-user consumers and edge providers of all types and sizes, including those contentproviders who do not enter into specific arrangements with broadband providers. In short, our approachwill enable consumers to access the content, services, and applications they demand and ensure thatinnovators and edge providers have the ability to offer new products and services. We seek comment onthis analysis.99.Under the approach described by the D.C. Circuit, ''broadband providers [would] have noobligation to actually provide an edge provider with the minimum service necessary to satisfy the rules,''because they could instead ''deliver all edge providers' traffic'' in a manner that exceeds that minimum,and they would then be free to ''negotiate separate agreements with each individual edge provider'' andalso to ''charge similarly-situated edge providers completely different prices for the same service.''223 Arethere alternative approaches that, consistent with the Verizon decision, would avoid per se common219 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 658.220 Such actions, permissible under the no-blocking rule, would, of course, be separately subject to the proposedcommercially reasonable practices standard set out below. See infra Section III.E.221 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 652 (quoting Cellco P'ship v. FCC, 700 F.3d 534, 548 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). In this regard, weview the operation of the no-blocking rule separate from any other impact on broadband providers that might arisefrom application of the legal standard, factors, and dispute resolution framework discussed below. See infra Sections III.E, III.F, III.H.222 See infra Appx. A (proposing a definition of ''block'' for purposes of the no-blocking rule).223 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 658. We note that a broadband provider's discretion in setting rates could be constrained tosome degree by the commercially reasonable standard and dispute resolution framework discussed below, if adoptedby the Commission. See infra Sections III.E, III.H. As we explain below, that proposed standard would notconstitute per se common carriage.36
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carriage? Are there forms of price discrimination that, even if appropriate under the no-blocking rule,should be separately subject to the commercial reasonableness rule or its equivalent?100.We also seek comment on how, consistent with this interpretation, we should define orclarify the minimum level of access required by the rule, or otherwise define what provider conductwould constitute ''blocking'' under the rule. In our view, a defined minimum level of access providesassurances both to end users, by helping them understand the potential uses of their service, and to edgeproviders. Such assurances should enhance consumer demand, which drives investment both in thenetwork and at the edge.101.We also seek comment on how ''minimum level of access'' should be defined to providethe robust, fast, and effectively usable access discussed above. Should we define the minimum level ofaccess from the perspective of end users, edge providers, or both? Should the minimum level of access bedynamic, evolving over time, and if so, how can that flexibility be incorporated into the rule? In thefollowing paragraphs, we describe in alphabetical order several possible options by which we may definea minimum level of access under the no-blocking rule. We seek comment on these options and on anyapproaches by which the Commission should define the minimum level of access. For each of thesepotential options, we seek comment on its advantages and disadvantages, on its legal sustainability underVerizon, and on how effective it would be at protecting the open Internet, including the ease or difficultywith which violations can be identified and remedied. We seek comment on how the Commission shouldimplement, monitor compliance with, and enforce the rule, under each of the options described. For eachoption, we also seek comment on whether the minimum level of access should be reflected in providers'disclosures under an enhanced transparency rule. Under any of these options, we seek comment on howthe minimum level of access should be measured. Should the Commission measure technical parameters,based on a sample, focusing on speed, packet loss, latency, or other factors? Where in the network shouldsuch measurement take place to ensure an accurate measure of the broadband provider's performance?Finally, we recognize that from time to time a provider may be unable to provide such a minimum levelof access temporarily for a variety of reasons.224 We seek comment on how the Commission shoulddistinguish such temporary inadvertent failures from intentional or prolonged blocking, including whetherthe Commission should consider exempting incidents of blocking that last for less than a specifiedamount of time.102.Best Effort. One way to define a minimum level of access is as a requirement thatbroadband providers apply no less than a ''best effort'' standard to deliver traffic to end users.225 For anyparticular type of Internet traffic, best-effort delivery would represent the ''typical'' level of service forthat type of traffic'--in effect, routing traffic according to the ''traditional'' architecture of the Internet.226Broadband providers would be free to negotiate ''better than typical'' delivery with edge providers, andwould be prohibited (subject to reasonable network management) from delivering ''worse than typical''service in the form of degradation or outright blocking. We seek comment on this potential approach.224 Aside from complete outages (which are not the subject of this Notice), we note that in some cases inadvertentaction or circumstances outside a provider's control may cause a subset of traffic to be blocked. For example, if aconnection with one of several peering partners is severed, some Internet traffic may seem unacceptably slow whileother traffic appears normal. Alternatively, a provider engaged in reasonable network management (such asblocking the source of a distributed denial of service attack) may inadvertently block other traffic due to atranscription error. If steps are taken in a timely manner to correct such problems, we would not anticipateconsidering such action to violate a no-blocking rule.225 See, e.g., S. Floyd & M. Allman, Comments on the Usefulness of Simple Best-Effort Traffic 9-14, InternetEngineering Task Force (July 2008), https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5290.226 Open Internet NPRM, 24 FCC Rcd at 13086, para. 56 (''The Internet has traditionally relied on an end-to-end,open architecture, in which network operators use their 'best effort' to deliver packets to their intended destinationswithout quality-of-service guarantees.'').37
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Would ''best effort'' be measured against the technical capacity of a particular broadband provider'snetwork capacity and characteristics?103.Minimum Quantitative Performance. Another way to define a minimum level of accessis through specific technical parameters, such as a minimum speed. To the extent that commentersbelieve that the Commission should promulgate a rule that establishes specific technical parameters forthe required minimum level of access, what should those parameters be? Should they identify specificspeeds of service, or would it be preferable to identify specific problems that a minimum level of servicewould avoid (such as preventing latency and jitter for services that tolerate them poorly)?227 Would theCommission need to differentiate between different broadband access technologies? While this approachwould provide greater certainty than other approaches, a specific technical definition of minimum accesscould become outdated as available broadband network technologies change and available broadbandspeeds improve. How frequently would we need to revisit a specific technical definition of minimumaccess to ensure that it keeps up with advances in broadband service?104.An Objective, Evolving ''Reasonable Person'' Standard. Another approach to defining aminimum level of access to broadband providers' end users is to think of it as the level that satisfies thereasonable expectations of a typical end user. We might think of this as a ''reasonable person'' standard ofaccess. For example, a typical end user may reasonably expect the ability to access streaming video fromany provider, place and receive telephone calls using the VoIP service of the end user's choosing, andaccess any lawful web content. Under this approach, a broadband provider that satisfies these and otherreasonable expectations would be in compliance with the no-blocking rule. One possible advantage ofthis approach to defining minimum access is flexibility: the absence of a specific technical definitionmeans that the standard for compliance can evolve as the expectations in the marketplace change withoutfurther Commission action. On the other hand, this approach may create less certainty than otherapproaches might and could be more difficult to enforce. We seek comment generally on a ''reasonableperson'' standard for defining minimum access, and in particular, how this standard could be crafted to besufficiently objective and predictable to provide certainty to broadband providers and edge providers.4.Application of the No-Blocking Rule to Mobile Broadband
105.As noted above, the 2010 no-blocking rule applied differently to mobile broadbandproviders than to fixed, and today's Notice would maintain that approach. The previous rule prohibitedmobile broadband providers from blocking consumers from accessing lawful websites or blockingapplications that compete with the provider's voice or video telephony services. We propose to adopt thesame approach as in the 2010 obligation, which would prohibit mobile broadband providers fromblocking lawful web content as well as applications that compete with the mobile broadband providers'own voice or video telephony services, subject to reasonable network management. We seek comment onthis proposal.106.In addition, we seek comment on whether it would serve the public interest to expand therule's scope to include reasonable access to all applications that compete with the mobile broadbandInternet access provider's other services, not just those that compete with voice or video telephonyservices, subject to reasonable network management practices. Should the application of the no-blockingrule to mobile broadband providers turn on whether mobile service was marketed to consumers as asubstitute for a fixed telecommunications service previously offered by the provider or its affiliate? Howwould treating mobile broadband differently from fixed broadband affect consumers in differentdemographic groups, including those who rely solely on mobile broadband for Internet access?228 How227 See Vonage Comments at 8 (urging the Commission to ''define a baseline throughput level'' that ''reflect[s]changing consumer expectations while recognizing legitimate technical constraints'').228 For example, according to the Pew Research Internet Project, in 2011, Blacks and Latinos were more than twiceas likely as whites to rely on their smartphones as their exclusive source of Internet access (38% of Black/Latinosmartphone users versus 17% of white non-Hispanic smartphone users), and those with incomes of less than(continued'...)38
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should the Commission consider applying a no-blocking rule to facilities-based mobile providers versusresellers?107.We also seek comment on whether and how we should define a minimum level of accessin the context of the proposed no-blocking rule for mobile broadband, or otherwise clarify whatconstitutes ''blocking,'' and whether that definition should be different for mobile broadband than forfixed. For each of the approaches discussed above to define a ''minimum level of access,'' we seekcomment on any particular benefits or difficulties that such approach would present.108.We recognize that there have been substantial mobile marketplace changes anddevelopments since 2010, including the increased use of Wi-Fi technology, and seek comment on whetherand how such changes should impact our no-blocking rule for mobile broadband. We seek comment onthe extent to which we should take into account the increasing provision of Wi-Fi by broadbandproviders,229 and the growing use of Wi-Fi by end users for the off-load of wireless broadband, as weconsider the application of the no-blocking rule to mobile broadband services.2305.Applicability of the No-Blocking Rule to Devices
109.The 2010 no-blocking rule prohibited fixed broadband providers from blocking non-harmful end-user devices, and the rule we propose today would do the same. We seek comment on howthis treatment of non-harmful devices fits into the Verizon court's interpretation of the rule. Should theability to attach non-harmful devices to broadband service be included among the reasonable end-userexpectations listed above, or should we analyze non-harmful devices differently?E.
Codifying an Enforceable Rule to Protect the Open Internet That Is Not CommonCarriage Per Se
110.Separate and distinct from the no-blocking rule, we believe that establishing anenforceable legal standard for broadband provider practices is necessary to preserve Internet openness,protect consumers, and promote competition. While the D.C. Circuit vacated the Commission's ruleprohibiting ''unreasonable discrimination'' by fixed broadband providers on the theory that it ''so limitedbroadband providers' control over edge providers' transmissions that [it] constitute[d] common carriageper se,'' the court underscored the validity of the ''commercially reasonable'' legal standard theCommission used in the data roaming context and the court upheld in Cellco.231111.Today, we tentatively conclude that the Commission should adopt a revised rule that,consistent with the court's decision, may permit broadband providers to engage in individualized(Continued from previous page)$30,000 were more than twice as likely as those with incomes of $50,000 or more to do so (40% versus 17%).Aaron Smith, Smartphones as an Internet Appliance, Pew Research Internet Project (July 2011),http://www.pewinternet.org/2011/07/11/smartphones-as-an-internet-appliance/.229 Kevin Fitchard, Comcast is Turning Homes Into Public Wi-Fi Hotspots, Bloomberg Businessweek (June 11,2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-06-11/comcast-is-turning-homes-into-public-wi-fi-hotspots(describing Comcast's wireless gateway that transmits two signals with each functioning as a separate networkwhere the household that owns or rents the router can access the first network, and any Comcast broadbandcustomer can access the second network).230 See New America Foundation & Open Technology Institute Comments at 10-11 (contending that theCommission should apply the same openness provisions to both fixed and mobile broadband networks and thatconsumers should have the same right to use the Internet whether their device is '''connected over WiFi to a wiredLAN, or moments later, connected over a wireless carrier's network''); see also NCTA Comments at 8-10 (arguingthat applying different rules to fixed and mobile creates marketplace distortions that may hamper cross-platformbroadband competition).231 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 655; see also Cellco, 700 F.3d 534.39Federal Communications Commission
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practices, while prohibiting those broadband provider practices that threaten to harm Internet openness.Our proposed approach contains three essential elements: (1) an enforceable legal standard of conductbarring broadband provider practices that threaten to undermine Internet openness, providing certainty tonetwork providers, end users, and edge providers alike, (2) clearly established factors that give additionalguidance on the kind of conduct that is likely to violate the enforceable legal standard, and(3) encouragement of individualized negotiation and, if necessary, a mechanism to allow the Commissionto evaluate challenged practices on a case-by-case basis, thereby providing flexibility in assessingwhether a particular practice comports with the legal standard. We seek comment below on the designand justification of this rule.112.Alternatively, we also seek comment on whether the Commission should adopt analternative legal standard to govern broadband providers' practices. How can we ensure that ourproposed rule sufficiently protects against harms to the open Internet? How would the rule we proposetoday change if the Commission were to rely on Title II (or other sources of legal authority) to adopt rulesto protect and promote Internet openness?232 We seek comment on how the goal of the proposed rule'--toprevent those broadband provider practices that limit Internet openness'--could best be achieved.1.The 2010 No Unreasonable Discrimination Rule
113.2010 Open Internet Order. The Commission adopted a no unreasonable discriminationrule to prevent fixed broadband providers from engaging in harmful conduct when transmitting lawfulnetwork traffic over a consumer's broadband Internet access service.233 The antidiscrimination ruleprohibited fixed broadband providers from unreasonably discriminating against network traffic subject toreasonable network management.234 Unlike the transparency and no-blocking rules the Commissionadopted in 2010, the no unreasonable discrimination rule did not apply to mobile broadband Internetaccess service providers.235114.D.C. Circuit Opinion in Verizon v. FCC. The D.C. Circuit vacated the antidiscriminationrule because it found that the rule improperly relegated fixed broadband providers to common carrierstatus.236 This violated the statutory ban on common carrier treatment of information service providersbecause the Commission had classified broadband providers ''not as providers of 'telecommunicationsservices' but instead as providers of 'information services.''' 237 The court disagreed with the232 See infra Section III.F.233 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17944, para. 68. The rule stated, ''A person engaged in the provision offixed broadband Internet access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not unreasonably discriminate intransmitting lawful network traffic over a consumer's broadband Internet access service. Reasonable networkmanagement shall not constitute unreasonable discrimination.'' Id. 234 Id. The broad purpose of the ''no unreasonable discrimination'' rule was ''to encourage competition and removeimpediments to infrastructure investment while protecting consumer choice, free expression, end-user control, andthe ability to innovate without permission.'' Id. at 17949, para. 78; see also id. at 17909-25, 17927-31, 17951-57,paras. 13-34, 38-42, 80-92.235 Id. at 17958, para. 96.236 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 655-56; see also id. at 656-57 (differentiating the antidiscrimination provision at issue in theOpen Internet Order from other Commission rules that survived common carrier challenges because unlike the ruleat issue in Southwestern Cable, which was ''limited to remedying a specific perceived evil,'' the rule here ''is not solimited, as the compelled carriage obligation applies in all circumstances and with respect to all edge providers'').237 Id. at 651; see also id. at 631 (''[T]he Commission classified other types of broadband providers, such as DSLand wireless, which includes those offering broadband Internet service for cellular telephones, as informationservice providers exempt from Title II's common carrier requirements.'') (citing Appropriate Framework forBroadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd 14853, 14862, para. 12 (2005); AppropriateRegulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireless Networks, 22 FCC Rcd 5901, 5901-02,para.1 (2007); United Power Line Council's Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding the Classification of(continued'...)40
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Commission's interpretation to the contrary,238 finding that by compelling fixed broadband providers toserve all edge providers who provided content, services, and applications over the Internet withoutunreasonable discrimination, the rule compelled those providers to hold themselves out ''to serve thepublic indiscriminately'''--thus treating them as common carriers.239115.In making its determination, the court relied on its previous decision in Cellco, where itupheld the Commission's data roaming requirements against a common carrier challenge.240 The courtsuggested that had the Commission shown that the ''no unreasonable discrimination'' standard adopted inthe Open Internet Order differed from the ''nondiscrimination'' standard applicable to common carriers,the rule might have withstood judicial review similar to the data roaming rule at issue in Cellco.241 This isbecause the rule in Cellco ''expressly permit[ted] providers to adapt roaming agreements to'individualized circumstances without having to hold themselves out to serve all comers indiscriminatelyon the same or standardized terms.'''242 The court went on to suggest that, unlike the data roaming rulesat issue in Cellco, which listed specific factors to consider in a case-by-case determination of whether adata roaming provider's conduct and offerings were commercially reasonable based on the totality of thecircumstances,243 the Open Internet Order did not attempt to ''ensure that [the] reasonableness standard(Continued from previous page)Broadband over Power Line Internet Access Service as an Information Service, 21 FCC Rcd 13281, 13281, para. 1(2006)).238 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 652-56 (rejecting the Commission's premise that broadband providers did not serve as''carriers'' for edge providers).239 Id. at 655-56.240 Cellco, 700 F.3d 534. The Cellco court turned aside a facial challenge to the data roaming rules, while remindingthe Commission that it could consider ''as applied'' challenges if the Commission were to apply its rules in a mannerthat, in fact, relegated network providers to common carrier status. Id. at 548-49. We remain cognizant of theCourt's admonition in that circumstance, and in this one.241 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 656. The court held that the Commission had forfeited the argument, made in footnote 251of the Open Internet Order, that the antidiscrimination rule did not constitute per se common carriage because theOpen Internet rules permitted broadband providers to engage in ''reasonable network management,'' because theCommission had failed to raise the argument in its appellate brief. Id. However, the court went on to explain thatthe argument would have failed, in any event, because there was no basis on which to distinguish it from the ''justand reasonable'' legal standard that applies to common carriers. Id.242 Id. at 652 (citing Cellco, 700 F.3d at 548) (some internal quotations removed). The data roaming rulespecifically states that ''providers may negotiate the terms of their roaming arrangements on an individualizedbasis.'' In other words, providers may offer data roaming arrangements on commercially reasonable terms andconditions tailored to individualized circumstances without having to hold themselves out to serve all comersindiscriminately on the same or standardized terms. Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial MobileRadio Service Providers and Other Providers of Mobile Data Services, WT Docket No. 05-265, Second Report andOrder, 26 FCC Rcd 5411, 5433, para. 45 (2011) (Data Roaming Order).243 Data Roaming Order, 26 FCC Rcd at 5452-53, para. 86. In determining whether negotiations were commerciallyreasonable, the Commission stated it would consider the following factors: ''whether the host provider hasresponded to the request for negotiation; whether it has engaged in a persistent pattern of stonewalling behavior, andthe length of time since the initial request; whether the terms and conditions offered by the host provider are sounreasonable as to be tantamount to a refusal to offer a data roaming arrangement; whether the parties have anyroaming arrangements with each other, including roaming for interconnected services such as voice, and the termsof such arrangements; whether the providers involved have had previous data roaming arrangements with similarterms; the level of competitive harm in a given market and the benefits to consumers; the extent and nature ofproviders' build-out; significant economic factors, such as whether building another network in the geographic areamay be economically infeasible or unrealistic, and the impact of any 'head-start' advantages; whether the requestingprovider is seeking data roaming for an area where it is already providing facilities-based service; the impact of theterms and conditions on the incentives for either provider to invest in facilities and coverage, services, and servicequality; whether there are other options for securing a data roaming arrangement in the areas subject to negotiations(continued'...)41Federal Communications Commission
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remains flexible.''244 The D.C. Circuit suggested that a rule preventing certain types of conduct bybroadband providers might be acceptable, given the manner in which the Commission has classifiedbroadband providers, if the Commission articulated a discrete, flexible standard that prohibited practicesthat could reasonably be understood to harm Internet openness, while allowing individualized broadbandprovider practices, akin to the ''commercially reasonable'' standard adopted by the Commission in thedata roaming context.2452.Proposed Elements of an Enforceable Legal Rule
a.Prohibiting Only Commercially Unreasonable Practices
116.Sound public policy requires that Internet openness be the touchstone of a new legalstandard. Accordingly, we tentatively conclude that the Commission should adopt a rule requiringbroadband providers to use ''commercially reasonable'' practices in the provision of broadband Internetaccess service. Our proposed approach is both more focused and more flexible than the vacated 2010non-discrimination rule. It would prohibit as commercially unreasonable those broadband providers'practices that, based on the totality of the circumstances, threaten to harm Internet openness and all that itprotects. At the same time, it could permit broadband providers to serve customers and carry traffic on anindividually negotiated basis, ''without having to hold themselves out to serve all comers indiscriminatelyon the same or standardized terms,'' so long as such conduct is commercially reasonable.246 The D.C.Circuit explained that such an approach distinguished the data roaming rules at issue in Cellco fromcommon carrier obligations.247 We seek general comment on this approach, and more targeted commentbelow.117.With respect to this approach in general, we tentatively conclude that it should operateseparately from the no-blocking rule that we also propose to adopt. In other words, the presence orabsence of the no-blocking rule would have no impact on the presence or absence of the ''commerciallyreasonable'' standard, and vice versa. This would mean that conduct acceptable under the no-blockingrule would still be subject to independent examination under the ''commercially reasonable'' standard.We seek comment on this approach.118.The core purpose of the legal standard that we wish to adopt, whether the ''commerciallyreasonable'' standard or another legal formulation, is to effectively employ the authority that the Verizon court held was within the Commission's power under section 706. In essence, the court upheld theCommission's judgment that (1) section 706 grants substantive power to the Commission to take actions,including removing barriers to infrastructure investment and promoting competition in(Continued from previous page)and whether alternative data roaming partners are available; events or circumstances beyond either provider'scontrol that impact either the provision of data roaming or the need for data roaming in the proposed area(s) ofcoverage; the propagation characteristics of the spectrum licensed to the providers; whether a host provider'sdecision not to offer a data roaming arrangement is reasonably based on the fact that the providers are nottechnologically compatible; whether a host provider's decision not to enter into a roaming arrangement is reasonablybased on the fact that roaming is not technically feasible for the service for which it is requested; whether a hostprovider's decision not to enter into a roaming arrangement is reasonably based on the fact that changes to the hostnetwork necessary to accommodate the request are not economically reasonable; whether a host provider's decisionnot to make a roaming arrangement effective was reasonably based on the fact that the requesting provider'sprovision of mobile data service to its own subscribers has not been done with a generation of wireless technologycomparable to the technology on which the requesting provider seeks to roam; other special or extenuatingcircumstances.'' Id.244 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 657.245 Id. 246 Id. at 652 (quoting Cellco, 700 F.3d at 548) (internal quotations removed).247 Id. at 652.42Federal Communications Commission
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telecommunications markets, that will promote the deployment of broadband networks; (2) theCommission was within its authority to conclude that the ''virtuous circle'' can be adversely impacted bybroadband network practices that, over the long term, depress end user demand, which then threatensbroadband deployment; and (3) threats to the open Internet, such as limitations on users to access thecontent of their choice or speak their views freely, are therefore within the authority of the Commission tocurb. In selecting a legal standard, the Commission not only wishes to avoid subjecting broadbandnetworks to common carriage per se, it also wishes to choose a legal standard whose valid adoptionrenders unnecessary the adjudication of any question other than whether the adopted legal standard hasbeen violated. This is the distinction between the authority to adopt a standard and its subsequentapplication.248119.Are there alternative legal standards, whether in analogous contexts or otherwiseidentified by commenters, that the Commission should consider? Is there an existing standard that wouldserve a similar purpose to what we propose here and that would prevent the harms to Internetopenness?249 If so, how, and if not, what would any differences be? Could the Commission modify itsapproach to ''reasonable network management'' in ways that would establish a more flexible legalstandard that would not constitute common carriage per se? Commenters advocating alternative legalstandards should explain why they are preferable, both in terms of the substantive requirements of thealternative standard (such as how they would address providers' conduct, offerings, and practices) and itsimplementation (such as whether and how it may permit individualized decision-making), and how theywould protect an open Internet. And, as to the ''commercially reasonable'' standard or any other, we seekcomment on whether there are sources of law or practice the Commission should rely upon in explainingthe meaning and application of that standard.120.We also seek comment on how a rule requiring broadband providers to engage incommercially reasonable practices with respect to delivery of traffic to and from end users should applyin circumstances in which no individualized negotiation occurs between the edge provider and thebroadband provider. To cite just a few of many possible examples, consider a start-up VoIP service, apolitically oriented website with an audience of fewer than 100 unique visitors per day, a socialnetworking application narrowly focused on a particular demographic, or peer-to-peer communicationsamong individuals. Not all of those actors may seek to enter into a contract with a broadband provider;they may simply wish to reach its subscribers. We seek comment on the impact of this difference on theselection and/or application of the general legal standard.248 It is axiomatic that an as-applied challenge to a rule would invalidate an application of the rule, but the rule itselfmay otherwise remain broadly applicable. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985). Thus,assuming the rule is facially sustained by a reviewing court, the Commission would not be required to re-litigate itsunderlying determination that adoption of the rule will promote deployment. 47 U.S.C. § 1302(b). Because thecommercially reasonable practices rule requires a determination that an entity did not act in a commerciallyreasonable manner, the inquiry is, then, not whether the Commission has authority to adopt the regulation, butwhether the Commission may enforce the regulation in a particular set of circumstances. See Colo. Right to LifeComm., Inc. v. Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137, 1146 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that an as-applied challenge is limited totesting ''the application of [a regulation] to the facts of a plaintiff's concrete case''). For example, the D.C. Circuitdetermined that the Commission's data roaming rule'--the legal standard adopted'--was facially valid and within theCommission's authority, but that the application of that standard could still be subject to subsequent challenge. SeeCellco, 700 F.3d at 548.249 For example, Section 628(b) of the Communications Act prohibits cable operators and certain programmingvendors from engaging in ''unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices, the purpose oreffect of which is to hinder significantly or to prevent any multichannel video programming distributor fromproviding satellite cable programming or satellite broadcast programming to subscribers or consumers.'' 47 U.S.C.§ 548(b). The Commission has established processes for making case-by-case determinations of whether certainpractices are ''unfair'' under section 628(b) of the Act. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.1003.43
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121.As an alternative to our proposed approach, we seek comment on whether theCommission should adopt a different rule to govern broadband providers' practices to protect andpromote Internet openness. As mentioned above, a number of parties have expressed concerns about theeffect of pay-for-priority agreements on Internet openness.250 How can the Commission ensure that therule it adopts sufficiently protects against harms to the open Internet, including broadband providers'incentives to disadvantage edge providers or classes of edge providers in ways that would harm Internetopenness? Should the Commission adopt a rule that prohibits unreasonable discrimination and, if so,what legal authority and theories should we rely upon to do so? If the Commission ultimately adopts aTitle II approach, how should the Commission define the rule in light of the requirements under sections201 and 202 of the Act?251b.Factors to Guide Application of the General Legal Standard
122.Similar to the Commission's approach in the data roaming context, we propose toidentify factors the Commission can use to administer the proposed commercially reasonable practicesstandard.252 These pre-defined factors would provide guidance to encourage commercially reasonableindividualized practices and, if disputes arise, provide the basis for the Commission to evaluate whether,taking into account the totality of the circumstances on a case-by-case basis as discussed below, aparticular practice satisfies the enforceable legal standard.123.We seek comment on this approach and what factors the Commission should adopt toensure commercially reasonable practices that will protect and promote Internet openness. We discussbelow several categories of factors, noting that there is considerable overlap between these categories, andthat they are not mutually exclusive. As with the data roaming rule, we tentatively conclude that a reviewof the totality of the circumstances should be preserved through the creation of a ''catch all'' factor250 See, e.g., Letter from Emily Sheketoff, ALA, Prudence Adler, ARL, and Diana Obligner, EDUCAUSE, toMarlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, GN Docket No. 14-28, at 2 (filed Feb. 13,2014) (''Prioritized delivery to end users, if allowed, will favor those content, application and service providers whocan pay for it. Paid prioritization and other forms of preferential access will significantly disadvantage libraries,education, and other non-profit institutions.'' (emphasis omitted)); Future of Music Coalition Comments at 2-3(expressing concern about ''a future where the Internet becomes a pay-to-play environment where only those withthe deepest pockets can guarantee delivery of their content''); Letter from Barbara van Schewick, Professor of Law,Stanford Law School to Tom Wheeler, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, GN Docket No. 14-28,Attach. A at 5-6 (filed Apr. 25, 2014) (noting the potential for access fees to ''significantly increase the costs ofoffering applications, content and services, which would fundamentally change the environment for innovation andfree speech on the Internet'' as well as create ''two classes of speakers'--those who can pay to receive bettertreatment (e.g., large, established companies or wealthy individuals) and those who cannot afford to do so'--oftenindividuals and groups with unpopular or new viewpoints, like activists and artists''); Free Press Comments at 6 (''Aworld in which broadband providers charge for priority access to their customers, and discriminate freely againstany content, service or application they see fit to disfavor, is not a world the Commission should entertaincreating.''); Letter from Sarah Morris, Senior Policy Council, New America Foundation, to Marlene H. Dortch,Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, GN Docket No. 14-28, at 1 (filed May 2, 2014) (expressing ''deepconcern'' that ''the draft rules would be insufficient to protect consumers from discrimination'').251 See 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (prohibiting unjust or unreasonable ''charges, practices, [or] classifications); id. at§ 202(a) (prohibiting ''unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regulations,facilities or services'').252 Data Roaming Order, 26 FCC Rcd at 5452-53, para. 86. As discussed above, in invalidating the 2010 nounreasonable discrimination rule as common carriage per se, the D.C. Circuit distinguished it from the commerciallyreasonable, factor-based approach adopted by the Commission in its Data Roaming Order and upheld by the courtin Cellco. We recognize that there are significant differences between the open Internet and the data roamingcontexts, including a broader range of open Internet practices at issue and a greater diversity of parties affected bysuch practices. Thus, while we look to our data roaming approach for guidance, we propose to develop factorsspecific to the open Internet context.44
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designed to ensure that rules can be applied evenly and fairly in response to changing circumstances andthat all users have an Internet experience that affords them access to a minimum level of service sufficientto protect and promote an open Internet. Further, we seek comment on providers' experiences with the''commercially reasonable'' practices standard in the data roaming context, and on how such experiencesmight inform our thinking as we develop the ''commercially reasonable'' practices standard for the openInternet.124.Impact on Present and Future Competition. The Commission has previously observedthat unfair competitive advantages can jeopardize innovation on the edge and impair otherwise lawfuldelivery of products and services.253 For that reason, we seek comment on how we should constructfactors in applying the commercially reasonable legal standard to assess the impact of broadband providerpractices on present and future competition. We understand this competition inquiry to extend beyond anapplication of antitrust principles to include, for example, the predicted impact of practices on futurecompetition.125.To what extent should such competition-oriented factors focus on market structure andthe extent of competition in a given market? For example, should we consider factors that theCommission has used in case-by-case adjudications under section 628(b) of the Act, which proscribescertain ''unfair methods of competition'' by cable operators and certain programming vendors?254 Are253 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17909-25, 17927-31, paras. 13-34, 38-42.254 Under section 628(b) of the Act, the Commission has held that determining whether challenged conduct is''unfair'' requires ''balancing the anticompetitive harms of the challenged conduct against the procompetitivebenefits.'' 47 U.S.C. § 548(b). To find a violation under section 628(b) of the Act, the Commission must make twoindependent judgments. First, the Commission must determine that the defendant has engaged in unfair methods ofcompetition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices. If the Commission finds unfair acts or practices, then theCommission must determine that the unfair acts or practices had the purpose or effect of hindering significantly orpreventing a multichannel video programming distributor (MVPD) from providing satellite cable programming tosubscribers or consumers. See, e.g., Dakota Telecom Inc. v. CBS Broadcasting, File No. 5381-P, MemorandumOpinion and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 10500 (Cable Services Bur. 1999). The Commission has determined that specificpractices are likely to be prohibited under section 628(b). For example, the Commission established a rebuttablepresumption that an MVPD's withholding of a terrestrially delivered Regional Sports Network (RSN) from anotherMVPD creates the harm targeted by section 628(b), based in part on the finding that such programming is ''verylikely to be both non-replicable and highly valued by consumers.'' Review of the Commission's Program AccessRules and Examination of Programming Tying Arrangements, MB Docket No. 07-198, First Report and Order, 25FCC Rcd 746, 782, para. 52 (2010), aff'd in part, Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, 649 F.3d 695, 703 (D.C. Cir.2011). Under this presumption, the Commission found that MSG/Cablevision's withholding of HD versions of theMadison Square Garden RSN from Verizon was ''unfair'' and created the harm targeted by section 628(b). SeeVerizon Tel. Companies & Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Madison Square Garden, L.P. and Cablevision Systems Corp.,File No. CSR-8185-P, Order, 26 FCC Rcd 13145, 13160-77, paras. 18-41 (Media Bur. 2011), aff'd, Verizon Tel.Companies & Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Madison Square Garden, L.P. and Cablevision Systems Corp, File No. CSR-8185-P, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 26 FCC Rcd 15849, 15852-53, para. 8 (2011) (''Determining whetherchallenged conduct is 'unfair' requires balancing the anticompetitive harms of the challenged conduct against theprocompetitive benefits.''); see also AT&T Servs., Inc. & S. New England Tel. Co. d/b/a AT&T Connecticut v.Madison Square Garden, L.P. and Cablevision Systems Corp, File No. CSR-8185-P, Order, 26 FCC Rcd 13206,13222-40, paras.19-42 (Media Bur. 2011) (finding that withholding of the HD versions of the MSG and MSG+RSNs from AT&T was an ''unfair act''), aff'd, AT&T Servs., Inc. & S. New England Tel. Co. d/b/a AT&TConnecticut v. Madison Square Garden, L.P. and Cablevision Systems Corp., File No. CSR-8185-P, MemorandumOpinion and Order, 26 FCC Rcd 15849 (2011). The Commission has also prohibited exclusive arrangements fordelivering cable television service to multiple dwelling unit (MDU) properties, given that ''[e]xclusivity clauses thatrun in favor of cable operators typically are a complete bar to entry into MDUs by fiber-deploying LECs such asVerizon, AT&T, and Qwest, as well as [private cable operators].'' Exclusive Service Contracts for Provision ofVideo Services in Multiple Dwelling Units and Other Real Estate Developments, MB Docket No. 07-51, Report andOrder and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 FCC Rcd 20235, 20240 para. 9 (2007), aff'd, Nat'l Cable &(continued'...)45
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there other competition-oriented standards in other contexts (including those outside oftelecommunications) that we should look to for guidance?126.We propose that the competitive factors should also examine the extent of an entity'svertical integration and/or its relationships with affiliated entities. For example, broadband providerssometimes offer an affiliated streaming video service over their broadband network in competition withmany other third-party broadband and edge providers' services.255 How can we ensure that competition isnot harmed in such situations? We note that the no-blocking rule as applied to mobile Internet accessservice specifically prohibits broadband providers from blocking ''applications that compete with theprovider's voice or video telephony services.''256 And the Commission looked to a similar restriction toaddress harms raised by the Comcast-NBCU transaction.257 In light of such concerns, we propose toadopt a rebuttable presumption that a broadband provider's exclusive (or effectively exclusive)arrangement prioritizing service to an affiliate would be commercially unreasonable. We seek commenton this proposal.127.More generally, we seek comment on the use of rebuttable presumptions as a tool tofocus attention on the likely impacts of particular practices. What source or law, either within theCommunications Act or in other statutes, would help us craft the creation and use of rebuttablepresumptions?258 Are there particular rebuttable presumptions that should be used, for example, dealingwith some or all forms of exclusive contracts, or particularized degradation of services?128.How can the Commission ensure that parties are acting in a commercially reasonablemanner without foreclosing the creation of pro-competitive opportunities through certain forms of pricediscrimination or exclusivity agreements? Should we develop factors modeled in part after those that theCommission uses in determining whether an exclusive contract between a vertically integrated cableoperator and cable-programming vendor would serve the public interest?259 Should the Commissionadopt a rebuttable presumption that broadband provider conduct that forecloses rivals (of the provider orits affiliates) from the competing marketplace is commercially unreasonable?(Continued from previous page)Telecomms. Ass'n v. FCC, 567 F.3d 659 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also 15 U.S.C. § 18 (''[T]he effect of such acquisitionmay be to substantially lessen competition . . . .'').255 For example, Comcast is a co-owner of the online video website Hulu.com. See About, Hulu.com,http://www.hulu.com/about (last visited Apr. 10, 2014); see also Applications of Comcast Corporation, GeneralElectric Company and NBC Universal, Inc. For Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licensees, MBDocket No. 10-56, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 26 FCC Rcd 4238, 4268, para. 78 (2011) (''We conclude thatComcast-NBCU will have the incentive and ability to discriminate against, thwart the development of, or otherwisetake anticompetitive actions against [online video distributors (OVDs)].''). 256 See supra Section III.D.4.257 See Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company and NBC Universal, Inc. For Consent toAssign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licensees, MB Docket No. 10-56, Memorandum Opinion and Order,26 FCC Rcd 4238, 4275, para. 94 (2011) (''[N]either Comcast nor Comcast-NBCU shall prioritize affiliated Internetcontent over unaffiliated Internet content.'').258 U.S. Dept. of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 5.3 (2010),http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html#5c.259 See 47 C.F.R. § 76.1002(c)(4). In determining whether a cable operator may enter into an exclusive contract withcertain types of affiliated programming vendors, the Commission considers the following factors regarding theeffect of the exclusive contract on the distribution of video programming in areas served by the cable operator:(i) the effect on the development of competition in local and national multichannel video programming distributionmarkets; (ii) the effect on competition from multichannel video programming distribution technologies other thancable; (iii) the effect on the attraction of capital investment in the production and distribution of new satellite-delivered cable programming; (iv) the effect on diversity of programming in the multichannel video programmingdistribution market; and (v) the duration of the exclusive contract. Id.46Federal Communications Commission
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129.Impact on Consumers. In addition to the competitive factors, the Commission proposesto adopt factors to examine the extent to which broadband providers' practices could harm consumers. Inthe Open Internet Order, the Commission looked to, among other things, the extent of transparency andend-user control in assessing whether a practice is unreasonably discriminatory.260 We believe thesefactors would likewise be relevant to assessing whether a practice is commercially reasonable. Whatcontinued role does the existing or enhanced transparency rule have in ensuring that consumers arereceiving correct information from broadband providers and not being misled?130.We believe that consumers of broadband access service should have the ability toexercise meaningful choices. How can we factor consumer choice into our analysis of what iscommercially reasonable? Should the Commission look for guidance to section 628 of the Act, whichmakes it unlawful for cable operators and their affiliated satellite cable programming vendors to engage in''unfair or deceptive acts or practices'' with certain purposes and effects?261131.Impact on Speech and Civic Engagement. The open Internet serves as a critical platformfor speech and civic engagement. As noted above, the ability of citizens and content providers to use thisopen platform to communicate with one another and express their views to a wide audience at very lowcosts drives further Internet use, consumer demand, and broadband investment and deployment.262 Wetherefore propose to adopt a factor or factors in applying the commercially reasonable standard that assessthe impact of broadband provider practices on free exercise of speech and civic engagement.132.Technical Characteristics. We also propose to examine the relevant technicalcharacteristics associated with broadband providers' practices. In the Data Roaming Order, for example,the Commission looked to the technical characteristics of the service at issue, including the technicalfeasibility of a requested service as well as the technical compatibility of providers' networks.263 We seekcomment on how the Commission should consider such technical characteristics in assessing whether abroadband provider's practice is commercially reasonable. The application of the legal standard tosatellite Internet access service presents one example. How should the Commission account for thetechnical differences between satellite and terrestrial broadband services when examining commerciallyreasonable behavior for satellite broadband providers?133.''Good Faith'' Negotiation. The Commission has imposed good faith negotiationrequirements in a variety of contexts. For example, the Commission explicitly requires televisionbroadcasters and multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs) to negotiate retransmissionconsent agreements in good faith.264 The Commission also mandated good faith negotiations for dealingsbetween certain spectrum licensees.265 Would adopting a similar framework for evaluating negotiations260 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17944, para. 70 (explaining that ''[d]ifferential treatment of traffic is morelikely to be reasonable the more transparent to the end user that treatment is'').261 47 U.S.C. § 548(b).262 See supra Section III.A.1; Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17912-15, paras. 15-18.263 Data Roaming Order, 26 FCC Rcd at 5452-53, para. 86.264 See, e.g., Implementation of Section 207 of the Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization Act of 2004Reciprocal Bargaining Obligation, MB Docket No. 05-89, Report and Order, 20 FCC Rcd 10339, 10340-41, 10345-46, paras. 3-4, 6, 15 (2005); Implementation of Section 207 of the Satellite Home Viewer Extension andReauthorization Act of 2004 Reciprocal Bargaining Obligation, MB Docket No. 05-89, Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd 5448, paras. 3-4 (2005); Implementation of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of1999; Retransmission Consent Issues: Good Faith Negotiation and Exclusivity, CS Docket No. 99-363, First Reportand Order, 15 FCC Rcd 5445 (2000); Amendment of the Commission's Rules Related to Retransmission Consent,MB Docket No. 10-71, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 29 FCC Rcd 3351 (2014)(2014 Retransmission Order).265 See, e.g., Gemini International, Inc. and Sprint Nextel, WT Docket No. 02-55, Memorandum Opinion and Order,22 FCC Rcd 6651, 6655-56, paras. 15-16 (2007); Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning the Requirement of(continued'...)47
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between parties in the open Internet context serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity? Howshould such a ''good faith'' test be applied where parties do not seek to enter into contractual relationshipswith each other?134.Industry Practices. How, if at all, should the fact that conduct is an industry practiceimpact the application of the ''commercially reasonable'' rule? What should be treated as an ''industrypractice''? For example, should that term be limited to express standards adopted by standards-settingorganizations or similar entities? If so, should the make-up or processes used by such a standards-settingorganization be considered? If not, how should the existence of an ''industry practice'' be effectivelyestablished for purposes of the application of the ''commercially reasonable'' rule, and how should theCommission best evaluate potential harms to competition arising from coordinated conduct in a marketwith a limited number of participants?266135.Other Factors. We seek comment on any additional factors the Commission shouldconsider in assessing whether a particular practice or set of practices by a broadband provider iscommercially reasonable, given the importance of preventing harms to an open Internet. Are there otherfactors that the Commission adopted in the Data Roaming Order that we should incorporate here?267How can the Commission best include a factor to capture special or extenuating circumstances to ensurethat it can take into account the totality of the circumstances, particularly given the rapid evolution of theInternet marketplace and technology?c.Case-by-Case Evaluations for Commercial Reasonableness
136.As discussed,268 we tentatively conclude that we will adopt a case-by-case approach,considering the totality of the circumstances, when analyzing whether conduct satisfies the proposedcommercially reasonable legal standard, or another legal standard ultimately adopted. We believe that, inconjunction with the factors listed above, this approach will provide the advantage of certainty andguidance to broadband providers and edge providers'--particularly smaller entities that might lackexperience dealing with broadband providers'--while also allowing parties flexibility in theirindividualized dealings. We seek comment on whether there is another avenue or mechanism we shoulduse when evaluating commercial reasonableness.3.Potential Conduct That Is Per Se
Commercially Unreasonable
137.In Southwestern Cable, the Supreme Court concluded that a Commission requirementthat cable systems carry local broadcast signals did not constitute common carriage even though theCommission's rule applied to all cable systems in defined circumstances. As the Supreme Court laternoted, that holding ''was limited to remedying a specific perceived evil [that] did not amount to a duty tohold out facilities indifferently for public use.''269 In Verizon, the D.C. Circuit likewise explained that theSouthwestern Cable regulation ''imposed no obligation on cable operators to hold their facilities open tothe public generally, but only to certain broadcasters if and when cable operators acted in ways that mightharm those broadcasters.''270 Thus, consistent with Supreme Court precedent and the Verizon decision,the Commission may be able to identify specific practices that do not satisfy the commercially reasonable(Continued from previous page)Good Faith Negotiations Among Economic Area Licensees and Incumbent Licensees in the Upper 200 Channels ofthe 800 MHz Band, PR Docket No. 93-144, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 FCC Rcd 4882, 4884, para. 4(2001).266 See infra para. 176; Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17946, para. 74.267 See supra n.243.268 See supra para. 61; see also infra Section III.H.269 FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 706 n.16 (1979).270 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 656.48Federal Communications Commission
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legal standard. For example, we note that the data roaming rule upheld by the D.C. Circuit's Cellcodecision states that ''[c]onduct that unreasonably restrains trade . . . is not commercially reasonable.''271Similarly, the Commission recently concluded that certain joint activities between certain televisionstations, which are not regulated as common carriers, in the negotiation of retransmission consent fees area per se violation of the requirement of ''good faith'' negotiation.272 Are there any practices that,consistent with the Verizon court's reasoning, could be viewed as per se commercially unreasonable?138.Some have suggested that the Commission go even beyond the requirements of the OpenInternet Order to impose flat bans on pay-for-priority service.273 We seek comment on these suggestions,including whether all pay-for-priority practices, or some of them, could be treated as per se violations ofthe commercially reasonable standard or under any other standard based on any source of legalauthority.274 We emphasize that section 706 could not be used to reach some conduct under this judiciallyrecognized approach to circumvent the principle that the proposed rules will not, in any circumstances,constitute common carriage per se. If the Commission were to ultimately rely on a source of authorityother than section 706 to adopt a legal standard for broadband provider practices, such as Title II, we seekcomment on whether and, if so, how we should prohibit all, or some, pay-for-priority arrangements,consistent with our authority, to protect and promote Internet openness.4.Potential Safe Harbors
139.Similar to the approach of identifying practices ex ante that would not satisfy thecommercially reasonable legal standard, the Commission may be able to identify specific services thatwould be treated separately from the application of the commercially reasonable legal standard. We seekcomment on this approach and how the services below should be considered under such an approach.140.Application to Mobile Broadband. The Commission chose not to apply its nounreasonable discrimination rule to mobile broadband providers in 2010 based on considerationsincluding the rapidly evolving nature of mobile technologies, the increased amount of consumer choice inmobile broadband services, and operational constraints that put greater pressure on the concept ofreasonable network management for mobile broadband services.275 We have tentatively concluded thatwe will continue that approach in the proposed rules.276 Alternatively, should the Commission accountfor different characteristics of mobile service as a factor in its application of the commercially reasonablestandard, subject to mobile providers' reasonable network management? How would maintaining ourprevious approach for mobile broadband affect end users across different demographic groups, includingend users who rely solely on mobile broadband for Internet access?277141.Non-exclusive, non-affiliated agreements. AT&T has suggested that the Commissionexclude from its review of particular practices any agreement between a broadband provider and an edgeprovider if the agreement is not exclusive and if the edge provider is not an affiliate of the broadbandprovider. AT&T explains that subjecting broadband providers to case-by-case scrutiny in such cases''would unnecessarily impede efficient and pro-consumer arms-length commercial dealings.''278 We seek271 Data Roaming Order, 26 FCC Rcd at 5433, para. 45.272 See generally 2014 Retransmission Order, 29 FCC Rcd 3351.273 See Adam Clark Estes, WSJ: The FCC's New Net Neutrality Rules Will OK Pay-to-Play, Gizmodo.com (Apr. 23,2014), http://gizmodo.com/wsj-the-fccs-new-net-neutrality-rules-will-ok-pay-to-p-1566738354.274 See supra Section III.E.3.275 See Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17956-59, paras. 93-98.276 See supra para. 62.277 See supra n.228.278 AT&T Comments at 3. AT&T further explains that this is because, in these situations, the ''ISP is neitherfavoring its own content, applications, or services nor providing a service on an exclusive basis.'' Id. at 12.49
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comment on whether this approach should be adopted to limit the scope of the commercially reasonablestandard and whether it could be made consistent with the protections afforded by the rule.F.
Legal Authority
142.In this Notice, we propose to adopt rules to protect and promote the open Internet. Forthe reasons set forth below, we believe we have ample authority to do so.279 We propose that theCommission exercise its authority under section 706, consistent with the D.C. Circuit's opinion inVerizon v. FCC, to adopt our proposed rules. We also seek comment on the nature and the extent of theCommission's authority to adopt open Internet rules relying on Title II, and other possible sources ofauthority, including Title III. Additionally, we seek comment on the Commission's authority under any ofthe legal theories discussed below to address any transition or implementation issues associated with anyopen Internet rules adopted in this proceeding, such as the effect on existing agreements.2801.Section 706
143.We seek comment on our authority under section 706.281 We interpret sections 706(a)and (b) as independent and overlapping grants of authority that give the Commission the flexibility toencourage deployment of broadband Internet access service through a variety of regulatory methods,including removal of barriers to infrastructure investment and promoting competition in thetelecommunications market, and, in the case of section 706(b), giving the Commission the authority to actswiftly when it makes a negative finding of adequate deployment.282 The rules we propose today wouldbe authorized by sections 706(a) and (b) because they would ''encourage the deployment'' of advancedtelecommunications capability by promoting competition in the telecommunications market and removingbarriers to infrastructure investment.283 We also seek comment on the relevant differences between279 For an in-depth description of the factual basis for the adoption of rules, see supra Sections III.A-E.280 When implementing requirements in other contexts the Commission has, for example, addressed the impact onpreexisting agreements. See, e.g., Promotion of Competitive Networks in Local Telecommunications Markets,WT Docket No. 99-217, Report and Order, 23 FCC Rcd 5385, 5387-91, paras. 8-13 (2008) (prohibiting carriersfrom entering into contracts that would make them the exclusive provider of telecommunications services inresidential multiple tenant environments and that carriers may not enforce existing exclusivity contracts); ExclusiveService Contracts for Provision of Video Services in Multiple Dwelling Units and Other Real Estate Developments,MB Docket No. 07-51, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 FCC Rcd 20235 (2007)(prohibiting the enforcement of existing exclusivity clauses and the execution of new ones by cable operators andothers subject section 628 in the context of multiple dwelling units (MDUs) and other real estate developments); seealso, e.g., Amendment of the Commission's Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, MB Docket No. 10-71, Reportand Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 29 FCC Rcd 3351, 3391, para. 66 (2014) (seeking commenton ''how elimination of the exclusivity rules would affect existing exclusivity contracts and broadcasters' ability toenforce those contracts'').281 Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 706, 110 Stat. 56, 153 (1996) (1996Act), as amended in relevant part by the Broadband Data Improvement Act (BDIA), Pub. L. No. 110-385, 122 Stat.4096 (2008), is now codified in Title 47, Chapter 12 of the United States Code. See 47 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.282 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 637 (''The question, then, is this: Does the Commission's current understanding of section706(a) as a grant of regulatory authority represent a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute? We believe itdoes.''); id. at 641 (''Contrary to Verizon's arguments, we believe the Commission has reasonably interpreted section706(b) to empower it to take steps to accelerate broadband deployment if and when it determines that suchdeployment is not reasonable and timely.''); Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17968-72, paras. 117-23(articulating a theory of authority under section 706(a)-(b)); Public Knowledge and Common Cause Comments at27-28.283 See supra Sections III.C.2; III.D.2; III.E.2.50
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sections 706(a) and (b) and how, if at all, those differences should impact our exercise of authorityhere.284144.To the extent that we rely on our authority under section 706(b), we seek comment onhow we should treat the existence of and the findings in the Commission's Broadband Progress Reportsfor the purposes of this proceeding. Could and should the Commission incorporate findings that satisfysection 706(b) in this proceeding? Finally, we seek comment on the extent to which the disparity betweenmetropolitan areas and rural deployment of broadband or within metropolitan areas should impact ourconclusions as to whether advanced telecommunications capability is being reasonably and timelydeployed.145.We also seek comment on how to construe the specific terms and definitions in section706. For example, ''advanced telecommunications capability'' is defined ''without regard to anytransmission media or technology, as high-speed, switched, broadband telecommunications capability thatenables users to originate and receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and video telecommunicationsusing any technology.''285 It is clear that broadband Internet access service is such ''advancedtelecommunications capability,'' but we also seek comment on what other broadband-enabled servicesmay fall within the definition of ''advanced telecommunications capability.''286 Should the Commissioninterpret the term ''advanced telecommunications capability'' to require that certain practices accompany abroadband provider's deployment to ensure that end users receive ''high-speed, switched, broadbandtelecommunications capability that enables users to originate and receive high-quality voice, data,graphics, and video telecommunications?'' In addition, we note that Congress did not define''deployment.'' We believe Congress intended this term to be construed broadly, and thus, consistent withprecedent, we have interpreted it to include the extension of networks as well as the extension of thecapabilities and capacities of those networks.287284 There are significant differences between the authorities granted in each provision. For example, while bothsection 706(a) and (b) permit the Commission to enact measures that promote competition in thetelecommunications market, section 706(b) permits the Commission to act by promoting competition in the''telecommunications market'' while section 706(a) limits the Commission to promoting competition in the ''localtelecommunications market.'' Also, while section 706(a) gives the Commission general authority to encourage thedeployment of broadband regardless of findings under section 706(b), section 706(b) gives the Commissionauthority to take ''immediate action.'' Compare 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (''The Commission . . . shall encourage thedeployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans . . . byutilizing, in a manner consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity, price cap regulation, regulatoryforbearance, measures that promote competition in the local telecommunications market, or other regulatingmethods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment.''), with 47 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (''If the Commission[]determin[es] [that advanced telecommunications capability is not being deployed to all Americans in a reasonableand timely fashion], it shall take immediate action to accelerate deployment of such capability by removing barriersto infrastructure investment and by promoting competition in the telecommunications market.'').285 47 U.S.C. § 1302(d)(1).286 See Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17968, para. 117 ('''[A]dvanced telecommunications capability,' asdefined in the statute, includes broadband Internet access.''); National Broadband Plan for our Future, GN DocketNo. 09-51, Notice of Inquiry, 24 FCC Rcd 4342, 4390, Appx. para. 14 (2009) (stating that ''advancedtelecommunications capability'' includes broadband Internet access); Inquiry Concerning the Deployment ofAdvanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, CC Docket No.98-146, Report, 14 FCC Rcd 2398, 2400, paras. 1, 20 (1999) (stating that section 706 addresses ''the deployment ofbroadband capability''). Even when broadband Internet access is provided as an ''information service'' rather than a''telecommunications service,'' see Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 977-78 (2005), it involves ''telecommunications.'' 47 U.S.C. § 153(24).287 See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in aReasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of theTelecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, GN Docket No. 11-121,(continued'...)51
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146.In section 230(b) of the Communications Act, Congress also set forth statutory''polic[ies] of the United States'': to ''promote the continued development of the Internet,'' to promote''technologies which maximize user control over what information is received'' over the Internet, and to''preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet, unfettered byFederal or State regulation.''288 We continue to believe the Commission's interpretation of section 706 isbolstered by these congressional policies.289 We seek comment on how the Commission should readsection 230(b) in exercising its section 706 authority.147.We also seek comment generally on how the court's decision in Verizon v. FCC shouldinform our exercise of legal authority.290 The D.C. Circuit upheld the Commission's interpretation of itsauthority under section 706,291 concluding that the factual predicate that the Commission had laidjustifying its regulations was reasonable and that such a factual predicate was reasonably linked to theCommission's exercise of authority.292 However, because the court determined that the Commission'sno-blocking and anti-discrimination rules impermissibly regulated broadband providers as commoncarriers, the court vacated those rules, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with theopinion.293 We seek comment generally on how the court's Verizon decision should impact our exerciseof authority here.294 Are there principles raised in Judge Silberman's separate opinion concurring in partand dissenting in part that are relevant to our exercise of authority as to the new rules proposed, or uponwhich we otherwise seek comment, here?2.Title II
148.We seek comment on whether the Commission should rely on its authority under Title IIof the Communications Act, 295 including both (1) whether we should revisit the Commission'sclassification of broadband Internet access service as an information service and (2) whether we should(Continued from previous page)Report, 27 FCC Rcd 10342, 10363, para. 27 (2012) (2012 Eighth Broadband Progress Report) (''Congress intendedthe annual section 706(b) inquiries to be broader than a narrow examination of physical network deployment . . .Accordingly, our inquiry includes an assessment of a variety of factors indicative of broadband availability, such asbroadband cost, quality, and adoption by consumers.''). But see CEA Comments at 4.288 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(b)(1), (3) (emphasis added).289 See Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17967, para. 116.290 See Public Knowledge and Common Cause Comments at 27-28 (discussing the Commission's broad authorityunder section 706 pursuant to Verizon v. FCC). But see generally Full Service Network Comments (arguing that theD.C. Circuit's decision was fatally flawed for a number of reasons).291 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 635 (''[S]ection 706 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act . . . furnishes the Commissionwith the requisite affirmative authority to adopt [open Internet] regulations.'').292 Id. at 644 (''[T]he Commission's prediction that the Open Internet Order regulations will encourage broadbanddeployment is, in our view, both rational and supported by substantial evidence. . . . [T]he Commission has morethan adequately supported and explained its conclusion that edge-provider innovation leads to the expansion andimprovement of broadband infrastructure.''). But see id. at 665 (Silberman J., concurring in part and dissenting inpart) (''[T]he Commission's failure to conduct a market power analysis is fatal to its attempt to regulate, because itmeans that there is inadequate evidence to support the lynchpin of the Commission's economic theory.'').293 Id. at 659 (''[A]lthough we reject Verizon's challenge to the Open Internet Order's disclosure rules, we vacateboth the anti-discrimination and the anti-blocking rules.'').294 See generally id.295 See, e.g., Cogent Comments at 2 (the Commission should use Title II authority); Voices for Internet FreedomComments at 1 (same); Vonage Comments at 2 (Title II authority and authority under section 706 arecomplementary); Public Knowledge and Common Cause Comments at 15-18 (section 706 is insufficient to adoptstrong open Internet rules, but Title II gives the Commission requisite authority). But see, e.g., American ActionForum Comments at 9 (the Commission should take Title II reclassification off the table).52Federal Communications Commission
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separately identify and classify as a telecommunications service a service that ''broadband providers . . .furnish to edge providers.''296 For either of these possibilities, we seek comment on whether and how theCommission should exercise its authority under section 10 (or section 332(c)(1) for mobile services) toforbear from specific obligations under the Act and Commission rules that would flow from theclassification of a service as telecommunications service.149.Title II'--Revisiting the Classification of Broadband Internet Access Service. In a seriesof decisions beginning in 2002, the Commission has classified broadband Internet access service offeredover cable modem,297 DSL and other wireline facilities,298 wireless facilities,299 and power lines300 as aninformation service, which is not subject to Title II and cannot be regulated as common carrier service.301In 2010, following the D.C. Circuit's Comcast decision, the Commission issued a Notice of Inquiry (2010NOI) that, among other things, asked whether the Commission should revisit these decisions and classifya telecommunications component service of wired broadband Internet access service as a''telecommunications service.''302 The Commission also asked whether it should similarly alter itsapproach to wireless broadband Internet access service, noting that section 332 requires that wirelessservices that meet the definition of ''commercial mobile service''303 be regulated as common carriers296 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 656.297 See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable & Other Facilities; Internet Over CableDeclaratory Ruling; Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities,GN Docket No. 00-185, CS Docket No. 02-52, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCCRcd 4798, 4824, para. 41 (2002) (Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling), aff'd sub nom. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms.Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).298 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities et al., CC Docket Nos.02-33, 01-337, 95-20, 98-10, WC Docket Nos. 04-242, 05-271, Report and Order and Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd 14853, 14863-65, 14909-12, paras. 14-17, 103-06 (2005).299 Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireless Networks, WT DocketNo. 07-53, Declaratory Ruling, 22 FCC Rcd 5901, 5909-10, 5912-14, paras. 19-26, 29-33 (2007).300 United Power Line Council's Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding the Classification of Broadband overPower Line Internet Access Service as an Information Service, WC Docket No. 06-10, Memorandum Opinion andOrder, 21 FCC Rcd 13281 (2006).301 47 U.S.C. § 153(24) (''The term 'information service' means the offering of a capability for generating,acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information viatelecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include any use of any such capability for themanagement, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunicationsservice.''); 47 U.S.C. § 153(50) (''The term 'telecommunications' means the transmission, between or among pointsspecified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the informationas sent and received.''); 47 U.S.C. § 153(53) (''The term 'telecommunications service' means the offering oftelecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available directlyto the public, regardless of the facilities used.''); 47 U.S.C. § 153(51) (''A telecommunications carrier shall be treatedas a common carrier under this chapter only to the extent that it is engaged in providing telecommunications services. . . .'').302 Framework for Broadband Internet Service, GN Docket No. 10-127, Notice of Inquiry, 25 FCC Rcd 7866 (2010)(2010 NOI). Specifically, the Commission sought comment on whether to classify as a telecommunications service''Internet connectivity,'' which it defined as ''the functions that 'enable [end users] to transmit data communicationsto and from the rest of the Internet.''' Id. at 7894, para. 64. The docket opened by the 2010 NOI remains open. Toensure that it remains current, we hereby direct the Wireline Competition Bureau to issue a public notice to refreshthe record in that proceeding including the inquiries contained herein.303 Commercial mobile service is defined ''as any mobile service (as defined in section 153 of this title) that isprovided for profit and makes interconnected service available (A) to the public or (B) to such classes of eligibleusers as to be effectively available to a substantial portion of the public, as specified by regulation by theCommission.'' 47 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1). The Commission has defined ''commercial mobile radio service'' or ''CMRS''(continued'...)53
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under Title II.304 In response, the Commission received substantial comments on these issues. We nowseek further and updated comment on whether the Commission should revisit its prior classificationdecisions and apply Title II to broadband Internet access service (or components thereof). How wouldsuch a reclassification approach serve our goal to protect and promote Internet openness? What would bethe legal bases and theories for particular open Internet rules adopted pursuant to such an approach?Would reclassification and applying Title II for the purpose of protecting and promoting Internetopenness impact the Commission's overall policy goals and, if so, how?150.What factors should the Commission keep in mind as it considers whether to revisit itsprior decisions? Have there been changes to the broadband marketplace that should lead us to reconsiderour prior classification decisions? To what extent is any telecommunications component of that serviceintegrated with applications and other offerings, such that they are ''inextricably intertwined'' with theunderlying connectivity service?305 Is broadband Internet access service (or any telecommunicationscomponent thereof) held out ''for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to beeffectively available directly to the public?''306 If not, should the Commission compel the offering of suchfunctionality on a common carrier basis even if not offered as such? For mobile broadband Internetaccess service, does that service fit within the definition of ''commercial mobile service''?307 We also notethat on May 14, 2014, Representative Henry Waxman, Ranking Member of the Committee on Energy andCommerce of the U.S. House of Representatives, sent a letter to Chairman Wheeler proposing anapproach to protecting the open Internet whereby the Commission would proceed under section 706 butuse Title II as a ''backstop authority.''308 We seek comment on the viability of that approach.151.Title II'--Classification of the Broadband Providers' Service to Edge Providers. Separatefrom the reclassification of ''broadband Internet access service,'' we seek comment on how theCommission should consider broadband providers' service to edge providers and whether that service (orsome portion of it) is subject to Title II regulation. As mentioned above, in Verizon, the D.C. Circuitstated that ''broadband providers furnish a service to edge providers, thus undoubtedly functioning as(Continued from previous page)as a list of ''mobile services that shall be treated as common carriage services and regulated as commercial mobileradio services . . . pursuant to Section 332 of the Communications Act.'' 47 C.F.R. § 20.9(a).304 2010 NOI, 25 FCC Rcd at 7907-09, paras. 101-05.305 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 978.306 47 U.S.C. § 153(46). A key feature of whether a provider is engaged in common carriage is if it ''make[s]capacity available to the public indifferently''; it can also be compelled to offer service on a common carrier basis if''the public interest requires common carrier operation of the proposed facility.'' Cable & Wireless PLC, File No.SCL-96-005, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 8516, 8522, paras. 14-15 (1997); see also U.S.Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 295 F.3d 1326, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (''[C]ommon carrier status turns on: (1) whether thecarrier 'holds himself out to serve indifferently all potential users'; and (2) whether the carrier allows 'customers totransmit intelligence of their own design and choosing.''' (citation omitted)); Virgin Islands Tel. Co. v. FCC, 198F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608-09 (D.C. Cir.1976); Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Whether a providerhas made a common carriage offering ''must be determined on a case-by-case basis.'' Bright House Networks, LLC,et al. v. Verizon California, Inc., et al., File No. EB-08-MD-002, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 FCC Rcd10704, 10717-19, paras. 37-40 (2008) (finding that carriers offered common carriage service despite lacking a tariff,website posting, or any other advertisement, because providers self-certified themselves as common carriers, enteredinto publicly available interconnection agreements, and obtained state certificates of public convenience andnecessity), aff'd sub nom. Verizon Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 555 F.3d 270, 275-76 (D.C. Cir. 2009).307 See 47 U.S.C. § 332; 47 C.F.R. § 20.3.308 Letter from Rep. Henry Waxman, Ranking Member, Committee on Energy and Commerce, to Thomas Wheeler,Chairman, Federal Communications Commission at 2 (May 14, 2014), http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Wheeler-Title-II-Backup-Option-2014-5-14.pdf.54Federal Communications Commission
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edge providers' 'carriers.'''309 We understand such service to include the flow of Internet traffic on thebroadband providers' own network, and not how it gets to the broadband providers' networks. TheCommission in the Open Internet Order understood the 2010 rules to regulate ''broadband Internet accessservice,'' which the Commission classified as an information service. That service, however, is bydefinition a ''mass-market retail service'' providing the capability to send and receive data from ''allInternet end points.''310 Does the ''service'' contemplated by the court between broadband providers andedge providers fit that definition? We seek comment on whether and, if so how, the Commission shouldseparately identify and classify a broadband service that is furnished by broadband providers' to edgeproviders in order to protect and promote Internet openness.152.Some have made proposals suggesting that the Commission could apply Title II to suchservices to achieve our open Internet objectives. For example, on May 5, 2014, Mozilla filed a petitionrequesting that the Commission (1) recognize remote delivery services in terminating access networks;(2) classify these services as ''telecommunications services'' under Title II of the Act; and (3) forbear fromany ''inapplicable or undesirable provisions of Title II'' for such services.311 Mozilla states that, unlike theend-user facing broadband services the Commission has classified as information services, theCommission has not classified the service that broadband Internet providers to remote endpoints,particularly to entities not in privity with the broadband provider.312 These services, Mozilla argues, canand should be classified as telecommunications services, subject to whatever Title II regulations theCommission deems appropriate.313 Similarly, academics from Columbia University have submitted analternate proposal to classify Internet-facing services that a broadband provider offers.314 This theorywould split broadband Internet access service into two components: first, the subscriber's ''request [for]data from a third-party provider; and second, the content provider's response to the subscriber.''315 Theproposal would classify the latter ''sender-side'' traffic, sent in response to a broadband provider'scustomer's request as a telecommunications service, subject to Title II.316 According to the proposal, thisis a stand-alone offer of telecommunications'--transmission between points specified by the end-user.317We seek comment on these proposals and other suggestions for how the Commission could identify andclassify such services and apply Title II to achieve our goals of protecting and promoting Internetopenness.153.Title II'--Forbearance. If the Commission were to reclassify broadband Internet accessservice as described above or classify a separate broadband service provided to edge providers as a''telecommunications service,'' such a service would then be subject to all of the requirements of the Actand Commission rules that would flow from the classification of a service as a telecommunicationsservice or common carrier service. Should the Commission take such an approach, we seek comment onthe extent to which forbearance from certain provisions of the Act or our rules would be justified in order309 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 653.310 See 47 C.F.R. § 8.11(a).311 Mozilla, Petition to Recognize Remote Delivery Services in Terminating Access Networks and Classify SuchServices as Telecommunications Services Under Title II of the Communications Act, GN Docket Nos. 09-91, 14-28,WC Docket No. 07-52, at ii, 10-13 (filed May 5, 2014) (Mozilla Petition).312 Id. at 6-9.313 Id. at 10-13.314 Letter from Tim Wu and Tejas Narechania, Columbia University to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FederalCommunications Commission, GN Docket No. 14-28 (filed Apr. 14, 2014) (Wu & Narechania Ex Parte Letter).315 Id., Attach. at 13.316 Id., Attach. at 13-14.317 Id. Attach. at 15; 47 U.S.C. § 153(50).55
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to strike the right balance between minimizing the regulatory burden on providers and ensuring that thepublic interest is served.318 For mobile broadband services, we seek comment on whether and how theCommission should apply section 332(c)(1) in addition to section 10 forbearance.319154.In the 2010 NOI, the Commission contemplated that, if it were to classify the Internetconnectivity component of broadband Internet access service, it would forbear from applying all but ahandful of core statutory provisions'--sections 201, 202, 208, and 254'--to the service.320 In addition, theCommission identified sections 222 and 255 as provisions that could be excluded from forbearance,noting that they have ''attracted longstanding and broad support in the broadband context.''321 Wereceived considerable comment in that proceeding and seek further and updated comment.322Commenters should list and explain which provisions should be exempt from forbearance and whichshould receive it in order to protect and promote Internet openness. Commenters should also detail whichservices should receive forbearance, list the provisions from which they believe the Commission shouldforbear, and provide justification for the forbearance. Commenters should also define the relevantgeographic and product markets in which the services or providers should receive forbearance.155.For mobile broadband services, we also seek comment on the extent to which forbearanceshould apply, if the Commission were to classify mobile broadband Internet access service as a CMRSservice subject to Title II. The 2010 NOI also asked whether the Commission could and should applysection 332(c)(1) as well as section 10 in its forbearance analysis for mobile services.323 We receivedconsiderable comment in that proceeding and seek further and updated comment here.3.Other Sources of Authority
156.Title III. We further seek comment on the Commission's authority to adopt open Internetrules for mobile broadband services under Title III of the Communications Act. The Supreme Court hasfound that Title III endows the Commission with ''expansive powers'' and a ''comprehensive mandate to318 Section 10 of the Communications Act provides that the Commission shall forbear from applying a provision ofthe Act or the Commission's rules to a telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service (or a class thereof)if: (1) enforcement of that provision is not necessary to ensure just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory practices;(2) enforcement is not necessary to protect consumers; and (3) forbearance is consistent with the public interest.47 U.S.C. § 160(a). ''In making the determination under subsection (a)(3) [that forbearance is in the public interest,]the Commission shall consider whether forbearance from enforcing the provision or regulation will promotecompetitive market conditions, including the extent to which such forbearance will enhance competition amongproviders of telecommunications services. If the Commission determines that such forbearance will promotecompetition among providers of telecommunications services, that determination may be the basis for a Commissionfinding that forbearance is in the public interest.'' 47 U.S.C. § 160(b).319 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1). Under that provision, the Commission may render provisions other than section 201, 202,or 208 inapplicable ''only if the Commission determines that'--(i) enforcement of such provision is not necessary inorder to ensure that the charges, practices, classifications, or regulations for or in connection with that service arejust and reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory; (ii) enforcement of such provision is notnecessary for the protection of consumers; and (iii) specifying such provision is consistent with the public interest.''Id.320 2010 NOI, 25 FCC Rcd at 7895, para. 68.321 Id.322 See Letter from Robert Quinn, AT&T to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission,GN Docket No. 14-28 at 1 (filed May 14, 2014) (stating that ''forbearance would not address the many seriousimplications of reclassification'') (emphasis in original).323 2010 NOI, 25 FCC Rcd at 7909, para. 104.56
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'encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest.'''324 Section 303 of the Act, inparticular, authorizes the Commission to exercise its authority as ''the public interest, convenience, andnecessity requires'' to ''[p]rescribe the nature of the service to be rendered by each class of licensedstations and each station within any class,'' and to establish obligations, not inconsistent with law, as maybe necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act .325 It further directs the Commission to ''generallyencourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest.''326 Likewise, section 316 ofthe Act authorizes the Commission to adopt ''new conditions on existing licensees'' when taking suchaction will ''promote the public interest, convenience, and necessity.''327 The Commission may exercisethis authority on a license-by-license basis or through a rulemaking,328 even if the affected licenses wereawarded at auction.329157.We find that these provisions provide authority for the Commission to adopt openInternet rules for mobile broadband service providers. Particularly, we find that it is within our authorityto ''prescribe the nature of the service to be rendered by each class of licensed stations and each stationwithin any class,'' consistent with what the ''public interest, convenience, and necessity requires'' to applyopen Internet rules to mobile broadband service providers.330 We seek comment on this interpretation ofour Title III authority.158.Other Sources of Authority. We seek comment on other sources of authority that theCommission may utilize to underpin the adoption of these rules. For example, the Open Internet Orderdelineated a number of arguments for authority under a variety of statutory provisions.331 We also seekcomment on the theory that the Commission may underpin open Internet rules by using its discretion todefine the scope of common carriage.332 In addition, we seek comment on the Commission's authority toadopt rules under the World Trade Organization's Basic Agreement on Trade in Telecommunications.333We seek comment on the efficacy of those, and other justifications for the rules we propose adoptinghere.4.Constitutional Considerations
159.Finally we seek comment on other legal limitations and barriers to adoption of the ruleswe propose today, including First Amendment and Due Process considerations. In the Open InternetOrder, the Commission concluded that ''broadband providers typically are best described not as'speakers,' but rather as conduits for speech,'' and that the open Internet rules therefore did not implicate324 CNBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 303(g)); see also Cellco, 700 F.3d at 542(upholding the Commission's authority to require licensees to offer data roaming arrangements on commerciallyreasonable terms and conditions).325 47 U.S.C. § 303(b), (r).326 47 U.S.C. § 303(g).327 47 U.S.C. § 316.328 See WBEN Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601, 618 (2d Cir. 1968).329 See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(6); Celtronix Telemetry v. FCC, 272 F.3d 585 (D.C. Cir. 2001).330 47 U.S.C. § 303(b).331 The Commission alternatively relied on a variety of provisions under Titles I, II, III, and VI as authority foradopting the rules. See Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17972-81, paras. 124-137.332 See Public Knowledge and Common Cause Comments 22-27.333 See generally Jennifer A. Manner and Alejandro Hernandez, An Overlooked Basis of Jurisdiction for NetNeutrality: The World Trade Organization Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services, 22 CommLawConspectus 60 (2014).57
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broadband providers' First Amendment rights.334 The Commission also found that even if the rules ''didimplicate expressive activity, they would not violate the First Amendment''335 because they wouldadvance an important government interest'--''ensur[ing] the public's access to a multiplicity ofinformation sources and maximiz[ing] the Internet's potential to further the public interest'''--withoutburdening '''substantially more speech than is necessary.'''336 We seek comment on these findings. Wedo not anticipate constitutional, statutory, or other legal barriers to adopting the rules we propose today,but we nonetheless seek comment on these matters. Are there modifications we could make to theproposals we make today that would avoid constitutional questions?G.
Other Laws and Considerations
160.The Open Internet Order provided that the open Internet rules did not alter broadbandproviders' rights or obligations with respect to other laws or safety and security considerations.337 TheCommission further established that the rules did not prohibit broadband providers from makingreasonable efforts to address transfers of unlawful content and unlawful transfers of content.338 Wetentatively conclude that this continues to be the correct approach in light of the rules proposed in today'sNotice. We therefore propose to retain these regulations without modification. We seek comment on thistentative conclusion.H.
Enforcement and Dispute Resolution
1.Background
161.The Open Internet Order allowed parties to file informal complaints pursuant to section1.41 of the Commission's rules and promulgated a set of formal complaint rules.339 The formal complaintrules give the Commission flexibility to shift the burden of proof or production where appropriate and tostructure and streamline the process to the extent possible.340 Due to the technical nature of potentialdisputes, however, the Open Internet Order stressed the importance of direct negotiations andconsultation with independent technical bodies in hope that parties would be able to resolve disputesbefore availing themselves of the complaint processes.341 Thus, the policy of the Commission has been toencourage the filing of informal, rather than formal, complaints, and thus it was not surprising that theCommission did not receive any formal complaints following the adoption of the Open Internet Order.As noted above, the Commission has received many informal complaints from consumers allegingviolations of the Open Internet Order. In addition, the Commission takes notice of public commentaryand events, which may lead the Enforcement Bureau to initiate its own investigation. We seek commenton the efficiency and functionality of the complaint processes adopted in, and used pursuant to, the OpenInternet Order.2.Designing an Effective Enforcement Process
162.The Verizon decision and our earlier data roaming rules provide a blueprint for thecreation of a dispute resolution process to govern the rules we propose today to protect and promote theopen Internet. Of course, there are significant potential differences between the data roaming and open334 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17982, para. 141.335 Id. at 17983, para. 145.336 Id. at 17984, para. 146.337 47 C.F.R. § 8.9; Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17963-64, paras. 108-10.338 47 C.F.R. § 8.9; Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17964-65, para. 111.339 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17986-89, paras. 153-59; 47 C.F.R. §§ 8.12-17.340 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17988, para. 157.341 See id. at 17986, 17988, paras. 151, 159.58
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Internet environments. For example, in Cellco, the D.C. Circuit considered a circumstance in which anidentified party, a wireless carrier, would desire to enter into a business arrangement with anotheridentified party, another wireless carrier. The rule at issue was designed to create circumstances that bothincented individualized bargaining and, in specific circumstances, curbed the limits of such negotiationwhere necessary to serve the public interest. A similar circumstance could arise in the open Internetcontext, if for example, an app developer wished to enter into a contractual arrangement with a broadbandprovider. But it is just as possible that the entity that feels aggrieved by an alleged violation of an openInternet rule does not seek a direct contractual relationship with a broadband provider. That could arise,for example, if a website is blocked or if an edge provider feels that it is being harmed by differentialtreatment afforded by a broadband provider to its own affiliate. For this reason, the dispute resolutionmechanism adopted by the Commission to enforce our proposed open Internet rules should be designed tooperate between parties that do not necessarily desire to enter into a binding agreement.163.We tentatively conclude that an effective institutional design for the rules proposed intoday's Notice must include at least three elements. First, there must be a mechanism to provide legalcertainty, so that broadband providers, end users and edge providers alike can better plan their activities inlight of clear Commission guidance. Second, there must be flexibility to consider the totality of the factsin an environment of dynamic innovation. Third, there must be effective access to dispute resolutions byend users and edge providers alike. We seek comment on these elements. Are there others that should beconsidered? Should any be eliminated? What forms of dispute resolution would be the best strategy toimplement ''data-driven decision-making''?342164.We believe we have ample legal authority to design an effective enforcement and disputeresolution process, whether the Commission ultimately relies on section 706, Title II, or another source oflegal authority. We seek comment on whether and how, if at all, the source of the Commission's legalauthority would affect our dispute resolution and enforcement proposals.343a.Legal Certainty
165.The Commission has a responsibility to provide certainty, guidance, and predictability tothe marketplace as we protect and promote the open Internet. The most important form of guidance is, ofcourse, the adoption by the Commission of a particular legal standard in the forthcoming rulemaking. Aswith the ''commercially reasonable'' standard employed in our data roaming rule, the purpose of such alegal standard is allow broadband providers, end users, and edge providers to measure broadband-provider conduct against a known rule of law, both prospectively and retroactively. Under the existingrules, formal complaints would also result in Commission orders that would both decide a specificcomplaint and provide useful guidance on the application of our proposed open Internet rules'--particularly in those cases where the adjudicated set of facts is representative of a larger industry practice.What other forms of guidance would be helpful? For example, is there value in establishing a business-review-letter approach similar to that of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, wherebyentities concerned about certain practices under the new rules may ask the Commission for a statement ofits current enforcement intentions with respect to that conduct and by which the Commission wouldpublish both the request for review and its response?344 If adopted, would it make sense to have such aprospective review process be administered jointly by the Enforcement Bureau and the Office of GeneralCounsel, or should such prospective reviews be considered by the full Commission? Should suchguidance be binding or non-binding? How might petitions for declaratory ruling be helpful?342 Phil Weiser, Institutional Design, FCC Reform and the Hidden Side of the Administrative States, Working Paper09-01 38 (2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1336820.343 See supra Section III.F.344 See 28 C.F.R. § 50.6; Dep't. of Justice, Pilot Program Announced to Expedite Business Review Process (1992),http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/201659a.pdf.59
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166.Non-Binding Staff Opinions. Are there other mechanisms by which the Commission canprovide guidance before broadband providers initiate practices that are within the scope of the openInternet rules? For example, the Commission could designate certain staff to offer parties non-bindingviews on the likelihood that a particular practice by a broadband provider is commercially reasonable orcommercially unreasonable (assuming that were the applicable legal standard ultimately adopted). TheCommission has some experience with this non-binding, advisory approach to interpretation of itsrules.345 While this type of informal guidance from staff is not binding, it may provide parties withhelpful information as they consider whether and how to resolve a dispute privately and outside of thecomplaint process. Should we establish a similar process for helping parties anticipate issues or resolvedisputes that might arise under our proposed open Internet rules? If so, should the non-binding guidancebe made public in any way, or should it provide a confidential basis for early consultation? Weemphasize that these sorts of non-binding processes would always be in addition to, and not in lieu of, theright of parties to seek binding determinations from the Commission through the formal or informalcomplaint process, declaratory rulings, or other mechanisms we adopt to resolve disputes and allegationsof violations of our open Internet rules.167.Enforcement Advisories. Another type of guidance can come in the form of enforcementadvisories. For example, the Enforcement Bureau and the Office of General Counsel issued anenforcement advisory in 2011, providing additional insight into the application of the transparency rule.346Is it helpful to have these bureaus issue such advisories periodically where issues of potential generalapplication come to, or are brought to, their attention? Should such enforcement advisories be consideredbinding policy of the Commission, or merely a recitation of staff views?b.Flexibility
168.Our process for promoting and protecting Internet openness through the rules we proposetoday must be flexible enough to account for the totality of circumstances, including Internet evolutionand innovation from all sources over time. In the Open Internet Order, the Commission stated that itwould make certain determinations on a case-by-case basis.347 The Commission also stated in the DataRoaming Order that it would determine whether the terms and conditions of a proffered data roamingarrangement were commercially reasonable on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the totalityof the circumstances.348 Based on the Commission's precedent in using this decision-making process, wetentatively conclude that we will adopt a similar case-by-case analysis and consider the totality of thecircumstances to consider alleged violations of our proposed open Internet rules. Such an approachwould, for example, allow the Commission to consider any sources of innovation when analyzingwhether conduct meets the legal standard ultimately adopted by the Commission. Moreover, thisapproach helps to ensure that, as new circumstances exist, the Commission and interested parties will beadvantaged by a culture of learning that, drawing on the strengths of common-law reasoning, reflects theexperiences of the present, as well as the logic of the past.349 We seek comment on whether the345 See Federal Communications Commission, Market Disputes Resolution Division,http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/market-disputes-resolution-division (last visited Apr. 24, 2014).346 FCC Enforcement Bureau and Office of General Counsel Issue Advisory Guidance for Compliance with OpenInternet Transparency Rule, GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52, Public Notice, 26 FCC Rcd 9411(Enforcement Bur./Office Gen. Counsel 2011).347 See supra para. 61.348 Data Roaming Order, 26 FCC Rcd at 5432, para. 42.349 See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law at 1 (1881): ''The life of the law has not been logic: ithas been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of publicpolicy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good dealmore to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies thestory of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the(continued'...)60
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combination of a certain legal standard and a case-by-case approach provides the best means of bothproviding guidance and cabining administrative discretion, while ensuring that a system of disputeresolution is both focused on facts and founded on the strengths of common-law reasoning.169.Fact Finding Processes. In implementing either an informal or formal complaintprocess, how should the Commission structure its fact-finding processes? What level of evidence shouldbe required in order to bring a claim? Are there other circumstances where initial pleading standards orburdens of production should be either higher or lower? In general, what is the showing required for theburden of production shift from the party bringing the claim to the other party in a dispute? Shouldinterim relief be available? Should the process permit parties to seek expedited treatment of claims and, ifso, under what circumstances?c.Effective Access to Dispute Resolution
170.To be effective in protecting and promoting Internet openness, the process for enforcingthe rules we propose today must be accessible to a diverse array of affected parties. As noted above, theOpen Internet Order contemplated informal and formal complaints but did not include any alternativemechanisms for either providing guidance beforehand or resolution in the wake of a challenge to anexisting practice. But, as also noted above, the rules proposed in today's Notice will operate in anenvironment in which a complaining party may not have sought, or may not even want, to enter into acontractual arrangement with a broadband provider. Moreover, the ability of edge providers to effectivelyaccess a dispute resolution is important to the administrative effectiveness of any legal regime that theCommission might adopt. To what extent should the structure of edge provider market segments impactthe kind of regime that the Commission adopts? For example, although 17 broadband access providersaccounted for about 93 percent of U.S. retail subscribers in 2013,350 near the end of that year there werealmost 900 app developers that each served more than one million active users globally.351 And appdevelopers as a group may be quite a bit smaller than broadband providers; one estimate in 2013calculated that 65 percent of app developers garner less than $35,000 per year.352 Moreover, individualsare themselves quite capable of serving as edge providers, for example aspiring musicians who uploadvideos to sites such as YouTube.353171.How can a dispute resolution system be best structured to account for individuals andsmall businesses that may not have the same legal resources and effective access to the Commission asbroadband providers? We propose to create an ombudsperson whose duty will be to act as a watchdog toprotect and promote the interests of edge providers, especially smaller entities. Should initial pleading orprocedural requirements be adopted that make access to Commission processes by individuals or smallbusinesses less cumbersome?(Continued from previous page)axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to know what it is, we must know what it has been, andwhat it tends to become. We must alternately consult history and existing theories of legislation. But the mostdifficult labor will be to understand the combination of the two into new products at every stage.''350 Jeff Baumgartner, Top U.S. MSO's & Telcos Added 2.6M Broadband Subs in 2013, Multichannel News (Mar.17, 2014), http://www.multichannel.com/news/technology/top-us-msos-telcos-added-26m-broadband-subs-2013/325549.351 Tony Danova, There Are Almost 900 Different App Developers That Have Over 1 Million Active Users, BusinessInsider (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/there-are-almost-900-different-app-developers-that-have-over-1-million-active-users-2013-11.352 Scott Austin, The Surprising Numbers Behind Apps, Wall Street Journal Digits Blog (Mar. 11, 2013),http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/03/11/the-surprising-numbers-behind-apps/.353 Leigh Goessl, How Musicians Can Use the Internet to Increase Exposure, Entertainment: Scene 360 (Jan. 1,2014), http://www.entertainmentscene360.com/index.php/how-musicians-can-use-the-internet-to-increase-exposure-31667/.61Federal Communications Commission
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3.Complaint Processes, Enforcement, and Additional Forms of DisputeResolution
172.Complaint Processes. We tentatively conclude that the same three means by which theCommission focused on potential open Internet violations after the adoption of the Open Internet Order,namely self-initiated investigation, informal complaints, and formal complaints, should be used as well toenforce any new open Internet rules. We seek comment on this tentative conclusion. Are there ways wecan improve our informal complaint process to make it easier to access and more effective, especially forconsumers and small businesses with limited resources? For example, should theCommission create a separate Open Internet complaint category for consumers filing informal complaintsunder the open Internet rules? Should the Commission permit individuals to report possiblenoncompliance with our Open Internet rules anonymously or take other steps to protect the identity ofindividuals who may be concerned about retaliation for raising concerns?173.Enforcement. We tentatively conclude that enforcement of the transparency rule and anyenhanced transparency rule that is adopted in this proceeding should proceed under the same disputemechanisms that will apply to the proposed no-blocking rule and the legal standard for provider practicesultimately adopted by the Commission. We also tentatively conclude that violations of the rules would besubject to forfeiture penalties, as appropriate, under the Act. We seek comment on these tentativeconclusions.174.Additional Forms of Dispute Resolution'--Alternative Dispute Resolution. In addition tothe Commission processes noted above to provide guidance, flexibility, and access, we seek comment onwhether additional dispute resolutions should be adopted. Should we adopt measures to require orencourage disputes over the legality of broadband provider practices to be resolved through alternativedispute resolution processes, such as arbitration? Would such an approach be sufficiently accessible tosmaller edge providers, or would a different dispute resolution process be more appropriate? Are thereany legal considerations, limitations, or concerns that the Commission should consider with adopting analternative dispute resolution procedure, including arbitration or mediation by a third party?354 We notethat under our informal dispute resolution procedures, Commission staff can mediate disputes if partiesvoluntarily request such a process. During such mediations, for instance, the staff may ask parties tosubmit their best offers to facilitate negotiations. We also can adopt specific rules to determineappropriate remedies and rapid resolution of formal complaints, including a requirement that partiesprovide their best and final offers to help Commission staff determine an appropriate remedy if a violationof the rule is found.355 We seek comment on the benefits and costs of such an approach in this context.175.Additional Forms of Dispute Resolution'--Multistakeholder Processes. We also seekcomment on whether a multistakeholder approach to the enforcement of our proposed open Internet ruleswould work in this context, in whole or in part. For example, should the Commission provide an initialforum for discussion and thereafter encourage stakeholders, should they so choose, to independentlydevelop standards that they consider to meet the governing legal standards? Such standards might then beshared with the Commission for consideration, or the stakeholders might publicize their proposedstandards and encourage industry to use them as best practices. If the Commission employed a modelsimilar to that of NTIA's multistakeholder privacy process, are there lessons we can learn from that354 For example, under the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, an agency ''may not require any person to consent toarbitration as a condition of entering into a contract or obtaining a benefit.'' 5 U.S.C. § 575(a)(3). We note,however, that this restriction does not prevent the Commission from requiring parties to submit to third-partyarbitration so long as the arbitration is subject to de novo review by the Commission. See, e.g., Comcast Corp.,Petition for Declaratory Ruling that The America Channel is not a Regional Sports Network, File No. CSR-7108,Order, 22 FCC Rcd 17938, 17948, para. 4, n.13 (2007).355 In the Data Roaming Order, the Commission reserved the right to require both parties to provide their best andfinal offers to help Commission staff determine an appropriate remedy if a violation of the rule was found. DataRoaming Order, 26 FCC Rcd 5411, 5450-51, paras. 79, 83.62
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experience?356 How can a multistakeholder process best further the goals of providing guidance,flexibility, and access?176.Additional Forms of Dispute Resolution'--Technical Advisory Groups. We also seekcomment on whether and how the Commission should incorporate the expertise of technical advisorygroups into a new open Internet framework in a manner that could serve the goals of providing guidance,flexibility and access. For example, should we invite the Open Internet Advisory Committee (OIAC), theBroadband Internet Technical Advisory Group (BITAG), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), orthe North American Network Operators Group (NANOG) to recommend to the Commission or publicmore generally industry best practices or other codes of conduct that would either serve as presumptivesafe harbors and/or help determine whether a broadband provider is in compliance with our open Internetrules?357 Or, rather than asking industry groups and other interested parties to play a role ex ante, shouldthe Commission instead ask them generally, or specific groups in particular, to weigh in on specificdisputes once they are brought to the Commission's attention?358 We seek comment generally on how theinclusion of advisory groups might strengthen the open Internet framework and reduce the burdens ofcompliance. Similarly, we seek comment on the potential value of allowing providers to opt intovoluntary codes of conduct or other suggested best practices that may serve as presumptive safe harbors.IV.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
A.
Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis
177.This document contains proposed new information collection requirements. TheCommission, as part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, invites the general public andthe Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to comment on the information collection requirementscontained in this document, as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13.In addition, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, see44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), we seek specific comment on how we might further reduce the informationcollection burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees.B.
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
178.As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA),359 the Commission hasprepared an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) for this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, of thepossible significant economic impact on small entities of the policies and rules addressed in thisdocument. The IRFA is set forth in Appendix B. Written public comments are requested on this IRFA.Comments must be identified as responses to the IRFA and must be filed by the deadlines for comments356 For example, the Department of Commerce directed the NTIA to convene multistakeholder processes to developlegally enforceable codes of conduct specifying how consumer data privacy rules should apply in specific businesscontexts. NTIA's role in the privacy multistakeholder process is to ''help the parties reach clarity on what theirpositions are and whether there are options for compromise toward consensus, rather than substituting [the NTIA's]own judgment.'' The White House, Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for ProtectingPrivacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy 23-26, 27 (Feb. 2012),http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf.357 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17989, para. 162. The Open Internet Advisory Committee is an inclusiveand transparent body comprised of a balanced group including consumer advocates; Internet engineering experts;content, application, and service providers; network equipment and end-user-device manufacturers and suppliers;investors; broadband service providers; and other parties the Commission may deem appropriate. The Committeeaids the Commission in tracking developments with respect to the freedom and openness of the Internet, includingtechnical standards and issues relating to mobile broadband and specialized services. The Committee reports to theCommission and make recommendations it deems appropriate concerning the open Internet framework. Id. 358 2013 OIAC Annual Report at 39-46 (AT&T Face Time Case Study).359 See 5 U.S.C. § 603.63
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on the Notice indicated on the first page of this document. The Commission's Consumer andGovernmental Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, will send a copy of this Notice of ProposedRulemaking, including the IRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small BusinessAdministration (SBA).360C.
Comment Filing Procedures
179.Pursuant to sections 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.415,1.419, interested parties may file comments and reply comments on or before the dates indicated on thefirst page of this document. Comments may be filed using the Commission's Electronic Comment FilingSystem (ECFS). See Electronic Filing of Documents in Rulemaking Proceedings, 63 FR 24121 (1998).§Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically using the Internet by accessing theECFS: http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs2/.§Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must file an original and one copy of eachfiling. If more than one docket or rulemaking number appears in the caption of this proceeding,filers must submit two additional copies for each additional docket or rulemaking number.Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial overnight courier, or by first-class or overnight U.S. Postal Service mail. All filings must be addressed to the Commission'sSecretary, Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.§All hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for the Commission's Secretarymust be delivered to FCC Headquarters at 445 12th St., SW, Room TW-A325,Washington, DC 20554. The filing hours are 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. All hand deliveriesmust be held together with rubber bands or fasteners. Any envelopes and boxes must bedisposed of before entering the building.§Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service Express Mail and PriorityMail) must be sent to 9300 East Hampton Drive, Capitol Heights, MD 20743.§U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express, and Priority mail must be addressed to 445 12thStreet, SW, Washington DC 20554.180.People with Disabilities: To request materials in accessible formats for people withdisabilities (braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), send an e-mail to fcc504@fcc.gov or callthe Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice), 202-418-0432 (tty).D.
Ex Parte Rules
181.This proceeding shall be treated as a ''permit-but-disclose'' proceeding in accordance withthe Commission's ex parte rules.361 Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy of anywritten presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days afterthe presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons makingoral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must (1) list allpersons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex parte presentation was made,and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during the presentation. If the presentationconsisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the presenter'swritten comments, memoranda or other filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to360 See 5 U.S.C. § 603(a).361 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1200 et seq.64
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such data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevantpage and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing themin the memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex parte meetings aredeemed to be written ex parte presentations and must be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b). Inproceedings governed by rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method ofelectronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte presentations,and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available for thatproceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants inthis proceeding should familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.E.
Contact Person
182.For further information about this rulemaking proceeding, please contact KristineFargotstein, Competition Policy Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, at (202) 418-2774.V.
ORDERING CLAUSES
183.Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to sections 1, 2, 4(i)-(j), 303 and 316 of theCommunications Act of 1934, as amended, and section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, asamended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152, 154(i)-(j), 303, 316, 1302, that this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ISADOPTED.184.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commission's Consumer and GovernmentalAffairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, SHALL SEND a copy of this Notice of ProposedRulemaking, including the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy ofthe Small Business Administration.FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSIONMarlene H. DortchSecretary65Federal Communications Commission
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APPENDIX A
Proposed Rules
Part 8 of Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as follows:PART 8 '' PROTECTING AND PROMOTING THE OPEN INTERNET
Sec.8.1Purpose.8.3Transparency.8.5No Blocking.8.7No Commercially Unreasonable Practices.8.9Other Laws and Considerations.8.11 Definitions.AUTHORITY: 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152, 154(i)-(j), 303, 316, 1302§ 8.1Purpose.
The purpose of this Part is to protect and promote the Internet as an open platform enabling consumerchoice, freedom of expression, end-user control, competition, and the freedom to innovate withoutpermission, and thereby to encourage the deployment of advanced telecommunications capability andremove barriers to infrastructure investment.§ 8.3Transparency.
(a) A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service shall publicly discloseaccurate information regarding the network management practices, performance, and commercial termsof its broadband Internet access services, in a manner tailored (i) for end users to make informed choicesregarding use of such services, (ii) for edge providers to develop, market, and maintain Internet offerings,and (iii) for the Commission and members of the public to understand how such person complies with therequirements described in sections 8.5 and 8.7 of this chapter.(b) In making the disclosures required by this section, a person engaged in the provision of broadbandInternet access service shall include meaningful information regarding the source, timing, speed, packetloss, and duration of congestion.(c) In making the disclosures required by this section, a person engaged in the provision of broadbandInternet access service shall publicly disclose in a timely manner to end users, edge providers, and theCommission when they make changes to their network practices as well as any instances of blocking,throttling, and pay-for-priority arrangements, or the parameters of default or ''best effort'' service asdistinct from any priority service.§ 8.5No Blocking.
A person engaged in the provision of fixed broadband Internet access service, insofar as such person is soengaged, shall not block lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices, subject toreasonable network management.A person engaged in the provision of mobile broadband Internet access service, insofar as such person isso engaged, shall not block consumers from accessing lawful websites, subject to reasonable network66Federal Communications Commission
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management; nor shall such person block applications that compete with the provider's voice or videotelephony services, subject to reasonable network management.§ 8.7No Commercially Unreasonable Practices.
A person engaged in the provision of fixed broadband Internet access service, insofar as such person is soengaged, shall not engage in commercially unreasonable practices. Reasonable network managementshall not constitute a commercially unreasonable practice.§ 8.9Other Laws and Considerations.
Nothing in this part supersedes any obligation or authorization a provider of broadband Internet accessservice may have to address the needs of emergency communications or law enforcement, public safety,or national security authorities, consistent with or as permitted by applicable law, or limits the provider'sability to do so.Nothing in this part prohibits reasonable efforts by a provider of broadband Internet access service toaddress copyright infringement or other unlawful activity.§ 8.11 Definitions.(a) Block. The failure of a broadband Internet access service to provide an edge provider with aminimum level of access that is sufficiently robust, fast, and dynamic for effective use by end users andedge providers.(b) Broadband Internet access service. A mass-market retail service by wire or radio that provides thecapability to transmit data to and receive data from all or substantially all Internet endpoints, includingany capabilities that are incidental to and enable the operation of the communications service, butexcluding dial-up Internet access service. This term also encompasses any service that the Commissionfinds to be providing a functional equivalent of the service described in the previous sentence, or that isused to evade the protections set forth in this Part.(c) Edge Provider. Any individual or entity that provides any content, application, or service over theInternet, and any individual or entity that provides a device used for accessing any content, application, orservice over the Internet.(d) End User. Any individual or entity that uses a broadband Internet access service.(e) Fixed broadband Internet access service. A broadband Internet access service that serves end usersprimarily at fixed endpoints using stationary equipment. Fixed broadband Internet access service includesfixed wireless services (including fixed unlicensed wireless services), and fixed satellite services.(f) Mobile broadband Internet access service. A broadband Internet access service that serves end usersprimarily using mobile stations.(g) Reasonable network management. A network management practice is reasonable if it is appropriateand tailored to achieving a legitimate network management purpose, taking into account the particularnetwork architecture and technology of the broadband Internet access service.67Federal Communications Commission
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APPENDIX B
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
1.As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA),1 theCommission has prepared this Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the possible significanteconomic impact on a substantial number of small entities from the policies and rules proposed in thisNotice of Proposed Rulemaking (Notice). The Commission requests written public comment on thisIRFA. Comments must be identified as responses to the IRFA and must be filed by the deadlines forcomments on the Notice provided on the first page of the Notice. The Commission will send a copy ofthe Notice, including this IRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration(SBA).2 In addition, the Notice and IRFA (or summaries thereof) will be published in the FederalRegister.3A.
Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Rules
2.With this Notice, the Commission is directly responding to the remand by the U.S. Courtof Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Verizon v. FCC of portions of the Commission's 2010 Open InternetOrder and proposing enforceable rules to protect and promote the open Internet.4 The Notice seekscomment on a variety of issues relating to the Commission's stated objective of protecting and promotingan open Internet. The Internet's openness promotes innovation, investment, competition, free expressionand other national broadband goals. It is also critical to the Internet's ability to serve as a platform forspeech and civic engagement and can help close the digital divide by facilitating the development ofdiverse content, applications, and services. The Commission has specifically found that the Internet'sopenness enables a ''virtuous circle of innovation in which new uses of the network'--including newcontent, applications, services, and devices'--lead to increased end-user demand for broadband, whichdrives network improvements, which in turn lead to further innovative network uses.''5 However, as theCommission has previously found, broadband providers have both the incentive and ability to limitInternet openness. As discussed in the Notice, the Commission is seeking comment on proposed openInternet rules that will protect against the harms identified in the 2010 Open Internet Order, whilefostering all sources of innovation on the collection of networks known as the Internet.6 The Notice asksfor comment in a variety of specific areas and sets forth proposals in the following six key areas: scope ofthe proposed rules, enhancement of the existing transparency rule, a no-blocking rule, an enforceable ruledesigned to protect the open Internet that is not per se common carriage, the best source of legal authorityfor protection of Internet openness and an enforcement and dispute resolution process.3.First, the Notice proposes to retain the same definitions and scope as the 2010 rules. TheNotice seeks comment, however, on whether the Commission should change the scope of the proposedrules as applied to the following: specifically identified services, enterprise services, Internet trafficexchange, specialized services, and mobile services. The Notice also proposes to interpret ''reasonablenetwork management'' under the same framework adopted in the 2010 Open Internet Order and seekscomment on developing the scope of ''reasonable network management'' on a case-by-case basis underthe proposed rules.1 See 5 U.S.C. § 603. The RFA, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-12, has been amended by the Small Business RegulatoryEnforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA), Pub. L. No. 104-121, Title II, 110 Stat. 857 (1996).2 See 5 U.S.C. § 603(a).3 Id.4 See Notice Section III; Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014).5 Open Internet Order, 25 FCC Rcd at 17910-11, para. 14.6 See Notice Section III. A.68
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4.Second, the Notice proposes enhancements to the Commission's existing transparencyrule, which was upheld by the D.C. Circuit. The Notice seeks comment on whether disclosures ofbroadband providers' network management practices, performance, and terms and conditions that arespecifically tailored to the needs of affected parties would better ensure that consumers, edge providers,and the Internet community at large have the information they need to understand the services they arereceiving and to monitor practices that could undermine the open Internet than the existing rule TheNotice seeks comment on the burdens of enhanced transparency on broadband providers and specificallyasks if there are ways to minimize these potential costs and burdens.5.Third, the Notice proposes adopting the text of the no-blocking rule from the 2010 OpenInternet Order, with a revised rationale, in order to ensure that all end users and edge providers can enjoythe use of robust, fast and dynamic Internet access. To address the ongoing concerns with the harmfuleffects that blocking of Internet traffic would have on Internet openness and to competition in adjacentmarkets, the Notice seeks comment on a draft no-blocking rule that would allow individualizedbargaining above a minimum level of access to a broadband provider's subscribers, which the D.C.Circuit suggested would be permissible and take the rule out of the realm of common carriage regulation.The Notice proposes a variety of ways to establish a minimum level of access under the proposed no-blocking rule and seeks comment on those interpretations. Alternatively, the Notice seeks comment onwhether the Commission should adopt a no-blocking rule that either itself prohibits broadband providersfrom entering into priority agreements with edge providers or acts in combination with a separate ruleprohibiting such conduct. Additionally, consistent with the 2010 Open Internet Order, the Noticeproposes to apply the proposed no-blocking rule differently to mobile broadband providers than to fixedbroadband providers and seeks comment on that approach.6.Fourth, where conduct would otherwise be permissible under the no-blocking rule, theNotice proposes a separate rule that requires broadband providers to adhere to an enforceable legalstandard of commercially reasonable practices. The Notice tentatively concludes that the Commissionshould adopt a revised rule that, consistent with the court's decision, may permit broadband providers toengage in individualized practices, while prohibiting those broadband provider practices that threaten toharm Internet openness. The Commission's proposed approach contains three essential elements: (1) anenforceable legal standard of conduct barring broadband provider practices that threaten to undermineInternet openness, providing certainty to network providers, end users, and edge providers alike, (2)clearly established factors that give additional guidance on the kind of conduct that is likely to violate theenforceable legal standard, and (3) encouragement of individualized negotiation and, if necessary, amechanism to allow the Commission to evaluate challenged practices on a case-by-case basis, therebyproviding flexibility in assessing whether a particular practice comports with the legal standard. TheNotice proposes that the concept of reasonable network management would be treated separately from theapplication of the commercially reasonable practices legal standard and seeks comment on this approach.The Notice asks how harm can best be identified and prohibited and whether certain practices, like paidprioritization, should be barred altogether. The Notice also seeks comment on whether the Commissionshould consider current technical characteristics, industry practices, and the impact on consumers, amongother factors, when evaluating commercially reasonable practices.7.Fifth, the Notice proposes to rely on section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996as the source of authority for the proposed rules. It seeks comment, however, on the best source ofauthority for protecting Internet openness, whether section 706, Title II of the Communications Act of1934, as amended, and/or other sources of legal authority such as Title III of the Communications Act forwireless services. With respect to the prospect of proceeding under Title II, the Notice seeks comment onwhether and how the Commission should exercise its authority under section 10 of the Act'--or section332(c)(1) for mobile services'--to forbear from specific Title II obligations that would flow from theclassification of a service as telecommunications service.8.Sixth, the Notice proposes a multi-faceted dispute resolution process to provide effectiveaccess for end users, edge providers, and broadband network providers alike and the creation of anombudsperson to act as a watchdog to represent the interests of consumers, start-ups and small69Federal Communications Commission
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businesses. The Notice seeks comment on the level of flexibility needed for such approaches and,specifically, how the Commission can ensure that the process is accessible by end users and edgeproviders, including small entities. The Notice also proposes that should the Commission ultimatelyadopt one of the proposed dispute mechanisms, then enforcement of the existing transparency rule andany enhancements to that rule would proceed under the same manner as enforcement of theCommission's other proposed open Internet rules if adopted.B.
Legal Basis
9.The legal basis for any action that may be taken pursuant to the Notice is contained insections 1, 2, 4(i)-(j), 303, and 316, of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and section 706 ofthe Telecommunications Act of 1996, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152, 154(i)-(j), 303, 316, 1302,C.
Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which the RulesWould Apply
10.The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and where feasible, an estimate ofthe number of small entities that may be affected by the proposed rules, if adopted.7 The RFA generallydefines the term ''small entity'' as having the same meaning as the terms ''small business,'' ''smallorganization,'' and ''small governmental jurisdiction.''8 In addition, the term ''small business'' has thesame meaning as the term ''small-business concern'' under the Small Business Act.9 A small-businessconcern'' is one which: (1) is independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field ofoperation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the SBA.101.Total Small Entities
11.Our proposed action, if implemented, may, over time, affect small entities that are noteasily categorized at present. We therefore describe here, at the outset, three comprehensive, statutorysmall entity size standards.11 First, nationwide, there are a total of approximately 28.2 million smallbusinesses, according to the SBA.12 In addition, a ''small organization'' is generally ''any not-for-profitenterprise which is independently owned and operated and is not dominant in its field.''13 Nationwide, asof 2007, there were approximately 1,621,315 small organizations.14 Finally, the term ''smallgovernmental jurisdiction'' is defined generally as ''governments of cities, towns, townships, villages,school districts, or special districts, with a population of less than fifty thousand.''15 Census Bureau datafor 2007 indicate that there were 89,476 local governmental jurisdictions in the United States.16 We7 See 5 U.S.C. § 603(b)(3).8 See 5 U.S.C. § 601(6).9 See 5 U.S.C. § 601(3) (incorporating by reference the definition of ''small-business concern'' in the Small BusinessAct, 15 U.S.C. § 632). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 601(3), the statutory definition of a small business applies ''unless anagency, after consultation with the Office of Advocacy of the Small Business Administration and after opportunityfor public comment, establishes one or more definitions of such term which are appropriate to the activities of theagency and publishes such definition(s) in the Federal Register.''10 See 15 U.S.C. § 632.11 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 601(3)-(6).12 See SBA, Office of Advocacy, ''Frequently Asked Questions,''http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/FAQ_March_2014_0.pdf (last accessed Apr. 28, 2014).13 5 U.S.C. § 601(4).14 Indep. Sector, The New Nonprofit Almanac and Desk Reference (2010).15 5 U.S.C. § 601(5).16 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012, Section 8, page 267, tbl. 429,https://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0429.pdf/ (data cited therein are from 2007).70
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estimate that, of this total, as many as 88,761 entities may qualify as ''small governmental jurisdictions.''17Thus, we estimate that most governmental jurisdictions are small.2.Internet Access Service Providers
12.The actions proposed in the Notice would apply to broadband Internet access serviceproviders. The 2011 Economic Census places these firms, whose services might include Voice overInternet Protocol (VoIP), in either of two categories, depending on whether the service is provided overthe provider's own telecommunications facilities (e.g., cable and DSL ISPs), or over client-suppliedtelecommunications connections (e.g., dial-up ISPs). The former are within the category of WiredTelecommunications Carriers,18 which has an SBA small business size standard of 1,500 or feweremployees.19 These are also labeled ''broadband.'' The latter are within the category of All OtherTelecommunications,20 which has a size standard of annual receipts of $25 million or less.21 These arelabeled non-broadband. The most current Economic Census data for Wired Telecommunications Carriersare 2011 data, and the most current Economic Census data for All Other Telecommunications are 2007data, which are detailed specifically for ISPs within the categories above. For the first category, the datashow that 3,372 firms operated for the entire year, of which 2,037 had nine or fewer employees.22 For thesecond category, the data show that 1,274 firms operated for the entire year. 23 Of those, 1,252 had annualreceipts below $25 million per year. Consequently, we estimate that the majority of ISP firms are smallentities.13.The ISP industry has changed since these definitions were introduced in 2007. The datacited above may therefore include entities that no longer provide Internet access service and may excludeentities that now provide such service. To ensure that this IRFA describes the universe of small entitiesthat our action might affect, we discuss in turn several different types of entities that might be providingInternet access service. We note that, although we have no specific information on the number of smallentities that provide broadband Internet access service over unlicensed spectrum, we include these entitiesin our Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis.17 The 2007 U.S. Census data for small governmental organizations are not presented based on the size of thepopulation in each such organization. There were 89,476 local governmental organizations in 2007. If we assumethat county, municipal, township, and school district organizations are more likely than larger governmentalorganizations to have populations of 50,000 or less, the total of these organizations is 52,095. As a basis ofestimating how many of these 89,476 local government organizations were small, in 2011, we note that there were atotal of 715 cities and towns (incorporated places and minor civil divisions) with populations over 50,000. City andTown Totals Vintage: 2011 '' U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/popest/data/cities/totals/2011/index.html.If we subtract the 715 cities and towns that meet or exceed the 50,000 population threshold, we conclude thatapproximately 88,761 are small. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012, Section 8,page 267, tbl. 429, https://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0429.pdf/ (data cited therein are from2007).18 U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 NAICS Definitions, ''517110 Wired Telecommunications Carriers,''http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?code=517110&search=2012%20NAICS%20Search19 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS code 517110.20 U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 NAICS Definitions, ''517919 All Other Telecommunications,'',http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?code=517919&search=2012%20NAICS%20Search.21 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS code 517919.22 U.S. Census Bureau, 2011 Economic Census, Subject Series: Information, ''Establishment and Firm Size,''NAICS code 5171103 (released Dec. 2013), http://www2.census.gov/econ/susb/data/2011/us_6digitnaics_2011.xls.23 U.S. Census Bureau, 2007 Economic Census, Subject Series: Information, ''Establishment and Firm Size,''NAICS code 5179191 (released Nov. 19, 2010) (receipts size).71
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3.Wireline Providers
14.Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (Incumbent LECs). Neither the Commission nor theSBA has developed a small business size standard specifically for incumbent local exchange services.The appropriate size standard under SBA rules is for the category Wired Telecommunications Carriers.Under that size standard, such a business is small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees.24 According toCommission data,25 1,307 carriers reported that they were incumbent local exchange service providers.26Of these 1,307 carriers, an estimated 1,006 have 1,500 or fewer employees and 301 have more than 1,500employees.27 Consequently, the Commission estimates that most providers of incumbent local exchangeservice are small businesses that may be affected by our proposed action.15.Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (Competitive LECs), Competitive Access Providers(CAPs), Shared-Tenant Service Providers, and Other Local Service Providers. Neither the Commissionnor the SBA has developed a small business size standard specifically for these service providers. Theappropriate size standard under SBA rules is for the category Wired Telecommunications Carriers. Underthat size standard, such a business is small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees.28 According toCommission data, 1,442 carriers reported that they were engaged in the provision of either competitivelocal exchange services or competitive access provider services.29 Of these 1,442 carriers, an estimated1,256 have 1,500 or fewer employees and 186 have more than 1,500 employees.30 In addition, 17 carriershave reported that they are Shared-Tenant Service Providers, and all 17 are estimated to have 1,500 orfewer employees.31 In addition, 72 carriers have reported that they are Other Local Service Providers.32Of the 72, seventy have 1,500 or fewer employees and two have more than 1,500 employees.33Consequently, the Commission estimates that most providers of competitive local exchange service,competitive access providers, Shared-Tenant Service Providers, and other local service providers aresmall entities that may be affected by our proposed action.16.We have included small incumbent LECs in this present RFA analysis. As noted above,a ''small business'' under the RFA is one that, inter alia, meets the pertinent small business size standard(e.g., a telephone communications business having 1,500 or fewer employees), and ''is not dominant in itsfield of operation.''34 The SBA's Office of Advocacy contends that, for RFA purposes, small incumbentLECs are not dominant in their field of operation because any such dominance is not ''national'' inscope.35 We have therefore included small incumbent LECs in this RFA analysis, although we emphasize24 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS code 517110.25 Federal Communications Commission, Wireline Competition Bureau, Industry Analysis and TechnologyDivision, Trends in Telephone Service, tbl. 5.3 (Sept. 2010) (Trends in Telephone Service).26 See Trends in Telephone Service at tbl. 5.3.27 See id.28 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS code 517110.29 See Trends in Telephone Service at tbl.5.3.30 See id.31 See id.32 See id.33 See id.34 5 U.S.C. § 601(3).35 Letter from Jere W. Glover, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, SBA, to William E. Kennard, Chairman, FederalCommunications Commission (filed May 27, 1999). The Small Business Act contains a definition of ''smallbusiness concern,'' which the RFA incorporates into its own definition of ''small business.'' 15 U.S.C. § 632(a); 5(continued'...)72
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that this RFA action has no effect on Commission analyses and determinations in other, non-RFAcontexts.17.Interexchange Carriers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA has developed a smallbusiness size standard specifically for providers of interexchange services. The appropriate size standardunder SBA rules is for the category Wired Telecommunications Carriers. Under that size standard, such abusiness is small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees.36 According to Commission data,37 359 carriers havereported that they are engaged in the provision of interexchange service. Of these, an estimated 317 have1,500 or fewer employees and 42 have more than 1,500 employees. Consequently, the Commissionestimates that the majority of IXCs are small entities that may be affected by our proposed action.18.Operator Service Providers (OSPs). Neither the Commission nor the SBA has developeda small business size standard specifically for operator service providers. The appropriate size standardunder SBA rules is for the category Wired Telecommunications Carriers. Under that size standard, such abusiness is small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees.38 According to Commission data, 33 carriers havereported that they are engaged in the provision of operator services. Of these, an estimated 31 have 1,500or fewer employees and two have more than 1,500 employees.39 Consequently, the Commissionestimates that the majority of OSPs are small entities that may be affected by our proposed action.4.Wireless Providers '' Fixed and Mobile
19.The broadband Internet access service provider category covered by this Notice maycover multiple wireless firms and categories of regulated wireless services. Thus, to the extent thewireless services listed below are used by wireless firms for broadband Internet access services, theproposed actions may have an impact on those small businesses as set forth above and further below. Inaddition, for those services subject to auctions, we note that, as a general matter, the number of winningbidders that claim to qualify as small businesses at the close of an auction does not necessarily representthe number of small businesses currently in service. Also, the Commission does not generally tracksubsequent business size unless, in the context of assignments and transfers or reportable eligibilityevents, unjust enrichment issues are implicated.20.Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite). Since 2007, the Census Bureauhas placed wireless firms within this new, broad, economic census category.40 Prior to 2007, such firmswere within the now-superseded categories of ''Paging'' and ''Cellular and Other WirelessTelecommunications.''41 Under the present and prior categories, the SBA has deemed a wireless businessto be small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees.42 For the category of Wireless Telecommunications(Continued from previous page)U.S.C. § 601(3). SBA regulations interpret ''small business concern'' to include the concept of dominance on anational basis. 13 C.F.R. § 121.102(b).36 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS code 517110.37 Trends in Telephone Service, tbl. 5.3.38 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS code 517110.39 Trends in Telephone Service, tbl. 5.3.40 U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 NAICS Definitions, ''517210 Wireless Telecommunications Categories (ExceptSatellite)''; http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?code=517210&search=2012%20NAICS%20Search.41 U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 NAICS Definitions, ''517211 Paging'';http://www.census.gov/epcd/naics02/def/NDEF517.HTM.; U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 NAICS Definitions, ''517212Cellular and Other Wireless Telecommunications''; http://www.census.gov/epcd/naics02/def/NDEF517.HTM.42 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS code 517210 (2012 NAICS). The now-superseded, pre-2007 C.F.R. citations were13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS codes 517211 and 517212 (referring to the 2002 NAICS).73Federal Communications Commission
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Carriers (except Satellite), data for 2011 show that there were 784 firms operating that year.43 Of these784 firms, an estimated 749 have 500 or fewer employees and 35 have more than 500 employees. Sinceall firms with fewer than 1,500 employees are considered small, given the total employment in the sector,we estimate that the vast majority of wireless firms are small.21.Wireless Communications Services. This service can be used for fixed, mobile,radiolocation, and digital audio broadcasting satellite uses. The Commission defined ''small business'' forthe wireless communications services (WCS) auction as an entity with average gross revenues of $40million for each of the three preceding years, and a ''very small business'' as an entity with average grossrevenues of $15 million for each of the three preceding years.44 The SBA has approved thesedefinitions.45 The Commission auctioned geographic area licenses in the WCS service in 1997. In theauction, seven bidders won 31 licenses that qualified as very small business entities, and one bidder wonone license that qualified as a small business entity.22.1670''1675 MHz Services. This service can be used for fixed and mobile uses, exceptaeronautical mobile.46 An auction for one license in the 1670''1675 MHz band was conducted in 2003.One license was awarded. The winning bidder was not a small entity.23.Wireless Telephony. Wireless telephony includes cellular, personal communicationsservices, and specialized mobile radio telephony carriers. As noted, the SBA has developed a smallbusiness size standard for Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite).47 Under the SBAsmall business size standard, a business is small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees.48 According toCommission data, 413 carriers reported that they were engaged in wireless telephony.49 Of these, anestimated 261 have 1,500 or fewer employees and 152 have more than 1,500 employees.50 Therefore, alittle less than one third of these entities can be considered small.24.Broadband Personal Communications Service. The broadband personal communicationsservices (PCS) spectrum is divided into six frequency blocks designated A through F, and theCommission has held auctions for each block. The Commission initially defined a ''small business'' forC- and F-Block licenses as an entity that has average gross revenues of $40 million or less in the threeprevious calendar years.51 For F-Block licenses, an additional small business size standard for ''verysmall business'' was added and is defined as an entity that, together with its affiliates, has average gross43 U.S. Census Bureau, 2011 Economic Census, Subject Series: Information, ''Establishment and Firm Size,''NAICS code 517210 (released Dec. 2013) (employment size).http://www2.census.gov/econ/susb/data/2011/us_6digitnaics_2011.xls44 Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish Part 27, the Wireless Communications Service (WCS), GNDocket No. 96-228, Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 10785, 10879, para. 194 (1997).45 See Letter from Aida Alvarez, Administrator, SBA, to Amy Zoslov, Chief, Auctions and Industry AnalysisDivision, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Federal Communications Commission (filed Dec. 2, 1998)(Alvarez Letter 1998).46 47 C.F.R. § 2.106; see generally 47 C.F.R. §§ 27.1-27.70.47 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS code 517210.48 Id.49 Trends in Telephone Service, tbl. 5.3.50 Id.51 See Amendment of Parts 20 and 24 of the Commission's Rules '' Broadband PCS Competitive Bidding and theCommercial Mobile Radio Service Spectrum Cap; Amendment of the Commission's Cellular/PCS Cross-OwnershipRule; WT Docket No. 96-59, GN Docket No. 90-314, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 7824, 7850-52, paras. 57-60(1996) (PCS Report and Order); see also 47 C.F.R. § 24.720(b).74
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revenues of not more than $15 million for the preceding three calendar years.52 These small business sizestandards, in the context of broadband PCS auctions, have been approved by the SBA.53 No smallbusinesses within the SBA-approved small business size standards bid successfully for licenses in BlocksA and B. There were 90 winning bidders that claimed small business status in the first two C-Blockauctions. A total of 93 bidders that claimed small business status won approximately 40 percent of the1,479 licenses in the first auction for the D, E, and F Blocks.54 On April 15, 1999, the Commissioncompleted the reauction of 347 C-, D-, E-, and F-Block licenses in Auction No. 22.55 Of the 57 winningbidders in that auction, 48 claimed small business status and won 277 licenses.25.On January 26, 2001, the Commission completed the auction of 422 C and F BlockBroadband PCS licenses in Auction No. 35. Of the 35 winning bidders in that auction, 29 claimed smallbusiness status.56 Subsequent events concerning Auction 35, including judicial and agencydeterminations, resulted in a total of 163 C and F Block licenses being available for grant. On February15, 2005, the Commission completed an auction of 242 C-, D-, E-, and F-Block licenses in Auction No.58. Of the 24 winning bidders in that auction, 16 claimed small business status and won 156 licenses.57On May 21, 2007, the Commission completed an auction of 33 licenses in the A, C, and F Blocks inAuction No. 71.58 Of the 12 winning bidders in that auction, five claimed small business status and won18 licenses.59 On August 20, 2008, the Commission completed the auction of 20 C-, D-, E-, and F-BlockBroadband PCS licenses in Auction No. 78.60 Of the eight winning bidders for Broadband PCS licensesin that auction, six claimed small business status and won 14 licenses.6126.Specialized Mobile Radio Licenses. The Commission awards ''small entity'' biddingcredits in auctions for Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR) geographic area licenses in the 800 MHz and 900MHz bands to firms that had revenues of no more than $15 million in each of the three previous calendaryears.62 The Commission awards ''very small entity'' bidding credits to firms that had revenues of nomore than $3 million in each of the three previous calendar years.63 The SBA has approved these small52 See PCS Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 7852, para. 60.53 See Alvarez Letter 1998.54 See Broadband PCS, D, E and F Block Auction Closes, Public Notice, Doc. No. 89838 (rel. Jan. 14, 1997).55 See C, D, E, and F Block Broadband PCS Auction Closes, Public Notice, 14 FCC Rcd 6688 (WTB 1999). BeforeAuction No. 22, the Commission established a very small standard for the C Block to match the standard used for FBlock. Amendment of the Commission's Rules Regarding Installment Payment Financing for PersonalCommunications Services (PCS) Licensees, WT Docket No. 97-82, Fourth Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 15743,15768, para. 46 (1998).56 See C and F Block Broadband PCS Auction Closes; Winning Bidders Announced, Public Notice, 16 FCC Rcd2339 (2001).57 See Broadband PCS Spectrum Auction Closes; Winning Bidders Announced for Auction No. 58, Public Notice, 20FCC Rcd 3703 (2005).58 See Auction of Broadband PCS Spectrum Licenses Closes; Winning Bidders Announced for Auction No. 71,Public Notice, 22 FCC Rcd 9247 (2007).59 Id.60 See Auction of AWS-1 and Broadband PCS Licenses Closes; Winning Bidders Announced for Auction 78, PublicNotice, 23 FCC Rcd 12749 (WTB 2008).61 Id.62 47 C.F.R. § 90.814(b)(1).63 Id.75
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business size standards for the 900 MHz Service.64 The Commission has held auctions for geographicarea licenses in the 800 MHz and 900 MHz bands. The 900 MHz SMR auction began on December 5,1995, and closed on April 15, 1996. Sixty bidders claiming that they qualified as small businesses underthe $15 million size standard won 263 geographic area licenses in the 900 MHz SMR band. The 800MHz SMR auction for the upper 200 channels began on October 28, 1997, and was completed onDecember 8, 1997. Ten bidders claiming that they qualified as small businesses under the $15 millionsize standard won 38 geographic area licenses for the upper 200 channels in the 800 MHz SMR band.65 Asecond auction for the 800 MHz band was held on January 10, 2002 and closed on January 17, 2002 andincluded 23 BEA licenses. One bidder claiming small business status won five licenses.6627.The auction of the 1,053 800 MHz SMR geographic area licenses for the GeneralCategory channels began on August 16, 2000, and was completed on September 1, 2000. Eleven bidderswon 108 geographic area licenses for the General Category channels in the 800 MHz SMR band andqualified as small businesses under the $15 million size standard.67 In an auction completed on December5, 2000, a total of 2,800 Economic Area licenses in the lower 80 channels of the 800 MHz SMR servicewere awarded.68 Of the 22 winning bidders, 19 claimed small business status and won 129 licenses.Thus, combining all four auctions, 41 winning bidders for geographic licenses in the 800 MHz SMR bandclaimed status as small businesses.28.In addition, there are numerous incumbent site-by-site SMR licenses and licensees withextended implementation authorizations in the 800 and 900 MHz bands. We do not know how manyfirms provide 800 MHz or 900 MHz geographic area SMR service pursuant to extended implementationauthorizations, nor how many of these providers have annual revenues of no more than $15 million. Onefirm has over $15 million in revenues. In addition, we do not know how many of these firms have 1,500or fewer employees, which is the SBA-determined size standard.69 We assume, for purposes of thisanalysis, that all of the remaining extended implementation authorizations are held by small entities, asdefined by the SBA.29.Lower 700 MHz Band Licenses. The Commission previously adopted criteria fordefining three groups of small businesses for purposes of determining their eligibility for specialprovisions such as bidding credits.70 The Commission defined a ''small business'' as an entity that,together with its affiliates and controlling principals, has average gross revenues not exceeding $40million for the preceding three years.71 A ''very small business'' is defined as an entity that, together withits affiliates and controlling principals, has average gross revenues that are not more than $15 million forthe preceding three years.72 Additionally, the lower 700 MHz Service had a third category of small64 See Letter from Aida Alvarez, Administrator, SBA, to Thomas Sugrue, Chief, Wireless TelecommunicationsBureau, Federal Communications Commission (filed Aug. 10, 1999) (Alvarez Letter 1999).65 See Correction to Public Notice DA 96-586 ''FCC Announces Winning Bidders in the Auction of 1020 Licenses toProvide 900 MHz SMR in Major Trading Areas,'' Public Notice, 18 FCC Rcd 18367 (WTB 1996).66 See Multi-Radio Service Auction Closes, Public Notice, 17 FCC Rcd 1446 (WTB 2002).67 See 800 MHz Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR) Service General Category (851''854 MHz) and Upper Band (861''865 MHz) Auction Closes; Winning Bidders Announced, Public Notice, 15 FCC Rcd 17162 (2000).68 See 800 MHz SMR Service Lower 80 Channels Auction Closes; Winning Bidders Announced, Public Notice,16 FCC Rcd 1736 (2000).69 See generally 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS code 517210.70 See Reallocation and Service Rules for the 698''746 MHz Spectrum Band (Television Channels 52''59), GNDocket No. 01-74, Report and Order, 17 FCC Rcd 1022 (2002) (Channels 52''59 Report and Order).71 See id. at 1087-88, para. 172.72 See id.76
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business status for Metropolitan/Rural Service Area (MSA/RSA) licenses'--''entrepreneur'''--which isdefined as an entity that, together with its affiliates and controlling principals, has average gross revenuesthat are not more than $3 million for the preceding three years.73 The SBA approved these small sizestandards.74 An auction of 740 licenses (one license in each of the 734 MSAs/RSAs and one license ineach of the six Economic Area Groupings (EAGs)) commenced on August 27, 2002, and closed onSeptember 18, 2002. Of the 740 licenses available for auction, 484 licenses were won by 102 winningbidders. Seventy-two of the winning bidders claimed small business, very small business or entrepreneurstatus and won a total of 329 licenses.75 A second auction commenced on May 28, 2003, closed on June13, 2003, and included 256 licenses: 5 EAG licenses and 476 Cellular Market Area licenses.76 Seventeenwinning bidders claimed small or very small business status and won 60 licenses, and nine winningbidders claimed entrepreneur status and won 154 licenses.77 On July 26, 2005, the Commissioncompleted an auction of 5 licenses in the Lower 700 MHz band (Auction No. 60). There were threewinning bidders for five licenses. All three winning bidders claimed small business status.30.In 2007, the Commission reexamined its rules governing the 700 MHz band in the 700MHz Second Report and Order.78 An auction of 700 MHz licenses commenced January 24, 2008 andclosed on March 18, 2008, which included, 176 Economic Area licenses in the A Block, 734 CellularMarket Area licenses in the B Block, and 176 EA licenses in the E Block.79 Twenty winning bidders,claiming small business status (those with attributable average annual gross revenues that exceed $15million and do not exceed $40 million for the preceding three years) won 49 licenses. Thirty threewinning bidders claiming very small business status (those with attributable average annual grossrevenues that do not exceed $15 million for the preceding three years) won 325 licenses.31.Upper 700 MHz Band Licenses. In the 700 MHz Second Report and Order, theCommission revised its rules regarding Upper 700 MHz licenses.80 On January 24, 2008, theCommission commenced Auction 73 in which several licenses in the Upper 700 MHz band wereavailable for licensing: 12 Regional Economic Area Grouping licenses in the C Block, and onenationwide license in the D Block.81 The auction concluded on March 18, 2008, with 3 winning biddersclaiming very small business status (those with attributable average annual gross revenues that do notexceed $15 million for the preceding three years) and winning five licenses.73 See id., at 1088, para. 173.74 See Alvarez Letter 1999.75 See Lower 700 MHz Band Auction Closes, Public Notice, 17 FCC Rcd 17272 (WTB 2002).76 See id. 77 See id.78 Service Rules for the 698''746, 747''762 and 777''792 MHz Band; Revision of the Commission's Rules to EnsureCompatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Systems; Section 68.4(a) of the Commission's RulesGoverning Hearing Aid-Compatible Telephones; Biennial Regulatory Review'--Amendment of Parts 1, 22, 24, 27,and 90 to Streamline and Harmonize Various Rules Affecting Wireless Radio Services; Former NextelCommunications, Inc. Upper 700 MHz Guard Band Licenses and Revisions to Part 27 of the Commission's Rules;Implementing a Nationwide, Broadband, Interoperable Public Safety Network in the 700 MHz Band; Developmentof Operational, Technical and Spectrum Requirements for Meeting Federal, State and Local Public SafetyCommunications Requirements Through the Year 2010; Declaratory Ruling on Reporting Requirement underCommission's Part 1 Anti-Collusion Rule, WT Docket Nos. 07-166, 06-169, 06-150, 03-264, 96-86, PS Docket No.06-229, CC Docket No. 94-102, Second Report and Order, 22 FCC Rcd 15289, 15359 n. 434 (2007) (700 MHzSecond Report and Order).79 See Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Closes, Public Notice, 23 FCC Rcd 4572 (WTB 2008).80 700 MHz Second Report and Order, 22 FCC Rcd 15289.81 See Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Closes, Public Notice, 23 FCC Rcd 4572 (WTB 2008).77
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32.700 MHz Guard Band Licensees. In 2000, in the 700 MHz Guard Band Order, theCommission adopted size standards for ''small businesses'' and ''very small businesses'' for purposes ofdetermining their eligibility for special provisions such as bidding credits and installment payments.82 Asmall business in this service is an entity that, together with its affiliates and controlling principals, hasaverage gross revenues not exceeding $40 million for the preceding three years.83 Additionally, a verysmall business is an entity that, together with its affiliates and controlling principals, has average grossrevenues that are not more than $15 million for the preceding three years.84 SBA approval of thesedefinitions is not required.85 An auction of 52 Major Economic Area licenses commenced on September6, 2000, and closed on September 21, 2000.86 Of the 104 licenses auctioned, 96 licenses were sold to ninebidders. Five of these bidders were small businesses that won a total of 26 licenses. A second auction of700 MHz Guard Band licenses commenced on February 13, 2001, and closed on February 21, 2001. Alleight of the licenses auctioned were sold to three bidders. One of these bidders was a small business thatwon a total of two licenses.8733.Air-Ground Radiotelephone Service. The Commission has previously used the SBA'ssmall business size standard applicable to Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite), i.e.,an entity employing no more than 1,500 persons.88 There are approximately 100 licensees in the Air-Ground Radiotelephone Service, and under that definition, we estimate that almost all of them qualify assmall entities under the SBA definition. For purposes of assigning Air-Ground Radiotelephone Servicelicenses through competitive bidding, the Commission has defined ''small business'' as an entity that,together with controlling interests and affiliates, has average annual gross revenues for the precedingthree years not exceeding $40 million.89 A ''very small business'' is defined as an entity that, togetherwith controlling interests and affiliates, has average annual gross revenues for the preceding three yearsnot exceeding $15 million.90 These definitions were approved by the SBA.91 In May 2006, theCommission completed an auction of nationwide commercial Air-Ground Radiotelephone Servicelicenses in the 800 MHz band (Auction No. 65). On June 2, 2006, the auction closed with two winning82 See Service Rules for the 746''764 MHz Bands, and Revisions to Part 27 of the Commission's Rules, WT DocketNo. 99-168, Second Report and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 5299 (2000) (746''764 MHz Band Second Report and Order).83 See id. at 5343, para. 108.84 See id.85 See id. at 5343, para. 108 n.246 (for the 746''764 MHz and 776''794 MHz bands, the Commission is exempt from15 U.S.C. § 632, which requires Federal agencies to obtain SBA approval before adopting small business sizestandards).86 See 700 MHz Guard Bands Auction Closes: Winning Bidders Announced, Public Notice, 15 FCC Rcd 18026(WTB 2000).87 See 700 MHz Guard Bands Auction Closes: Winning Bidders Announced, Public Notice, 16 FCC Rcd 4590 (WTB2001).88 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS codes 517210.89 Amendment of Part 22 of the Commission's Rules to Benefit the Consumers of Air-Ground TelecommunicationsServices, Biennial Regulatory Review'--Amendment of Parts 1, 22, and 90 of the Commission's Rules, Amendment ofParts 1 and 22 of the Commission's Rules to Adopt Competitive Bidding Rules for Commercial and GeneralAviation Air-Ground Radiotelephone Service, WT Docket Nos. 03-103, 05-42, Order on Reconsideration and Reportand Order, 20 FCC Rcd 19663, paras. 28-42 (2005).90 Id.91 See Letter from Hector V. Barreto, Administrator, SBA, to Gary D. Michaels, Deputy Chief, Auctions andSpectrum Access Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Federal Communications Commission (filedSept. 19, 2005).78
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bidders winning two Air-Ground Radiotelephone Services licenses. Neither of the winning biddersclaimed small business status.34.AWS Services (1710''1755 MHz and 2110''2155 MHz bands (AWS-1); 1915''1920 MHz,1995''2000 MHz, 2020''2025 MHz and 2175''2180 MHz bands (AWS-2); 2155''2175 MHz band (AWS-3)). For the AWS-1 bands,92 the Commission has defined a ''small business'' as an entity with averageannual gross revenues for the preceding three years not exceeding $40 million, and a ''very smallbusiness'' as an entity with average annual gross revenues for the preceding three years not exceeding $15million. For AWS-2 and AWS-3, although we do not know for certain which entities are likely to applyfor these frequencies, we note that the AWS-1 bands are comparable to those used for cellular service andpersonal communications service. The Commission has not yet adopted size standards for the AWS-2 orAWS-3 bands but proposes to treat both AWS-2 and AWS-3 similarly to broadband PCS service andAWS-1 service due to the comparable capital requirements and other factors, such as issues involved inrelocating incumbents and developing markets, technologies, and services.9335.3651''3700 MHz band. In March 2005, the Commission released a Report and Orderand Memorandum Opinion and Order that provides for nationwide, non-exclusive licensing of terrestrialoperations, utilizing contention-based technologies, in the 3651 MHz band (i.e., 3651''3700 MHz). As ofApril 2010, more than 1270 licenses have been granted and more than 7433 sites have been registered.The Commission has not developed a definition of small entities applicable to 3651''3700 MHz bandnationwide, non-exclusive licensees. However, we estimate that the majority of these licensees areInternet Access Service Providers (ISPs) and that most of those licensees are small businesses.36.Fixed Microwave Services. Microwave services include common carrier,94 private-operational fixed,95 and broadcast auxiliary radio services.96 They also include the Local MultipointDistribution Service (LMDS),97 the Digital Electronic Message Service (DEMS),98 and the 24 GHzService,99 where licensees can choose between common carrier and non-common carrier status.100 Atpresent, there are approximately 36,708 common carrier fixed licensees and 59,291 private operational-fixed licensees and broadcast auxiliary radio licensees in the microwave services. There areapproximately 135 LMDS licensees, three DEMS licensees, and three 24 GHz licensees. The92 The service is defined in section 90.1301 et seq. of the Commission's Rules, 47 C.F.R. § 90.1301 et seq.93 See Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Services in the 1.7 GHz and 2.1 GHz Bands, WT Docket No. 02-353,Report and Order, 18 FCC Rcd 25162, Appx. B (2003), modified by Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Servicesin the 1.7 GHz and 2.1 GHz Bands, WT Docket No. 02-353, Order on Reconsideration, 20 FCC Rcd 14058, Appx.C (2005); Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Services in the 1915''1920 MHz, 1995''2000 MHz, 2020''2025 MHzand 2175''2180 MHz Bands; Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Services in the 1.7 GHz and 2.1 GHz Bands, WTDocket Nos. 04-356, 02-353, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 FCC Rcd 19263, Appx. B (2005); Service Rulesfor Advanced Wireless Services in the 2155''2175 MHz Band, WT Docket No. 07-195, Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 22 FCC Rcd 17035, Appx. (2007).94 See 47 C.F.R. Part 101, Subparts C and I.95 See 47 C.F.R. Part 101, Subparts C and H.96 Auxiliary Microwave Service is governed by Part 74 of Title 47 of the Commission's Rules. See 47 C.F.R. Part74. Available to licensees of broadcast stations and to broadcast and cable network entities, broadcast auxiliarymicrowave stations are used for relaying broadcast television signals from the studio to the transmitter, or betweentwo points such as a main studio and an auxiliary studio. The service also includes mobile TV pickups, which relaysignals from a remote location back to the studio.97 See 47 C.F.R. Part 101, Subpart L.98 See 47 C.F.R. Part 101, Subpart G.99 See id.100 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 101.533, 101.1017.79
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Commission has not yet defined a small business with respect to microwave services. For purposes of theIRFA, we will use the SBA's definition applicable to Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (exceptsatellite)'--i.e., an entity with no more than 1,500 persons.101 Under the present and prior categories, theSBA has deemed a wireless business to be small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees.102 For the category ofWireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite), data for 2011 show that there were 784 firmsoperating that year.103 While the Census Bureau has not released data on the establishments broken downby number of employees, we note that the Census Bureau lists total employment for all firms in thatsector at 245,875.104 Since all firms with fewer than 1,500 employees are considered small, given thetotal employment in the sector, we estimate that the vast majority of firms using microwave services aresmall. We note that the number of firms does not necessarily track the number of licensees. We estimatethat virtually all of the Fixed Microwave licensees (excluding broadcast auxiliary licensees) wouldqualify as small entities under the SBA definition.37.Broadband Radio Service and Educational Broadband Service. Broadband RadioService systems, previously referred to as Multipoint Distribution Service (MDS) and MultichannelMultipoint Distribution Service (MMDS) systems, and ''wireless cable,'' transmit video programming tosubscribers and provide two-way high speed data operations using the microwave frequencies of theBroadband Radio Service (BRS) and Educational Broadband Service (EBS) (previously referred to as theInstructional Television Fixed Service (ITFS)).105 In connection with the 1996 BRS auction, theCommission established a small business size standard as an entity that had annual average grossrevenues of no more than $40 million in the previous three calendar years.106 The BRS auctions resultedin 67 successful bidders obtaining licensing opportunities for 493 Basic Trading Areas (BTAs). Of the 67auction winners, 61 met the definition of a small business. BRS also includes licensees of stationsauthorized prior to the auction. At this time, we estimate that of the 61 small business BRS auctionwinners, 48 remain small business licensees. In addition to the 48 small businesses that hold BTAauthorizations, there are approximately 392 incumbent BRS licensees that are considered small entities.107After adding the number of small business auction licensees to the number of incumbent licensees notalready counted, we find that there are currently approximately 440 BRS licensees that are defined assmall businesses under either the SBA or the Commission's rules.38.In 2009, the Commission conducted Auction 86, the sale of 78 licenses in the BRSareas.108 The Commission offered three levels of bidding credits: (i) a bidder with attributed average101 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS code 517210.102 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS code 517210 (2007 NAICS). The now-superseded, pre-2007 C.F.R. citations were13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS codes 517211 and 517212 (referring to the 2002 NAICS).103 U.S. Census Bureau, 2011 Economic Census, Subject Series: Information, ''Establishment and Firm Size,''NAICS code 517210 (released Dec. 2013) (employment size).http://www2.census.gov/econ/susb/data/2011/us_6digitnaics_2011.xls104 Id.105 Amendment of Parts 21 and 74 of the Commission's Rules with Regard to Filing Procedures in the MultipointDistribution Service and in the Instructional Television Fixed Service and Implementation of Section 309(j) of theCommunications Act'--Competitive Bidding, MM Docket No. 94-131, PP Docket No. 93-253, Report and Order, 10FCC Rcd 9589, 9593, para. 7 (1995).106 47 C.F.R. § 21.961(b)(1).107 47 U.S.C. § 309(j). Hundreds of stations were licensed to incumbent MDS licensees prior to implementation ofSection 309(j) of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 309(j). For these pre-auction licenses, theapplicable standard is SBA's small business size standard of 1500 or fewer employees.108 Auction of Broadband Radio Service (BRS) Licenses, Scheduled for October 27, 2009, Notice and FilingRequirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments, and Other Procedures for Auction 86, AU Docket No.09-56, Public Notice, 24 FCC Rcd 8277 (2009).80
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annual gross revenues that exceed $15 million and do not exceed $40 million for the preceding threeyears (small business) received a 15 percent discount on its winning bid; (ii) a bidder with attributedaverage annual gross revenues that exceed $3 million and do not exceed $15 million for the precedingthree years (very small business) received a 25 percent discount on its winning bid; and (iii) a bidder withattributed average annual gross revenues that do not exceed $3 million for the preceding three years(entrepreneur) received a 35 percent discount on its winning bid.109 Auction 86 concluded in 2009 withthe sale of 61 licenses.110 Of the ten winning bidders, two bidders that claimed small business status won4 licenses; one bidder that claimed very small business status won three licenses; and two bidders thatclaimed entrepreneur status won six licenses.39.In addition, the SBA's Cable Television Distribution Services small business sizestandard is applicable to EBS. There are presently 2,436 EBS licensees. All but 100 of these licenses areheld by educational institutions. Educational institutions are included in this analysis as small entities.111Thus, we estimate that at least 2,336 licensees are small businesses. Since 2007, Cable TelevisionDistribution Services have been defined within the broad economic census category of WiredTelecommunications Carriers; that category is defined as follows: ''This industry comprisesestablishments primarily engaged in operating and/or providing access to transmission facilities andinfrastructure that they own and/or lease for the transmission of voice, data, text, sound, and video usingwired telecommunications networks. Transmission facilities may be based on a single technology or acombination of technologies.''112 The SBA has developed a small business size standard for this category,which is: all such firms having 1,500 or fewer employees. To gauge small business prevalence for thesecable services we must, however, use the most current census data that are based on the previous categoryof Cable and Other Program Distribution and its associated size standard; that size standard was: all suchfirms having $13.5 million or less in annual receipts.113 According to Census Bureau data for 2007, therewere a total of 996 firms in this category that operated for the entire year.114 Of this total, 948 firms hadannual receipts of under $10 million, and 48 firms had receipts of $10 million or more but less than $25million.115 Thus, the majority of these firms can be considered small.5.Satellite Service Providers
40.Satellite Telecommunications Providers. Two economic census categories address thesatellite industry. The first category has a small business size standard of $30 million or less in averageannual receipts, under SBA rules.116 The second has a size standard of $30 million or less in annualreceipts.117109 Id. at 8296 para. 73.110 Auction of Broadband Radio Service Licenses Closes, Winning Bidders Announced for Auction 86, DownPayments Due November 23, 2009, Final Payments Due December 8, 2009, Ten-Day Petition to Deny Period,Public Notice, 24 FCC Rcd 13572 (2009).111 The term ''small entity'' within SBREFA applies to small organizations (nonprofits) and to small governmentaljurisdictions (cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school districts, and special districts with populations ofless than 50,000). 5 U.S.C. §§ 601(4)-(6). We do not collect annual revenue data on EBS licensees.112 U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 NAICS Definitions, ''517110 Wired Telecommunications Carriers,'' (partialdefinition), http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?code=517110&search=2012.113 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS code 517110.114 U.S. Census Bureau, 2007 Economic Census, Subject Series: Information, Receipts by Enterprise EmploymentSize for the United States: 2007, NAICS code 517510 (released Nov. 19, 2010).115 Id.116 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS Code 517410.117 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS Code 517919.81
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41.The category of Satellite Telecommunications ''comprises establishments primarilyengaged in providing telecommunications services to other establishments in the telecommunications andbroadcasting industries by forwarding and receiving communications signals via a system of satellites orreselling satellite telecommunications.''118 For this category, Census Bureau data for 2007 show that therewere a total of 570 firms that operated for the entire year.119 Of this total, 530 firms had annual receipts ofunder $30 million, and 40 firms had receipts of over $30 million.120 Consequently, we estimate that themajority of Satellite Telecommunications firms are small entities that might be affected by our action.42.The second category of Other Telecommunications comprises, inter alia, ''establishmentsprimarily engaged in providing specialized telecommunications services, such as satellite tracking,communications telemetry, and radar station operation. This industry also includes establishmentsprimarily engaged in providing satellite terminal stations and associated facilities connected with one ormore terrestrial systems and capable of transmitting telecommunications to, and receivingtelecommunications from, satellite systems.''121 For this category, Census Bureau data for 2007 show thatthere were a total of 1,274 firms that operated for the entire year.122 Of this total, 1,252 had annualreceipts below $25 million per year.123 Consequently, we estimate that the majority of All OtherTelecommunications firms are small entities that might be affected by our action.6.Cable Service Providers
43.Because section 706 requires us to monitor the deployment of broadband using anytechnology, we anticipate that some broadband service providers may not provide telephone service.Accordingly, we describe below other types of firms that may provide broadband services, includingcable companies, MDS providers, and utilities, among others.44.Cable and Other Program Distributors. Since 2007, these services have been definedwithin the broad economic census category of Wired Telecommunications Carriers; that category isdefined as follows: ''This industry comprises establishments primarily engaged in operating and/orproviding access to transmission facilities and infrastructure that they own and/or lease for thetransmission of voice, data, text, sound, and video using wired telecommunications networks.Transmission facilities may be based on a single technology or a combination of technologies.''124 TheSBA has developed a small business size standard for this category, which is: all such firms having 1,500or fewer employees. To gauge small business prevalence for these cable services we must, however, usecurrent census data that are based on the previous category of Cable and Other Program Distribution andits associated size standard; that size standard was: all such firms having $13.5 million or less in annualreceipts.125 According to Census Bureau data for 2007, there were a total of 2,048 firms in this category118 U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 NAICS Definitions, ''517410 Satellite Telecommunications,''http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?code=517410&search=2012.119 U.S. Census Bureau, 2007 Economic Census, Subject Series: Information, ''Establishment and Firm Size,''NAICS code 517410 (released Nov. 19, 2010).120 Id.121 U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 NAICS Definitions, ''517919 All Other Telecommunications,''http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?code=517919&search=2012.122 U.S. Census Bureau, 2007 Economic Census, Subject Series: Information, ''Establishment and Firm Size,''NAICS code 517410 (released Nov. 19, 2010).123 Id.124 U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 NAICS Definitions, ''517110 Wired Telecommunications Carriers,'' (partialdefinition), http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?code=517110&search=2012.125 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS code 517110.82
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that operated for the entire year.126 Of this total, 1,393 firms had annual receipts of under $10 million, and655 firms had receipts of $10 million or more.127 Thus, the majority of these firms can be consideredsmall.45.Cable Companies and Systems. The Commission has also developed its own smallbusiness size standards, for the purpose of cable rate regulation. Under the Commission's rules, a ''smallcable company'' is one serving 400,000 or fewer subscribers, nationwide.128 Industry data shows thatthere were 1,141 cable companies at the end of June 2012.129 Of this total, all but ten cable operatorsnationwide are small under this size standard.130 In addition, under the Commission's rules, a ''smallsystem'' is a cable system serving 15,000 or fewer subscribers.131 Current Commission records show4,945 cable systems nationwide.132 Of this total, 4,380 cable systems have less than 20,000 subscribers,and 565 systems have 20,000 or more subscribers, based on the same records. Thus, under this standard,we estimate that most cable systems are small entities.46.Cable System Operators. The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, also contains asize standard for small cable system operators, which is ''a cable operator that, directly or through anaffiliate, serves in the aggregate fewer than 1 percent of all subscribers in the United States and is notaffiliated with any entity or entities whose gross annual revenues in the aggregate exceed$250,000,000.''133 The Commission has determined that an operator serving fewer than 677,000subscribers shall be deemed a small operator, if its annual revenues, when combined with the total annualrevenues of all its affiliates, do not exceed $250 million in the aggregate.134 Based on available data, wefind that all but ten incumbent cable operators are small entities under this size standard.135 We note that126 U.S. Census Bureau, 2007 Economic Census, Subject Series: Information, ''Establishment and Firm Size,''NAICS code 517110 (released Nov. 19, 2010).127 Id.128 47 C.F.R. § 76.901(e). The Commission determined that this size standard equates approximately to a sizestandard of $100 million or less in annual revenues. Implementation of Sections of the 1992 Cable Act: RateRegulation, Sixth Report and Order and Eleventh Order on Reconsideration, 10 FCC Rcd 7393, 7408 (1995).129 NCTA, Industry Data, Number of Cable Operating Companies (June 2012), http://www.ncta.com/Statistics.aspx(visited Sept. 28, 2012). Depending upon the number of homes and the size of the geographic area served, cableoperators use one or more cable systems to provide video service. See Annual Assessment of the Status ofCompetition in the Market for Delivery of Video Programming, MB Docket No. 12-203, Fifteenth Report, 28 FCCRcd 10496, 10505-06, para. 24 (2013) (15th Annual Competition Report).130 See SNL Kagan, ''Top Cable MSOs '' 12/12 Q'',http://www.snl.com/InteractiveX/TopCableMSOs.aspx?period=2012Q4&sortcol=subscribersbasic&sortorder=desc. We note that, when applied to an MVPD operator, under this size standard (i.e., 400,000 or fewer subscribers) allbut 14 MVPD operators would be considered small. See NCTA, Industry Data, Top 25 Multichannel Video ServiceCustomers (2012), http://www.ncta.com/industry-data. The Commission applied this size standard to MVPDoperators in its implementation of the CALM Act. See Implementation of the Commercial Advertisement LoudnessMitigation (CALM) Act, MB Docket No. 11-93, Report and Order, 26 FCC Rcd 17222, 17245-46, para. 37 (2011)(CALM Act Report and Order) (defining a smaller MVPD operator as one serving 400,000 or fewer subscribersnationwide, as of December 31, 2011).131 47 C.F.R. § 76.901(c).132 The number of active, registered cable systems comes from the Commission's Cable Operations and LicensingSystem (COALS) database on Aug. 28, 2013. A cable system is a physical system integrated to a principal headend.133 47 U.S.C. § 543(m)(2); see 47 C.F.R. § 76.901(f) & nn.1-3.134 47 C.F.R. § 76.901(f); see FCC Announces New Subscriber Count for the Definition of Small Cable Operator,Public Notice, 16 FCC Rcd 2225 (Cable Services Bureau 2001).135 See NCTA, Industry Data, Top 25 Multichannel Video Service Customers (2012), http://www.ncta.com/industry-data.83
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the Commission neither requests nor collects information on whether cable system operators are affiliatedwith entities whose gross annual revenues exceed $250 million,136 and therefore we are unable to estimatemore accurately the number of cable system operators that would qualify as small under this sizestandard.7.Electric Power Generators, Transmitters, and Distributors
47.Electric Power Generators, Transmitters, and Distributors. The Census Bureau definesan industry group comprised of ''establishments, primarily engaged in generating, transmitting, and/ordistributing electric power. Establishments in this industry group may perform one or more of thefollowing activities: (1) operate generation facilities that produce electric energy; (2) operatetransmission systems that convey the electricity from the generation facility to the distribution system;and (3) operate distribution systems that convey electric power received from the generation facility orthe transmission system to the final consumer.''137 The SBA has developed a small business size standardfor firms in this category: ''A firm is small if, including its affiliates, it is primarily engaged in thegeneration, transmission, and/or distribution of electric energy for sale and its total electric output for thepreceding fiscal year did not exceed 4 million megawatt hours.''138 According to Census Bureau data for2011, there were 2,419 firms in this category that operated for the entire year.139 Census data do not trackelectric output and we have not determined how many of these firms fit the SBA size standard for small,with no more than 4 million megawatt hours of electric output. Consequently, we estimate that 2,419 orfewer firms may be considered small under the SBA small business size standard.D.
Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other ComplianceRequirements for Small Entities
48.As indicated above, the Notice seeks comment on possible enhancements to theCommission's existing transparency rule that may impose additional reporting, recordkeeping, or othercompliance requirements on some small entities.140 While the Notice tentatively concludes that theCommission should enhance the transparency rule to improve its effectiveness for end users, edgeproviders, the Internet community, and the Commission, the Notice does not propose specific revisions tothe existing transparency rule. As described above, the Notice also seeks comment on a disputeresolution process that would, if adopted, potentially require small entities to respond to complaints orotherwise participate in dispute resolution procedures.141 One feature of the enforcement mechanism asdiscussed in the Notice, includes a proposal to establish the role of an ombudsperson who would act as awatchdog to represent the interests of start-ups and other small entities in addition to consumers.E.
Steps Taken to Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small Entities,and Significant Alternatives Considered
49.The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant alternatives that it has consideredin reaching its proposed approach, which may include (among others) the following four alternatives:136 The Commission does receive such information on a case-by-case basis if a cable operator appeals a localfranchise authority's finding that the operator does not qualify as a small cable operator pursuant to § 76.901(f) ofthe Commission's rules. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.909(b).137 U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 NAICS Definitions, ''2211 Electric Power Generation, Transmission andDistribution,'' http://www.census.gov/epcd/naics02/def/NDEF221.HTM (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).138 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS codes 221111, 221112, 221113, 221119, 221121, 221122, n. 1.139 U.S. Census Bureau, 2011 Economic Census, Subject Series: Information, ''Establishment and Firm Size,''NAICS codes 221111, 221112, 221113, 221119, 221121, 221122 (released Dec. 2013) (employment size).http://www2.census.gov/econ/susb/data/2011/us_6digitnaics_2011.xls.140 See Notice, Section III.141 See supra para. 7.84
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(1) the establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or timetables that take intoaccount the resources available to small entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification ofcompliance or reporting requirements under the rule for small entities; (3) the use of performance, ratherthan design, standards; and (4) an exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for smallentities.142 We expect to consider all of these factors when we have received substantive comment fromthe public and potentially affected entities.50.The Commission expects to consider the economic impact on small entities, as identifiedin comments filed in response to the Notice and this IRFA, in reaching its final conclusions and takingaction in this proceeding.51.We note, though, that the potential enhancements to the transparency rule, the proposedmechanism for individualized decision-making under the proposed enforceable legal standard ofcommercially reasonable practices, and various aspects of the proposed dispute resolution process allcontemplate a certain amount of flexibility that may be helpful to small entities. For example, theCommission seeks comment on whether there are ways the Commission or industry associations couldreduce burdens on broadband providers in complying with the proposed enhanced transparency rulethrough the use of a voluntary industry standardized glossary, or through the creation of a dashboard thatpermits easy comparison of the policies, procedures, and prices of various broadband providersthroughout the country. We seek comment here on the effect the various proposals described in theNotice, and summarized above, will have on small entities, and on what effect alternative rules wouldhave on those entities. How can the Commission achieve its goal of protecting and promoting an openInternet while also imposing minimal burdens on small entities? What specific steps could theCommission take in this regard?F.
Federal Rules that May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict with the Proposed Rules
52.None.142 5 U.S.C. § 603(c).85
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STATEMENT OF
CHAIRMAN TOM WHEELER
Re:Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 14-28.I strongly support an open, fast and robust Internet. This agency supports an Open Internet.There is ONE Internet. Not a fast internet, not a slow internet; ONE Internet.The attention being paid to this topic is proof of why the open and free exchange of informationmust be protected. Thank you to the thousands who have emailed me personally. Thank you to thosewho felt so strongly about the issue that they camped outside. The Founding Fathers must be lookingdown and smiling at how the republic they created is practicing the ideals they established.By releasing this Item today those who have been expressing themselves will now be able to seewhat we are actually proposing. They have been heard, we look forward to further input, and we saythank you.Today we take another step in what has been a decade-long effort to preserve and protect theOpen Internet. Unfortunately, those previous efforts were blocked twice by court challenges by thosewho sell Internet connections to consumers. Today this agency moves to surmount that opposition and tostand up for consumers and the Open Internet.This Notice of Proposed Rulemaking starts an important process. Where it ends depends on whatwe learn during this process. That is why I am grateful for all the attention this topic has received.We start with the simple, obvious premise: Protecting the Open Internet is important both toconsumers and to economic growth. We are dedicated to protecting and preserving an Open Internet.What we are dealing with today is a proposal, not a final rule. With this Notice we arespecifically asking for input on different approaches to accomplish the same goal: an Open Internet.The potential for there to be some kind of ''fast lane'' available to only a few has many peopleconcerned. Personally, I don't like the idea that the Internet could become divided into ''haves'' and''have nots.'' I will work to see that does not happen. In this Item we specifically ask whether and how toprevent the kind of paid prioritization that could result in ''fast lanes.''Two weeks ago I told the convention of America's cable broadband providers something that isworth repeating here, ''If someone acts to divide the Internet between 'haves' and 'have nots,''' I told thecable industry, ''we will use every power at our disposal to stop it.'' I will take a backseat to no one thatprivileging some network users in a manner that squeezes out smaller voices is unacceptable. Today, wehave proposed how to stop that from happening, including consideration of the applicability of Title II.There is only ONE Internet. It must be fast, robust and open. The speed and quality of theconnection the consumer purchases must be unaffected by what content he or she is using.And there has to be a level playing field of opportunity for new ideas. Small companies andstartups must be able to effectively reach consumers with innovative products and services and they mustbe protected against harmful conduct by broadband providers. The prospect of a gatekeeper choosingwinners and losers on the Internet is unacceptable.Let's look at how the Internet works at the retail level. The consumer accesses the Internet usingconnectivity provided by an Internet Service Provider (ISP). That connectivity should be open and86Federal Communications Commission
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inviolate; it is the simple purchase of a pathway. I believe it would be commercially unreasonable '' andtherefore not permitted'' for the ISP not to deliver the contracted-for open pathway.Let's consider specifically what that means. I want to get to rules that work like this:· If the network operator slowed the speed below that which the consumer bought (for reasonsother than reasonable network management), it would be a commercially unreasonablepractice and therefore prohibited,· If the network operator blocked access to lawful content, it would violate our no blockingrule and be commercially unreasonable and therefore doubly prohibited,· When content provided by a firm such as Netflix reaches the consumer's network provider itwould be commercially unreasonable to charge the content provider to use the bandwidth forwhich the consumer had already paid and therefore prohibited,· When a consumer buys specified capacity from a network provider he or she is buying opencapacity, not capacity the network can prioritize for its own profit purposes. Prioritizationthat deprives the consumer of what the consumer has paid for would be commerciallyunreasonable and therefore prohibited.Simply put, when a consumer buys a specified bandwidth, it is commercially unreasonable '' andthus a violation of this proposal '' to deny them the full connectivity and the full benefits that connectionenables.Also included in this proposal are two new powers for those who use the Internet and for theCommission:·Expanded transparency will require networks to inform on themselves:
The proposalexpands the existing transparency rules to require that networks disclose any practices thatcould change a consumer's or a content provider's relationship with the network. I thusanticipate that, if a network ever planned to take an action that would affect a contentprovider's access there would be time for the FCC to consider petitions to review such anaction.·Voice for the Average American:
Recognizing that Internet entrepreneurs and consumersshouldn't have to hire a lawyer to call the Commission's attention to a grievance, anOmbudsperson would be created within the FCC to receive their complaints and, wherewarranted, investigate and represent their case.Separate and apart from this connectivity is the question of interconnection (''peering'') betweenthe consumer's network provider and the various networks that deliver to that ISP. That is a differentmatter that is better addressed separately. Today's proposal is all about what happens on the broadbandprovider's network and how the consumer's connection to the Internet may not be interfered with orotherwise compromised.The situation in which this Commission finds itself is inherited from the actions of previousCommissions over the last decade. The D.C. Circuit's ruling in January of this year upheld ourdetermination that we need rules to protect Internet openness, and upheld our authority under Section 706to adopt such rules, even while it found that portions of the 2010 Open Internet Order were beyond thescope of our authority. In response, I promptly stated that we would reinstate rules that achieve the goalsof the 2010 Order using the Section 706-based roadmap laid out by the court. That is what we areproposing today.Section 706 is one of the two principal methods proposed to accomplish the goals of an OpenInternet. Today we are seeking input on both Section 706 and Title II of the Communications Act.We
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are specifically asking for input as to the benefits of each and why one might be preferable toanother. We have established a lengthy comment and reply period sufficient to allow everyone anopportunity to participate.As a former entrepreneur and venture capitalist, I know the importance of openness first hand.As an entrepreneur, I have had products and services shut out of closed cable networks. As a VC, Iinvested in companies that wouldn't have been able to innovate if the Internet weren't open. I havehands-on experience with the importance of network openness.I will not allow the national asset of an Open Internet to be compromised
. I understand thisissue in my bones. I can show you the scars from when my companies were denied open access in thepre-Internet days.The consideration we are beginning today is not about whether the Internet must be open, butabout how and when we will have rules in place to assure an Open Internet. My preference has been tofollow the roadmap laid out by the D.C. Circuit in the belief that it was the fastest and best way to getprotections in place. I have also indicated repeatedly that I am open to using Title II.This rulemaking begins the process by putting forth a proposal, asking important and specificquestions, and opening the discussion to all Americans. We look forward to hearing feedback on all theseapproaches.88Federal Communications Commission
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STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER MIGNON L. CLYBURN
Re:Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 14-28.When my mother calls, with public policy concerns, I know there is a problem.In my 16 years as a public servant, Emily Clyburn has never called me about a substantive issueunder consideration. Not during my time serving on the South Carolina Public Service Commission. Notduring my tenure here as a Commissioner nor as Acting Chairwoman. Never. But all of that changed onMonday, April 28th.Please indulge me for a moment. My mother is a very organized, intuitive and intelligent woman.She was a medical librarian and earned a master's degree while she raised three girls. She is smart,thoughtful and engaged. She is a natural researcher. So when she picked up the phone to call me aboutthis issue, I knew for sure something was just not right.She gave voice to three basic questions which, and as of today's date, her message remains on mytelephone and in personal memory banks: (1) ''what is this net neutrality issue?'' (2) ''can providers dowhat they want to do?'' and (3) ''did it already pass?''So, like any good daughter with an independent streak, I will directly answer my mother'squestions in my own time and in my own way. But her inquiry truly echoes the calls, emails and letters Ihave received from thousands of consumers, investors, startups, healthcare providers, educators andothers across the country who are equally concerned and confused. All of this demonstrates, (no punintended) how fundamental the Internet has become for all of us.So, why are we here, and exactly what is net neutrality or Open Internet?
First, let me startfrom a place where I believe most of us can agree that a free and open exchange of ideas is critical to ademocratic society. Consumers with the ability to visit whatever website and access any lawful contentof their choice, interact with their government, apply for a job, even monitor their household devices.Educators have the capacity to leverage the best digital learning tools for their students. Healthcareproviders treating their patients with the latest technologies '' all of this occurring without those servicesor content being discriminated against or blocked.All content, all ''bits,'' being treated equally. Small startups on a shoestring budget with novelideas have the ability to reach millions of people and compete on equal footing with those establishedplayers and their considerable budgets. Innovation abounds with new applications, technologies andservices.At its core, an open Internet means that consumers, not a company, not the government,determine winners and losers. It is the free market at its best. All of this, however, does not nor will itever, occur organically. Without rules governing a free and open Internet it is possible that companies ''fixed and wireless broadband providers '' could independently determine whether they want todiscriminate or block content, pick favorites, charge higher fees or distort the market.I have been listening to concerns not just from my mother, but from thousands of consumers andinterested parties. Startups that fear, they ''won't even get a chance to succeed,'' if access to consumers iscontrolled by corporations, rather than a competitive level playing field. Investors who say they will bereticent to commit money to new companies because they are concerned that their new service will not beable to reach consumers in the marketplace because of high costs or differential treatment.89Federal Communications Commission
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Educators, even where there is a high capacity connection at the school, feel that their studentsmay not be able to take advantage of the best in digital learning if the quality of the content is poor.Healthcare professionals worrying that the images they need to view will load too slowly and that patientswill be unable to benefit from the latest technologies and specialized care made possible through remotemonitoring. And, I am hearing from everyday people, who say that we need to maintain the openness ofthe Internet and that this openness enables today's discourse to be viewed by thousands, and offers themthe ability to interact directly with policy makers and engage in robust exchanges like we are experiencingtoday.In fact, let me say how impressed I was when I spoke with some of you on Maine Street earlierthis week. You came to Washington from North Carolina, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia at yourown expense to affirm just how important this issue is to you. You made it clear that the Internet is agreat equalizer in our society and that average consumers should have the same access to the Internet asthose with deep pockets.There are dozens of examples across the globe where we have seen firsthand the dangers tosociety when people are not allowed to choose. Governments blocking access to content and stifling freespeech and public discourse.Countries, including some in Europe, where providers have congested or degraded content, andapps are being blocked from certain mobile devices. Hints of problems have occurred even here at home,particularly with regard to apps on mobile devices, even though providers in the United State, have beensubject to net neutrality principles and rules with the threat of enforcement for over a decade.So, to Mom and to all of you, this is an issue about promoting our democratic values of freespeech, competition, economic growth, and civic engagement.The second she posed was, can providers just do what they want?
The short answer, is yes.As of January we have no rules to prevent discrimination or blocking.This is actually a significant change because the FCC has had policies in place dating back to2004, when the Commission under former Chairman, and my friend Michael Powell, unanimouslyadopted four principles of an open Internet in the Internet Policy Statement. These principles became therules of the road with the potential for enforcement. Then, in 2010, the Commission formally adoptedrules to promote an open Internet by preventing blocking, and unreasonable discrimination.When the Commission approved these rules, I explained why I would have done some thingsdifferently. For instance, I would have applied the same rules to both fixed and mobile broadband;prohibited paid priority agreements; limited any exceptions to the rule; and I am on record as preferring adifferent legal structure. The 2010 rules reflect a compromise'... yes, Mom, I do compromise at times.But in January 2014, the D.C. Circuit disagreed with our legal framework '... so here we are, again.And I say again, that the court decision means that today we have no unreasonable discriminationor no blocking rules on the books. Nothing prevents providers from acting in small ways that largely maygo undetected. And, nothing prevents them from acting in larger ways to discriminate against or evenblock certain content. To be fair, providers have stated that they intend, for the time being, not to do soand have publicly committed to retain their current policies of openness. But, for me, the issue comesdown to whether broadband providers should have the ability to determine, on their own, whether theInternet is free and open OR whether we should have basic and clear rules of the road in place to ensurethat this occurs as we have had for the last decade.90
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And, this may be surprising to some but I have chosen to view the court decision in a positivelight for it has given us a unique opportunity to take a fresh look and evaluate our policy in light of thedevelopments that have occurred in the market over the last four years, including the increased use ofWiFi, deployment of LTE, faster speeds and connections to homes, schools, libraries, and the increaseduse of broadband on mobile devices, to name a few. The remand enables us to issue this clarion call tothe public where they can once again help us answer that most important question of how to protect andmaintain a free and open Internet. That ability officially begins for everyone today.The third question, and, judging by the headlines and subsequent reactions, my Mother is
in good company here, was ''has, it, passed?'' No, it has not, but let me explain. Some press accountshave reported that the Chairman's initial proposal is what we are voting on, and have conflated proposedrules with, final rules. Neither is accurate.For those who practice in this space, I ask that you bear with me for a moment. When theChairman circulates an item, it is indeed a reflection of his vision. My office then evaluates the proposal,listens to any concerns voiced by interested parties, including consumers, then considers whether we haveconcerns and, if so, what changes we want to request so that we could move to a position of support.This item was no different. It is true. I too had significant concerns about the initial proposal butafter interactions among the staff, my office, and the Chairman's office, this item has changedconsiderably over the last few weeks and I greatly appreciate the Chairman incorporating my manyrequests to do so. Though I still may have preferred to make portions of the draft more neutral, what weare voting on today asks about a number of alternatives, which will allow for a well-rounded record todevelop, on how best to protect the public interest.Second, today, we are voting only on proposed rules '' not final rules. Again, this item is anofficial call inviting interested parties to comment, to discuss the pros and cons of various approaches,and to have a robust dialogue about the best path forward. When the Chairman hits the gavel after votesare cast on this item this morning, it will signal the start of 120 unique days of opportunity each of youhas in shaping and influencing the direction of one of the world's most incredible platforms. Thefeedback up until now has been nothing short of astounding but the real call to action begins after thisvote is taken. Comments are due on July 15th, and there is ample time to evaluate any of the proposals andprovide meaningful feedback.You have spoken and I am listening. Your power will never be underestimated, and I sincerelyhope that your passion continues. As I said to those I met with outside of FCC headquarters, this is youropportunity to formally make your point on the record. You have the ear of the entire FCC. The eyes ofthe world are on all of us. Use your voice and this platform to continue to be heard.I will do all that I can independently, and with the Chairman, to identify ways to encourage amore interactive dialogue with all stakeholders whether through town halls, workshops, webinars, orsocial media because I know with a robust record this Commission will be able move quickly and get tothe finish line with the adoption of permanent rules that provide certainty, and which are clear andenforceable.So, mom, I hope that answers most of your questions and I sincerely hope that you won't feelcompelled to ask me any more significant policy questions for another 16 years.In all seriousness, I want to thank the dedicated staff from the Office of General Counsel,including Jonathan Sallet and Stephanie Weiner, as well as the Wireline Competition and WirelessTelecommunications Bureaus, for their work on this significant item. And I want to especially thank myWireline Legal Advisor, Rebekah Goodheart, for her expert work on this item.91Federal Communications Commission
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CONCURRING STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER JESSICA ROSENWORCEL
Re:Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 14-28.I support an open Internet. But I would have done this differently. Before proceeding, I wouldhave taken time to understand the future. Because the future of the Internet is the future of everything.There is nothing in our commercial and civic lives that will be untouched by its influence or unmoved byits power. I would have taken time for more input. Because I think as public servants we have a duty toacknowledge and respond to the great tide of public commentary that followed in the wake of theChairman's proposal. Even now, the phone calls continue, the e-mails pour in, and the web itself isablaze with commentary on how this Commission should proceed.It's no wonder. Our Internet economy is the envy of the world. We invented it. The broadbandbelow us and the airwaves all around us deliver its collective might to our homes and businesses incommunities across the country. The applications economy began here'--on our shores. What producedthis dynamic engine of entrepreneurship and experimentation is a foundation of openness. Sustainingwhat has made us innovative, fierce, and creative should not be a choice'--it should be an obligation.As we proceed, we are also obligated to protect what has made the Internet the most dynamicplatform for free speech ever invented. It is our modern town square. It is our printing press. It is ourshared platform for opportunity. Online we are sovereign'--we can choose, create, and consume contentunimpeded by the preferences of our broadband providers. Sustaining this freedom is essential.As we proceed, we also must keep front of mind the principles of fairness and protection fromdiscrimination that have informed every proceeding involving the Internet that has been before thisagency. These are the essential values in our communications laws. They are the ones we have honoredin the past; they must guide us in the future. So going forward we must honor transparency, banblocking, and prevent unreasonable discrimination. We cannot have a two-tiered Internet, with fast lanesthat speed the traffic of the privileged and leave the rest of us lagging behind.So I support network neutrality. But I believe the process that got us to this rulemaking today isflawed. I would have preferred a delay. I think we moved too fast to be fair. So I concur. But I want toacknowledge that the Chairman has made significant adjustments to the text of the rulemaking we adopttoday. He has expanded its scope and put all options on the table. Our effort now covers law and policy,Section 706 and Title II.If past is prologue, the future of this proceeding, the future of network neutrality, and the future ofthe Internet is still being written. I am hopeful that we can write it together'--and I am mindful that wemust get it right.92Federal Communications Commission
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DISSENTING STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER AJIT PAI
Re:Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 14-28.A few years ago, Google's then-CEO, Eric Schmidt, was quoted as saying: ''The Internet is thefirst thing that humanity has built that humanity doesn't understand.''1 If that is so, every American whocares about the future of the Internet should be wary about five unelected officials deciding its fate.After the U.S. Court of Appeals here in Washington struck down the agency's latest attempt toregulate broadband providers' network management practices,2 I recommended that the Commission seekguidance from Congress instead of plowing ahead yet again on its own. In my view, recent events haveonly confirmed the wisdom of that approach.Let's start by acknowledging the obvious: The Chairman's proposal has sparked a vigorouspublic debate. But we should not let that debate obscure some important common ground: namely, abipartisan consensus in favor of a free and open Internet. Indeed, this consensus reaches back at least adecade. In 2004, then-FCC Chairman Michael Powell outlined four principles of Internet freedom: Thefreedom to access lawful content, the freedom to use applications, the freedom to attach personal devicesto the network, and the freedom to obtain service plan information.3 One year later, the FCCunanimously endorsed these principles when it adopted the Internet Policy Statement.4Respect for these four Internet freedoms has aided the Internet's tremendous growth over the lastdecade. It has shielded online competitors from anticompetitive practices. It has fostered long-terminvestments in broadband infrastructure. It has made the Internet an unprecedented platform for civicengagement, commerce, entertainment, and more. And it has made the United States the epicenter ofonline innovation. I support the four Internet freedoms, and I am committed to protecting them goingforward.It's not news that people of good faith disagree when it comes to the best way to maintain a freeand open Internet'--or as I think of it, how best to preserve the four Internet freedoms for consumers.Some would like to regulate broadband providers as utilities under Title II of the Communications Act.This turn to common-carrier regulation would scrap the Clinton-era decision to let the Internet grow andthrive free from price regulation and other obligations applicable to telephone carriers.5There are others'--and I am one of them'--who believe President Clinton and Congress got it rightin the Telecommunications Act of 1996 when they declared the policy of the United States to be''preserv[ing] the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet . . . unfettered1 See Jerome Taylor, Google chief: My fears for Generation Facebook, The Independent (Aug. 18, 2010), availableathttp://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/google-chief-my-fears-for-generation-facebook-2055390.html.2 Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 740 F. 3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014).3 Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC, Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Principles for the Industry (Feb. 8,2004), available athttp://go.usa.gov/8CZe.4 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities; Review of RegulatoryRequirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecommunications Services; Computer III Further RemandProceedings: Bell Operating Company Provision of Enhanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Reviewof Computer III and ONA Safeguards and Requirements; Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the InternetOver Cable and Other Facilities Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling; Appropriate Regulatory Treatment forBroadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities, GN Docket No. 00-185, CC Docket Nos. 02-33, 01-33, 98-10, 95-20, CS Docket No. 02-52, Policy Statement, 20 FCC Rcd 14986 (2005).5 See Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, CC Docket No. 96-45, Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd11501 (1998).93Federal Communications Commission
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by Federal or State regulation.''6 They think that we should recognize the benefits made possible by theregulatory regime that has been in place for most of the last decade. After all, nobody thinks of plain oldtelephone service or utilities as cutting-edge. But everyone recognizes that the Internet has boundlesspotential. And that's because government didn't set the bounds early on.Today's item strikes yet a third approach. It's a lawyerly one that proposes a minimal-level-of-access rule and a not-too-much-discrimination rule. It also allows for paid prioritization underunspecified circumstances. To date, no one outside the building has asked me to support this proposal. Itbrings to mind a Texas politician's observation that there is nothing in the middle of the road but yellowstripes and dead armadillos.Nothing less than the future of the Internet depends on how we resolve this disagreement. Whatwe do will imperil or preserve Internet freedom. It will promote or deter broadband deployment to ruralconsumers and infrastructure investment throughout our nation. It will brighten or hamper the future ofinnovation both within networks and at their edge. It will determine whether control of the Internet willreside with the U.S. government or the private sector. It will impact whether consumers are connected bysmart networks or dumb pipes. And it will advance or undermine American advocacy on theinternational stage for an Internet free from government control.A dispute this fundamental is not for us, five unelected individuals, to decide. Instead, it shouldbe resolved by the people's elected representatives, those who choose the direction of government'--andthose whom the American people can hold accountable for that choice.I am therefore disappointed that today, rather than turning to Congress, we have chosen to takematters into our own hands. It is all the more disappointing because we have been down this road before.Our prior two attempts to go it alone ended in court defeats. Even with the newfangled tools the FCC willtry to pull out of its legal grab-bag, I am skeptical that the third time will be the charm.For one, I see no legal path for the FCC to prohibit paid prioritization or the development of atwo-sided market'--which appears to be the sine qua non objection by many to the Chairman's proposal.As the NPRM frankly acknowledges, section 706 of the Telecommunications Act ''could not be used'' forsuch a ban.7 And while the NPRM resists saying it outright, neither could Title II. After all, Title II onlyauthorizes the FCC to prohibit ''unjust or unreasonable discrimination''8 and both the Commission and thecourts have consistently interpreted that provision to allow carriers to charge different prices for differentservices.9 Indeed, I have been unable to find even a single case in which the Commission found itunlawfully discriminatory to offer a different (faster) service to customers at a different (higher) price.6 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (emphasis added).7 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at para. 138.8 47 U.S.C. § 202(a).9 See, e.g., Development of Operational, Technical and Spectrum Requirements for Meeting Federal, State andLocal Public Safety Agency Communication Requirements Through the Year 2010; Establishment of Rules andRequirements for Priority Access Service, WT Docket No. 96-86, Second Report and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 16720(2000) (finding Priority Access Service, a wireless priority service for both governmental and non-governmentpublic safety personnel, ''prima facie lawful'' under section 202); Access Charge Reform; Price Cap PerformanceReview for Local Exchange Carriers; Interexchange Carrier Purchases Of Switched Access Services Offered ByCompetitive Local Exchange Carriers; Petition of US West Communications, Inc. for Forbearance from Regulationas a Dominant Carrier in the Phoenix, Arizona MSA, CC Docket Nos. 96-262, 94-1, 98-157, CCB/CPD File No. 98-63, 14 FCC Rcd 14221 (1999) (granting dominant carriers pricing flexibility or special access services, allowingboth higher charges for faster connections as well as individualized pricing and customers discounts); GTETelephone Operating Companies Tariff F.C.C. No. 1 et al., Transmittal Nos. 900, 102, 519, 621, 9 FCC Rcd 5758(Common Carrier Bur. 1994) (approving tariffs for Government Emergency Telephone Service(GETS), a prioritizedtelephone service, and additional charges therefor); see also, e.g., Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore &O.R. Co., 145 U.S. 263, 283''84 (1892) (noting that common carriers are ''only bound to give the same terms to all(continued'...)94
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For another, the legal consequences of moving forward with net-neutrality regulation are sure towreak havoc on the Internet economy, no matter which legal path we take. If we are to take the D.C.Circuit at its word, section 706 grants the FCC virtually unfettered authority to encourage broadbandadoption and deployment.10 So if three members of the FCC think that more Americans would go onlineif they knew their information would be secure, could we impose cybersecurity and encryption standardson website operators? If three members of the FCC think that more Americans would purchasebroadband if edge providers were prohibited from targeted advertising, could we impose Do Not Trackregulations? Or if three members of the FCC think that more Americans would use the Internet if therewere greater privacy protections, could we follow the European Union and impose right-to-be-forgottenmandates? And because section 706 gives state commissions authority equal to the FCC,11 everybroadband provider, every online innovator, every Internet-enabled entrepreneur may now have tocomply with differing regulations in each of the 50 states. Tesla, Uber, Airbnb, and countless others canattest to the welcome that parochial regulators give to disruptive start-ups.The Internet would fare no better under Title II, and the consequences are likely to be even worse.Reclassification opens the door to actual access charges'--tariffed charges that Internet service providerscould impose on edge providers, content delivery networks, and transit operators without their consent.Indeed, one Title II option on the table would guarantee new Internet tolls by giving broadband ISPs nooption other than access charges to recover their regulated costs.12 Not only that, but reclassificationmeans a broadband price hike for every consumer in America'--not exactly a move that will encouragebroadband adoption.13 And alongside tariffed access charges and higher consumer prices, other Title IIprovisions'--ranging from the disclosure of customer information14 to mandatory billing disclosures15'--would apply to broadband providers, edge providers, or really anyone in the Internet economy. And likesection 706, Title II puts state regulators on par with the FCC, meaning there may be 50 sets of accesscharges to be paid, 50 different broadband fees to be assessed, 50 different privacy regimes to becomplied with, and 50 different types of mandatory disclosures to be made. As this suggests, a Title IIregime hardly lowers the barriers to competitive entry'--starting a company doesn't get you free legalservices. And it would hardly ''provide certainty to all market participants and keep the costs ofregulation low,'' as 150 Internet companies asked us to do last week.16Finally, pursuing net-neutrality regulations under section 706 or Title II places in jeopardy everyother goal of this Commission in the communications marketplace. Most obviously, this pursuit injectstremendous regulatory uncertainty into the market, chilling further broadband deployment,17 threatening(Continued from previous page)persons alike under the same conditions and circumstances,'' and ''any fact which produces an inequality ofcondition and a change of circumstances justifies an inequality of charge'').10 Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 639''40 (D.C. Cir. 2014).11 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (''The Commission and each State commission with regulatory jurisdiction overtelecommunications services shall encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advancedtelecommunications capability to all Americans . . . .'' (emphasis added)).12 See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at paras. 151''52.13 See 47 U.S.C. § 254(d) (imposing universal service fees on all telecommunications carriers).14 See 47 U.S.C. § 222.15 See 47 C.F.R. § 64.2401 (implementing 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 258).16 Letter from Amazon et al., to Chairman Wheeler and Commissioners Clyburn, Rosenworcel, Pai, and O'Rielly,GN Docket No. 14-28 (May 7, 2014).17 See, e.g., Letter from Robert W. Quinn, Jr., Senior Vice President, AT&T, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC,GN Docket No. 14-28, at 2''3 (May 9, 2014); Letter from Kathryn A. Zachem, Senior Vice President, ComcastCorporation, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 14-28, at 1''2 (May 12, 2014); Letter from Rick(continued'...)95Federal Communications Commission
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the $60 billion a year that private companies invest in their broadband networks, and potentiallyjeopardizing some of the millions of jobs that depend on such investment.18 This brave new world willdeter new entrants and reduce competition in the broadband market.This is no academic concern. Even with the cushion of market capitalization equivalent toComcast, Verizon, and T-Mobile combined, Google has already attested that our legacy regulations led itnot to offer phone service as part of Google Fiber.19 On the other end of the size spectrum, there arethousands of smaller Internet service providers'--wireless ISPs (WISPs), small-town cable operators,electric cooperatives, and others'--that don't have the means or the margins to withstand a regulatoryonslaught. If they go dark, consumers they serve (including my parents, who are WISP subscribers inrural Kansas) will be thrown offline.On top of all this, undertaking such a ''politically corrosive'' rulemaking on dubious legal andpolicy grounds will swamp what should be an independent, expert agency with years of litigation andpartisan division.20 That is not good for broadband deployment, that is not good for consumers, and thatis not good for future of the Internet.For all of these reasons, I respectfully dissent.* * *Nevertheless, if we are going to act like our own mini-legislature and plunge the Commission intothis morass, we need to use a better process going forward. I agree with my colleague, CommissionerRosenworcel, that we have rushed headlong into this rulemaking by holding this vote today21'--and whenthere is any bipartisan agreement on net neutrality, that's something to pay attention to. We have seenover the past month what happens when the American people feel excluded from the Commission'sdeliberations. Indeed, on several recent issues, many say that the Commission has spent too much timespeaking at the American people and not enough time listening to them.Going forward, we need to give the American people a full and fair opportunity to participate inthis process. And we must ensure that our decisions are based on a robust record.So what is the way forward? Here's one suggestion. Just as we commissioned a series ofeconomic studies in past media-ownership proceedings,22 we should ask ten distinguished economistsfrom across the country to study the impact of our proposed regulations and alternative approaches on theInternet ecosystem. To ensure that we obtain a wide range of perspectives, let each Commissioner picktwo authors. To ensure accuracy, each study should be peer reviewed. And to ensure public oversight,(Continued from previous page)Chessen, Senior Vice President, National Cable & Telecommunications Association, to Marlene H. Dortch,Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 14-28, at 3 (May 14, 2014).18 Letter from Thomas R. Stanton, Chairman & CEO, ADTRAN, et al., to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GNDocket No. 14-28 (May 13, 2014).19 Alyson Raletz, Google Considers But Drops Plans to Include Phone Service, Too, Kansas City Business Journal(Dec. 4, 2012), available athttp://www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/blog/2012/12/google-considers-drops-phone-service.html.20 See Letter from Mitch McConnell, Senate Republican Leader, et al., to the Honorable Thomas Wheeler,Chairman, FCC (May 13, 2014); Letter from John A. Boehner, Speak of the House, to the Honorable Thomas E.Wheeler, Chairman, FCC (May 14, 2014); Letter from Fred Upton, Chairman, U.S. House of RepresentativesCommittee on Energy and Commerce, et al. to the Honorable Thomas E. Wheeler, Chairman, FCC (May 13, 2014).21 See Remarks of Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel at the Chief Officers of State Library Agencies Meeting (May7, 2014), available athttp://go.usa.gov/84SG; see also Letter from Senators Kelly Ayotte, Deb Fischer, and DanCoats, to the Honorable Tom Wheeler, Chairman, FCC (May 14, 2014), available athttp://go.usa.gov/84Sz.22 FCC, 10 Research Studies on Media Ownership, http://go.usa.gov/8YSA.96Federal Communications Commission
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we should host a series of hearings where Commissioners could question the authors of the studies andthe authors of those studies could discuss their differences. Surely the future of the Internet is no lessimportant than media ownership.But we should not limit ourselves to economic studies. We should also engage computerscientists, technologists, and other technical experts to tell us how they see the Internet's infrastructureand consumers' online experience evolving. Their studies too should be subject to peer review and publichearings.Ultimately, any decisions we make on Internet regulation must be based on sound engineeringand an accurate understanding of how networks actually function. They should be informed by thejudicious and successful regulatory approach embraced by both Democrats and Republicans in recentyears. And they should avoid embroiling everyone, from the FCC to industry to the average Americanconsumer, in yet another years-long legal waiting game.In short, getting the future of the Internet right is more important than getting this done right now.After all, the Internet was free and open before the FCC's net-neutrality rules took effect in November2011. And it is still free and open today even though those rules are no longer in force. Going forward, Ihope that we will not rush headlong into enacting bad rules. We are not confronted with an immediatecrisis that requires immediate action. And if we are going to usurp Congress's role and makefundamental policy choices for the American people, we must do better than the process that led totoday's vote.97Federal Communications Commission
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DISSENTING STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER MICHAEL O'RIELLY
Re:Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 14-28.It should come as no surprise that I cannot support today's Notice. As I've said before, thepremise for imposing net neutrality rules is fundamentally flawed and rests on a faulty foundation ofmake-believe statutory authority. I have serious concerns that this ill-advised item will create damaginguncertainty and head the Commission down a slippery slope of regulation.As anticipated, the Notice proposes to ground the net neutrality rules in section 706 of theTelecommunications Act of 1996. I have already expressed my views that Congress never intendedsection 706 to be an affirmative grant of authority to the Commission to regulate the Internet. At most, itcould be used to trigger deregulation.But the Notice doesn't stop there. It seeks comment on ways to construe additional language insection 706 and even suggests using section 230(b) to broaden the scope of the Commission's usurpedauthority. This is absurd. I was worried enough that the Commission's current reading of section 706could be used to justify any number of regulatory interventions and could ultimately impact not justbroadband providers, but also edge providers. Now that the Commission is trying to cast an even widernet of authority, I fear that other services and providers could become ensnared in the future.And just in case section 706 proves to be inadequate for this regulatory boondoggle, the Noticeexplores upending years of precedent and investment by reclassifying broadband Internet access as a TitleII service. That is, the Commission examines applying monopoly era telephone rules to modernbroadband services solely to impose unnecessary and defective net neutrality regulations. I cannotsupport such a backward-looking, ends-driven approach'--not in a Notice and certainly not in final rules.While courts can recognize that an agency may legally reverse course as long as it adequatelyexplains the reasons for changing its position, I am concerned about the real world impact that such adecision could have on the communications industry and the economy as a whole. The currentframework has provided a climate of certainty and stability for broadband investment and Internetinnovation. Upending that framework could disrupt the tremendous progress that has been made over thelast decade. I also worry about the credibility of an agency that consistently fails to meet statutorydeadlines to review and eliminate old rules, but is supposedly open to reapplying obsolete provisions.The Notice suggests that reclassification could be accompanied by substantial forbearance fromthe Title II requirements. But the need to forbear from a significant number of provisions in Title IIproves the point that Title II is an inappropriate framework for today's dynamic technologies. Indeed,Title II includes a host of arcane provisions on topics like interlocking directorates, valuation of carrierproperty, uniform system of accounts and depreciation charges, telephone operator services,telemessaging service, Bell Operating Company entry into interLATA services, manufacturing oftelecommunications equipment and customer premises equipment, and electronic publishing. Even if theCommission granted forbearance from all of the provisions that it has eliminated for incumbent telephonecompanies'--and then some'--advocates are ignoring that broadband providers and services would still besubject to a host of unnecessary rules. The idea that the Commission can magically impose or sprinklejust the right amount of Title II on broadband providers is giving the Commission more credit than it everdeserves.Additionally, before taking any action on any issue, the Commission should have specific andverifiable evidence that there is a market failure. The Notice does not examine the broadband marketmuch less identify any failures. A true and accurate review of the U.S. broadband market'--which must98Federal Communications Commission
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include wireless broadband'--would show how dynamic it is. The Notice does acknowledge thatinnovation and investment have flourished, although it implausibly ascribes those successes to the vacatednet neutrality rules.Moreover, the Notice fails to make the case that there's an actual problem resulting in real harmto consumers. The Notice identifies, at most, two additional examples of alleged harm. And in oneinstance, the Commission concedes it did not find a violation. The Notice tries to explain away theabsence of net neutrality complaints, but the unpersuasive excuses cannot mask a lack of evidence. In alast ditch attempt to find problems, the Notice points to supposed bad conduct occurring outside of theUnited States without explaining how that is relevant to a very different U.S. broadband market andregulatory structure.Having come up empty handed, the Notice proceeds to explore hypothetical concerns. At the topof the list is prioritization. But even ardent supporters of net neutrality recognize that some amount oftraffic differentiation or ''prioritization'' must be allowed or even encouraged. Voice must be prioritizedover email; video over plain data. Prioritization is not a bad word. It is a necessary component ofreasonable network management.The Notice is particularly skeptical of paid prioritization and contemplates banning some or allsuch arrangements outright. Yet companies that do business over the Internet, including some of thestrongest supporters of net neutrality, routinely pay for a variety of services to ensure the best possibleexperience for their consumers. They've been doing it for years. And certain arrangements have evenbeen viewed as ''good for the Internet.'' In short, fears that paid prioritization will automatically degradeservice for other users, relegating them to a so-called ''slow lane,'' have been disproven by years ofexperience.Because there's no evidence of actual harm that could help inform the proposed rules, they arenot narrowly tailored but hopelessly vague and unclear. We are left to puzzle over what it means toprovide a ''minimum level of access'' or what constitutes a ''commercially unreasonable'' practice,especially in the absence of contractual relationships. The Notice suggests that providers could seek non-binding staff guidance or prospective reviews of their practices. But it is very troubling when legitimatecompanies are put in the position of having to ask the government for its blessing every time they need tomake a business decision in order to avoid costly enforcement or litigation. It is even more telling that theCommission is suggesting new layers of enforcement options for which it has no experience. Forinstance, where are ombudsmen mentioned in the statute and what are they to do exactly?Finally, to say the cost-benefit ''analysis'' is woefully inadequate is an understatement. TheNotice devotes several pages to a wish list of disclosures, reporting requirements, and certifications thatwill impose new burdens and carry real costs, but may not even be meaningful to end users. For example,what will the average consumer do with information on packet corruption and jitter? However, there isno attempt to quantify and compare the costs of the proposed new requirements against the supposedbenefits'--just a single paragraph seeking comment on ways to reduce the burdens. Proposed rules shouldbe accompanied by a fulsome cost-benefit analysis that includes a detailed and extensive review ofcurrent law, especially as it applies to other federal agencies that we seek to imitate. The Commission'sshort-shrift approach to cost-benefit analysis cannot continue, and I intend to spend time improving thisimportant function.In sum, the proposed net neutrality rules and legal theories will stifle innovation and investmentby the private sector, provide no help to consumers, and thrust the Commission into a place it shouldn'tbe. I respectfully dissent.99Note: We are currently transitioning our documents into web compatible formats for easier reading. We have done our best to supply this content to you in a presentable form, but there may be some formatting issues while we improve the technology. The original version of the document is available as a PDF, Word Document, or as plain text.