Sun, 10 Jan 2021 13:58
1. Historical BackgroundFor I dipt into the future, far as human eye could see,Saw the Vision of the world, and all the wonders that would be;'...Till the war-drum throbb'd no longer, and the battle-flags werefurl'dIn the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world.There the common sense of most shall hold a fretful realm in awe,And the kindly earth shall slumber, lapt in universal law.
'--Alfred, Lord Tennyson, ''Locksley Hall'' (1837)
United States President Harry Truman, who oversaw the founding of theUnited Nations after the Second World War, kept these lines fromTennyson's poem in his wallet (Kennedy 2006: xi). After thisbrutal global war that claimed over fifty million lives, just likeafter the previous world war in which almost ten million perished,ordinary people and statespersons alike sought to establish a post-warinternational order that would be able to prevent another war ofglobal devastation from occurring. In fact, since the problem of war,or large-scale socially organized violence, has been with usthroughout human history, the ideal of a universal community ofhumankind living in perpetual peace was not at all new.
Derek Heater's history of ideas of world government andcitizenship begins by noting their presence in ancient Chinese andIndian as well as Graeco-Roman thought (1996: ix''x). Accordingto Heater, the concept of human unity produced an ideal that suchunity ought to be expressed in political form. The exact nature ofthat form, however, has changed radically over time. While Stoic ideasabout the oneness of the universe were politically inchoate, theyinspired medieval Christian proposals for a global politicalauthority; at the same time, the historical model of imperial Rome (orits myths) inspired medieval quests for world empire.
The Italian poet, philosopher, and statesperson, Dante(1265''1321), perhaps best articulated the Christian ideal ofhuman unity and its expression through a world governed by a universalmonarch. In The Banquet [Convivio], Dante arguedthat wars and all their causes would be eliminated if
the whole earth and all that humans can possess be a monarchy, thatis, one government under one ruler. Because he possesses everything,the ruler would not desire to possess anything further, and thus, hewould hold kings contentedly within the borders of their kingdoms, andkeep peace among them. (Convivio, bk 4, ch 4 [2000: 169])
In De Monarchia (1309''13: 8]), a full politicaltreatise affirming universal monarchy, Dante draws on Aristotle toargue that human unity stems from a shared end, purpose or function,to develop and realize fully and constantly humanity's distinctintellectual potential. In Book I, Dante argues that peace is a vitalcondition for realizing this end, and peace cannot be maintained ifhumanity is divided. Just as ''[e]very kingdom divided againstitself shall be laid waste'' (Monarchia bk 1, ch. V,quoting Luke 11:17 [1995: 10]), since humankind shares one goal,
there must therefore be one person who directs and rules mankind, andhe is properly called ''Monarch'' or ''Emperor''.And thus it is apparent that the well-being of the world requires thatthere be a monarchy or empire. (Monarchia bk 1, ch. V [1995:10])
Most importantly, when conflicts inevitably arise between two rulerswho are equals, ''there must be a third party of widerjurisdiction who rules over both of them by right''; a universalmonarch is necessary as
a first and supreme judge, whose judgment resolves all disputes eitherdirectly or indirectly. (Monarchia bk 1, ch. X [1995:14])
In the absence of a universal monarch, humanity is ''transformedinto a many-headed beast'', striving after ''conflictingthings'' (Monarchia bk 1, ch. XVI [1995: 28]); humankindordered under a universal monarch, however,
will most closely resemble God, by mirroring the principle of onenessor unity of which he is the supreme example. (Monarchia bk 1,ch. VIII [1995: 19])
Dante completes his treatise by extolling the Roman Empire as a partof God's providence (Monarchia bks 2 and 3 [1995:30''94). And while Dante argued for a universal emperor whosetemporal power was distinct from the pope's religious power, andnot derivative from the latter, he envisioned that God's willmust require pope and emperor to forge a cooperative and conciliatory,rather than competitive and antagonistic, relationship.
The idea of uniting humanity under one empire or monarch, however,became an ambivalent appeal by the seventeenth century with theentrenchment in Europe of the system of sovereign states after thePeace of Westphalia (1648). At the same time, European encounters withnon-European worlds precipitated European ambitions based on theprinciple of promoting civilization as an organizing framework forlegitimizing European imperial and colonial expansion into other partsof the world (Keene 2002).
In Leviathan (1651), Hobbes (1588''1679) gave thequintessential formulation of sovereignty as supreme legal coerciveauthority over a particular population and territory. Hobbes arguedthat although mutual vulnerabilities and interests lead individuals togive up their liberties in the state of nature, in exchange forprotection'--thereby instituting sovereign states'--themiseries that accompany a plurality of sovereign states are not asonerous to individuals, hence there is less rational basis forpolitical organization to move towards a global leviathan:
because states uphold the Industry of their Subjects; there does notfollow from the international state of nature, that misery, whichaccompanies the Liberty of particular men. (1651: ch. 13 [1986:188])
Contrary to realist interpretations of Hobbes in internationalrelations thought, Hobbes did not consider international law orcooperation between sovereign states to be impossible or impractical.Anticipating the development of international law, collective securityorganizations, the League of Nations and the United Nations, heaffirmed the possibility and efficacy of leagues of commonwealthsfounded on the interests of states in peace and justice:
Leagues between Common-wealths, over whom there is no humane Powerestablished, to keep them all in awe, are not onely lawfull [becausethey are allowed by the commonwealth], but also profitable for thetime they last. (1651: ch. 22 [1986: 286])
In Hobbes, we find the first articulation of the argument that a worldstate is unnecessary, although he envisaged that the development of alawful interstate order is possible, and potentially desirable.
In the eighteenth century, Charles Castel, Abb(C) de Saint-Pierre(1658''1743), in his Project for Making Peace Perpetual inEurope (1713), extended Hobbes's argument that a rationalinterest in self-preservation necessitated the creation a domesticleviathan to the international realm, asserting that reason shouldlead the princes of Europe to form a federation of states by socialcontract. The contracting sovereigns would form a perpetual andirrevocable alliance, establishing a permanent Diet or Congress thatwould adjudicate all conflicts between the contracting parties. Thefederation would also proscribe as ''a public enemy''(Rousseau 1756 [1917: 63]) any member who breaks the Treaty ordisregards the decisions of the congress; in such a situation, allmembers would ''arm and take the offensive, conjointly and at thecommon expense, against any State put to the ban of Europe'' inorder to enforce the decisions of the federation (1756 [1917:61''4]). In other words, perpetual peace can be achieved if theprinces of Europe would agree to relinquish their sovereign rights tomake war or peace to a superior, federal body that guaranteedprotection of their basic interests.
In his comments on this proposal, Rousseau (1712''78)acknowledged its perfect rationality:
Realize this Commonwealth of Europe for a single day, and you may besure it will last forever; so fully would experience convince men thattheir own gain is to be found in the good of all. (1756 [1917:93])
To Rousseau, however, existing societies had so thoroughly corruptedhumans' natural innocence that they were largely incapable ofdiscovering their true or real interests. Thus, theAbb(C)'s proposals were not utopian, but they were notlikely to be realized ''because men are crazy, and to be sane ina world of madmen is itself a kind of madness'' (1756 [1917:91]). At the same time, Rousseau noted that the sovereigns of Europewere not likely to agree voluntarily to form such a federation:
No Federation could ever be established except by a revolution. Thatbeing so, which of us would dare say whether the League of Europe is athing more to be desired or feared? It would perhaps do more harm inthe moment than it would guard against for ages. (1756 [1917:112])
This consequentialist objection to the idea of worldgovernment speculates that even if it were desirable, the process ofcreating a world government may produce more harm than good; thenecessary evils committed on the road to establishing a worldgovernment would outweigh whatever benefits might result from itsachievement.
Rousseau viewed war as a product of defectively ordered socialinstitutions; it is states as public entities that make war, andindividuals participate in wars only as members or citizens of states.Far from viewing the achievement of a domestic leviathan as moralprogress, Rousseau noted that the condition of a world of entangledsovereign states puts human beings in more peril than if no suchinstitutions existed at all. Isn't it the case, he argued,that
each one of us being in the civil state as regards our fellowcitizens, but in the state of nature as regards the rest of the world,we have taken all kinds of precautions against private wars only tokindle national wars a thousand times more terrible? And that, injoining a particular group of men, we have really declared ourselvesthe enemies of the whole race? (1756 [1917: 56])
In Rousseau's view, the solution to war is to establishwell-governed societies, along the lines he established in TheSocial Contract (1762); only in such contexts will human beingsrealize their full rational and moral potential. To establishperpetual peace, then, we should not pursue world government, but themoral perfection of states. A world of ideal societies would have nocause for war, and no need for world government.
Kant tried, in his Idea for a Universal History with aCosmopolitan Purpose (1784), to refute the claim that thedevelopment of the domestic state constituted a moral step backwardsfor humankind, by placing it and its trials
in the history of the entire species, as a steadily advancing but slowdevelopment of man's original [rational] capacities. (1784[1991: 41])
Nature employs the ''unsociableness of men'' to motivatemoral progress; thus war is a means by which nature moves states
to take the step which reason could have suggested to them evenwithout so many sad experiences'--that of abandoning a lawlessstate of savagery and entering a federation of peoples in which everystate, even the smallest, could expect to derive its security andrights not from its own power or its own legal judgment, but solelyfrom this great federation (Foedus Amphictyonum), from aunited power and the law-governed decisions of a united will. (1784[1991: 47])
This is the ''inevitable outcome'' (1784 [1991: 48]) ofhuman history, a point Kant reiterated in Perpetual Peace[1795], when he argued that rationality dictated the formation of
an international state (civitas gentium), which wouldnecessarily continue to grow until it embraced all the peoples of theearth. (1784 [1991: 105])
In present conditions, however, Kant noted that ''the positiveidea of a world republic cannot be realized'', thus histreatise on perpetual peace begins with the social fact of a world ofdistinct but interacting states. What would be required, given such aworld, to achieve perpetual peace? Kant makes three arguments. First,every state must have a republican constitution that guarantees thefreedom and equality of citizens through the rule of law andrepresentative political institutions. The internally well-orderedrepublican state is less likely to engage in wars without goodreason;
under a constitution where the subject is not a citizen, and which istherefore not republican, it is the simplest thing in the world to goto war. (1784 [1991: 100])
Second, such internally well-ordered states would need to enter into a''federation of peoples'', which is distinct from an''international state'' (1784 [1991: 102]). A
pacific federation (foedus pacificum) '... does not aimto acquire any power like that of a state, but merely to preserve andsecure the freedom of each state in itself, along with that of theother confederated states. (1784 [1991: 104])
In this context, a federal union of free and independent states, heargued,
is still to be preferred to an amalgamation of the separate nationsunder a single power which has overruled the rest and created auniversal monarchy.
His reasons against a universal monarchy combine fears of anall-powerful and powerless world government:
For the laws progressively lose their impact as the governmentincreases its range, and a soulless despotism, after crushing thegerms of goodness, will finally lapse into anarchy. (1784 [1991:113])
Most forcefully articulating the tyranny objection, Kant argued that a''universal despotism'' would end ''in the graveyard offreedom'' (1784 [1991: 114]). The third condition for perpetualpeace in a world of distinct but interacting states is the observanceof cosmopolitan right, which Kant limits to universal hospitality.Although the human race shares in common a right to the earth'ssurface, Kant argued that strangers do not have entitlements to settleon foreign territory without the inhabitants' agreement. Thus,cosmopolitan right justifies visiting a foreign land, but notconquering it, which Kant criticized the commercial states of his dayto have done in ''America, the negro countries, the SpiceIslands, the Cape'' and East India (1784 [1991: 106]).
Kant's views on the desirability of world government wereclearly complex (Kokaz 2005: 87''92; Pogge 2009). On the onehand, Kant provides two of the most trenchant objections to worldgovernment. The tyranny argument posits that world governmentwould descend into a global tyranny, hindering rather than enhancingthe ideal of human autonomy (Kant 1795 [1991]). Instead of deliveringimpartial global justice and peace, a world government may form aninescapable tyranny that would have the power to make humanity serveits own interests, and opposition against which might engenderincessant and intractable civil wars (Waltz 1979; DuFord 2017). Inanother argument against its desirability, the inevitable remotenessof a global political authority would dilute the laws, making themineffectual and meaningless. The posited weakness of world governmentleads to objections based on its potential inefficiency andsoullessness (Kant 1795 [1991]).
On the other hand, Kant also provides a republican vision of worldgovernment based on universal reason. His endorsement of the ideal ofhuman unity prompted him to see a world republic, under which free andequal individuals, united by one global sovereign, would achieve a''fully juridical condition'' (Pogge 2009: 198), as theideal end of the progress of human history. At the same time,Kant's faith in human unity through reason coexisted with hissubscription to a theory of racial hierarchy in human development, andhe came to be critical of the dominant modes of European expansionistpolicies in world politics in the late eighteenthcentury'--through colonial wars, exploitation, andconquests'--as undermining the moral progress of Europeans (Valdez2019). More generally, Kant condemned any move towards a universalmonarchy, because a monarchy, in contrast to a republic, does notguarantee, but undermines, the freedom and equality of individuals.Although a world republic is Kant's ultimate political ideal, auniversal despotic monarch that exercises power arbitrarily isequivalent to a global anarchic state of nature, which is his ultimatedystopia. In between lies his ''realistic utopia'' (Rawls1999: 11''6) consisting of a federation of free (republican)states short of a world state. As Habermas has put it,
This weak conception of a voluntary association of states that arewilling to coexist peacefully while nevertheless retaining theirsovereignty seemed to recommend itself as a transitional stage enroute to a world republic. (2010: 268)
Kant's work shows that even in the eighteenth century, debatesabout world government were alive and well, including arguments byradical political cosmopolitans such as Anacharsis Cloots(Jean-Baptiste du Val-de-Grace, baron de Cloots, 1755''1794), whoused social contract theory to advocate the abolition of the sovereignstates system in favor of a universal republic encompassing allhumanity (Kleingeld & Brown 2002). At the same time, philosophicalprojects for perpetual peace in the seventeenth and eighteenthcenturies were Eurocentric in adopting Europe as the centre of worldorder, in failing to recognize non-European peoples in equal standing,and in obscuring the global inequalities and injustices beingestablished by European commercial enterprises and states (Pitts 2018:6''7).
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries witnessed revivals of proposalsfor world government that were fueled by racialized theories ofprogress that buttressed European-led colonial and imperial expansionover much of the world, technological developments in travel andcommunications, the rapid ascent of a global capitalist system, aswell as the devastating impact of wars fought with modern technology.Theories of ''scientific racism'' continued to pervadeEuropean thought on world order:
White supremacist visions of global governance circulated widely inthe Anglo-American world. (Bell 2018: 871)
One of the most prominent proponents of world order, H.G. Wells(1866''1946), envisaged in 1901 a ''New Republic'' ofAnglo-American dominance, and while he repudiated racial theories, hisvision of a universal world state included a civilizing mission (Wells1902; Bell 2018: 870). The construction of racial and civilizationalhierarchies, backed by military domination, meant that the inclusionof non-Europeans and non-whites, whether in imperial projects,colonial civilizing missions, or later, in a system of formallyindependent states embedded in a capitalist global economy, would bemarked by deep asymmetries and inequalities in standing, status,rights, burdens, and powers (Anghie 2005; Bell 2019; Getachew2019).
In the Second World War, after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima andNagasaki, atomic scientists lobbied for the international control ofatomic energy as a main function of world federalist government.Albert Einstein wrote in 1946 that technological developments hadshrunk the planet, through increased economic interdependence andmutual vulnerability through weapons of mass destruction. Although hisadherence to the idea of a world government to guarantee interstatepeace preceded the development of nuclear weapons, Einstein'sadvocacy gained momentum with the risk of nuclear annihilation:
A world government must be created which is able to solve conflictsbetween nations by judicial decision. This government must be based ona clear-cut constitution which is approved by the governments andnations and which gives it the sole disposition of offensive weapons.(1946 [1950: 132]; Nathan & Norden 1960)
Organizations such as the United World Federalists (UWF), establishedin 1947, called for the transformation of the United Nations into auniversal federation of states with powers to control armaments. Worldpeace required that states should give up their traditionalunrestricted sovereign rights to amass weapons and wage war, and thatthey should submit their disputes to authoritative internationalinstitutions of adjudication and enforcement; world peace would onlybe achieved through the establishment of world law (Clark & Sohn1958/1960 [1962]).
Calls for world government in the post-World War Two era implied adeep suspicion about the sovereign state's potential as avehicle for moral progress in world politics. Emery Reves'influential The Anatomy of Peace, is a condemnation of thenation-state as a political institution: ''The modern Bastille isthe nation-state, no matter whether the jailers are conservative,liberal or socialist'' (1945: 270). Echoing Rousseau, Revesargued that nation-states threaten human peace, justice and freedom,by diverting funds from important needs, prolonging a global climateof mistrust and fear, and creating a war machine that ultimatelyprecipitates actual war. The experience of the world wars thus made itespecially difficult to view states as agents of moral progress. DavidMitrany, perhaps motivated by such suspicions, bracketed the idea of aworld federation or world state, and focused on the role that ''aspreading web of international activities and agencies'' couldplay in the pursuit of world integration and peace (1966: 38;Trachtman 2013).
Some did not reject the nation-state per se, but onlyauthoritarian nondemocratic states as unfit partners for building apeaceful world order. The Atlantic Union Committee (AUC), formed in1949 by Clarence Streit, for example, called for a federal union ofdemocratic states that would be the genesis of a
free world government, as nations are encouraged by example topractice the principles which would make them eligible for membership,namely the principles of representative government and protection ofindividual liberty by law. (1950, quoted in Baratta 2004: 470; for acritique see Rosenboim 2017)
In the context of the Cold War (1945''89), however, the divisionof the world into two ideologically opposed camps'--led by theUnited States (US) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics(USSR)'--produced mutual distrust that pervaded the reception ofall proposals for world government. Soviet opposition to all Westernproposals as attempts to impose ''American monopolisticcapitalism'' on the world (Goodman 1953: 234) made the worldfederalist movement's goal of establishing a universalfederation infeasible. The Soviet leadership also condemned theAUC's proposal for an exclusive union of democracies as part ofthe Cold War rivalry'--an attempt to strengthen the anti-communist(anti-Soviet) bloc.
In a distorted fashion, the Soviet Union became the historicalmanifestation of socialist or communist thought. Socialist ideas canbe traced back to the French Revolution, but developed more fully as aresponse to negative aspects of the rapid growth of industry in thenineteenth century. At the same time that technological advancementspromised great material progress, the changes they wrought in socialand economic relations were not all positive. While the many workers,or ''proletarians'', in new industrial factories workedunder terrible conditions for meager wages, the few factory owners,''the bourgeoisie'' or ''capitalists'', amassedgreat wealth and power. According to Karl Marx (1818''1883),human history is a history of struggles not between nations or states,but between classes, created and destroyed by changing modes ofproduction. The state as a centralized, coercive authority emergesunder social modes of production at a certain stage of development,and is only necessary in a class society as the coercive instrument ofthe ruling class. The capitalist economic system, however, containswithin it the seeds of its own destruction: capitalism necessitatesthe creation of an ever-growing proletarian class, and a globalrevolution by the proletariat will sweep away ''the conditionsfor the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally''(Marx & Engels 1848 [1988: 75]). The state will fall along withthe fall of classes:
The society that will organize production on the basis of a free andequal association of the producers will put the whole machinery ofstate where it will then belong: into the Museum of Antiquities, bythe side of the spinning wheel and the bronze axe. (Engels 1884 [1978:755])
In a communist vision, capitalism is a necessary but transitional andephemeral order of things; the revolutionary overthrow of capitalismby forces it unleashed itself is necessary to attain a new worldorder, ''in which the free development of each is the conditionfor the free development of all'' (Marx & Engels 1848 [1988:75]). World peace and freedom as nondomination for all (Roberts 2017),including freedom from the ''alienated'' or''estranged'' labor (Marx 1844 [1978: 71''81]) producedunder capitalism, will be achieved through the transformation of acapitalist to a communist social order:
In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nationvanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end.(Marx & Engels 1848 [1988: 73])
The Russian revolutionary, V.I. Lenin (1870''1924), drew on Marxto argue that the proletarian class needed to seize the coerciveapparatus of the state to oppress the resisters and exploiters, thebourgeoisie, however, Lenin was committed to world revolution, and tothe view that the state is ''the organ of class rule'', andthat even the
proletarian state will begin to wither away immediately after itsvictory because the state is unnecessary and cannot exist in a societyin which there are no class antagonisms. (Lenin 1918: 65)
In the context of the post-World War I world that witnessed thecollapse of empires as well as the fortification of others, buttressedby the League of Nations, Lenin's vision of a new communistworld order entailed an appeal to the colonized to mountanti-imperialist revolutions. This contrasted with U.S. PresidentWoodrow Wilson's less radical interpretation ofself-determination as good self-government, a formulation that wasconsistent with the civilizing narrative based on racial hierarchies,and the continuation and extension of a colonial international order(Pedersen 2015).
Later Soviet leaders and elites who rejected Western proposals forworld federation somewhat inconsistently envisaged the transcendenceof nation-states and world capitalism, and the establishment of aworld socialist economy governed by a ''Bolshevik WorldState'' (Goodman 1953: 231). In communist ideology, ultimately,balance-of-power politics between states enjoying unrestrictedsovereignty did not cause war; the real cause of war was capitalism.In practice, the Soviet Union's internally and externallyrepressive policies made a mockery of socialist ideals of a classlesssociety, or a world of peaceful socialist republics, and thedisintegration of the Soviet Union itself spelled the practical end ofone alternative to a capitalist world order.
The end of Cold War ideological divisions led some to have greatexpectations in the 1990s of enhanced global cooperation to ridhumanity of the threat of global nuclear annihilation and to increaseglobal commerce and spread prosperity, the material bases for buildinga truly global moral and political community of humankind. The end ofthe twentieth century was marked by an unbridled faith and optimism inthe inexorable twin triumph of capitalism and liberal democracy as theend of history (Fukuyama 1992). With the collapse of Soviet-stylestate socialism, the world witnessed neoliberal transformations on aglobal scale, driven by the ''ideology of free markets, tradeliberalization, deregulation, and the small state'' (L¼thi2020: 596). Quinn Slobodian has described the paradoxical ascendancyof ''globalist'' neoliberalism, entailing the development ofa world state and regulatory laws that privileged the''encasement'' of markets from domestic democraticregulation and accountability, leading to an institutional project toredesign ''states, laws, and other institutions to protect themarket'' (2018: 4 and 6). As neoliberalism spread on a globalscale, so did the deterioration of conditions for robust democraticpolitics, precipitating serious backsliding of democratization.
The optimism of the 1990s and early 2000s was thus short-lived as avariety of persistent and deepening structural injustices of themodern international system produced conditions ripe for violentconflict and mass atrocities, the global war on terror after 2001, theglobal financial crisis of 2007''9, growing numbers of displacedpeople, rising socioeconomic inequality, and the hollowing out ofsocial welfare protections, not to mention the disruptive consequenceswrought by climate change, and the Covid-19 global pandemic. Thepersistence of racial subordination and gender inequalities, as wellas the ascendancy of a neoliberal world order, have provoked muchcritical debate about how these and other dominating hierarchies,backed by powerful international institutions, law, states, andcorporations, can be tamed or overthrown, or how the crises theygenerate may accelerate structural transformations at the global levelin a more emancipatory direction.
2. Debates in Contemporary Political Theory2.1 International Relations TheoryContemporary international relations theory developed out of theurgent need to explain and predict the causes of war and peace inworld politics. International relations theory has also developed inresponse to globalization, which has wrought ''fundamentalchanges in the spatial and temporal contours of socialexistence'' (Scheuerman 2002 [2018]), characterized by the unevenincrease and intensification of social interconnectedness, economicintegration, and the ''shrinkage of geographic distance on aworld scale'' (Keohane 2001). While much of internationalrelations theory's approach to world government has remainedfocused on the problem of overcoming interstate anarchy for the sakeof human security in the face of common global threats, a''global politics paradigm'' (Z¼rn 2018) has emergedwhich understands world government as only one possible institutionaldevelopment among others in a system of global governancecharacterized by the co-constitution of transnational, internationaland domestic realms of politics and political contestation.
Contemporary international ''realists'' or''neorealists'' claim not to evaluate the contemporarystates system in normative terms. They liken the international orderto a Hobbesian state of nature, where notions of justice and injusticehave no place, and in which each unit is rationally motivated topursue every means within its power to assure its own survival, evenat the expense of others' basic interests. Some realists havethus held that ideas of world government constitute exercises inutopian thinking, and are utterly impractical as a goal for humanpolitical organization. Assuming that world government would lead todesirable outcomes such as perpetual peace, realists are skepticalthat world government will ever materialize as an institutionalreality, given the problems of egoistic or corrupted human nature, orthe logic of international anarchy that characterizes a world ofstates, all jealously guarding their own sovereignty or claims tosupreme authority. World government is thus infeasible as a solutionto global problems because of the unsurpassable difficulties ofestablishing ''authoritative hierarchies'' at the global orinternational level (Krasner 1999: 42). Furthermore, Kenneth Waltz, inhis seminal account of neorealism, Theory of InternationalPolitics, clearly favors a system of sovereign states over aworld government (1979: 111''2). World government, according toWaltz, would not deliver universal, disinterested, impartial justice,order or security, but like domestic governments, it would be drivenby its own particular or exclusive organizational interests, which itwould pursue at the expense of the interests and freedom of states.This realist view thus provides a sobering antidote to liberal andother progressive narratives that foretell peace throughinterdependence.
William Scheuerman has argued (2011: 67''97), however, thatso-called ''classical'' realists of the mid-twentiethcentury were more sympathetic to ideas of global institutional reformthan contemporary realists. ''Classical'' and''progressive'' realists such as Reinhold Niebuhr, E.H.Carr, and Hans Morgenthau, as well as John Herz and Frederick Schuman,supported a global reformist agenda, prompted by the advent ofeconomic globalization, technological change, modern total warfare,and the nuclear revolution. Although a desirable end-goal, thefeasibility of global political change towards a world government inthe form of a global federal system, according to Reinhold Niebuhr,would depend on deeper global social integration and cohesion than wasevident in the mid-twentieth century (Scheuerman 2011: 73). Inaddition, Niebuhr was concerned that absent the required social andcultural basis for global political unity, the achievement of worldgovernment would be undesirable, since in such conditions, a worldgovernment would require authoritarian devices to rule, raising thespecter of a global tyrannical power (72''6). Others, such asJames Burnham, posited that a world state could only arise throughimperial conquest (Deudney 2019). Despite these caveats, realistprudence-based as well as functional arguments for a Weberian worldstate have gained traction again (Cabrera 2010; UlaÅ 2016; Araujo2018; Craig 2019).
''International society'' theorists, or the ''Englishschool'', argue that although there is no central overridingauthority above sovereign states, their relations are not whollylawless or devoid of authoritative and enforceable norms and rules forconduct. The anarchy between states does not preclude the concept of anorm-governed society of states (Bull 1977). Since''international society'' theorists do not see the absenceof a central global authority as necessitating a state-eat-stateworld, they regard the idea of world government as unnecessary, andpotentially dangerous, since it may serve as a cloak in the strugglefor imperial domination between states. Martin Wight has noted thatthe moral ideals of cosmopolitanism typically translate in practiceinto political tyranny and imperialism (1991). As an alternative toworld government, and echoing both Rousseau and Kant, Chris Brownforwards
the ideal of a plurality of morally autonomous, just communitiesrelated to one another in a framework of peace and law. (1995:106)
Establishing an international society, ideally conceived, would make asupreme world government unnecessary. Andrew Hurrell, however, arguesthat
it is important to recognize the extent to which social, environmentaland, above all, technological change is likely to affect thescale of governance challenges, the sources ofcontrol and governance, and the subjects of control. (2007:293)
For these reasons, Hurrell does not consider a retreat to atraditional state-based pluralism to be feasible, but argues that thedevelopment of a ''stable, effective and legitimate internationalsociety'' requires redressing global inequality through thesignificant redistribution of political power to buttress thecollective political agency of the weak and marginalized (2007:318).Liberal internationalist accounts of world order are motivated bymore than just the traditional preoccupation with problems of war andpeace. This school of international relations thought, more than thepreceding two, is explicitly critical of traditional accounts of statesovereignty. Richard Falk has depicted the contemporary world order asone of ''inhumane governance'', identifying the followingills: global severe poverty affecting more than one billion humanbeings, denial of human rights to socially and culturally vulnerablegroups, the persistent use and threat of war as an instrument ofpolitics, environmental degradation, and the lack of transnationaldemocratic accountability (1995: 1''2). A liberalinternationalist agenda is advanced when progress is made onalleviating or correcting these ills. However, Falk is explicitthat
humane governance can be achieved without world government,and that this is both the more likely and more desirable course ofaction. (1995: 8)
By world government, Falk means a form of global politicalorganization that has, at minimum, the following features:
compulsory peaceful settlement of all disputes by third-party decisionin accordance with law; general and complete disarmament at the stateand regional levels; a global legislative capacity backed up byenforcement capabilities; and some form of centralized leadership.(1995: 7)
Instead of world government, Falk calls for ''transnationaldemocratic initiatives'' from global civil society as well asUnited Nations reform, both of which would challenge and complementthe statist and market forces that currently produce our contemporaryglobal ills (1995: 207). Most liberal international theorists thusenvision the need for authoritative international and globalinstitutions that modify significantly the powers and prerogativestraditionally attributed to the sovereign state.
Anne-Marie Slaughter has also rejected the idea of cosmopolitandemocracy and a global parliament as infeasible and unwieldy (2004: 8and 238). Slaughter is an advocate of ''global governance'',in the sense of ''a much looser and less threatening concept ofcollective organization and regulation without coercion'', tosolve common global problems such as transnational crime, terrorism,and environmental destruction (2004: 9). According to Slaughter,states are not unitary, but ''disaggregated'' andincreasingly ''networked'' through information, enforcement,and harmonization networks (2004: 167)'--producing
a world of governments, with all the different institutions thatperform the basic functions of governments'--legislation,adjudication, implementation'--interacting both with each otherdomestically and also with their foreign and supranationalcounterparts. (2004: 5)
A networked world order, she argues,
would be a more effective and potentially more just world order thaneither what we have today or a world government in which a set ofglobal institutions perched above nation-states enforced global rules.(2004: 6''7)
Although Slaughter is keen to highlight the promise of ''globalgovernance through government networks'' as ''good publicpolicy for the world and good national foreign policy'' (2004:261), she acknowledges that in contemporary world conditions ofradical social, economic and political inequality between states andpeoples, effective and fair global governance will require thenetworks comprising global governance to abide by the norms of''global deliberative equality'', toleration of reasonableand legitimate difference, and ''positive comity'' in theform of consultation and active assistance between organizations; inaddition, global governance networks would need to be made moreaccountable through a system of checks and balances, and moreresponsive through the principle of subsidiarity (2004: 244''60).Without movement towards a more equitable world of mutual respect,however, it is difficult to see actually existing global governancenetworks operating in an impartial and generous spirit to help
all nations and their peoples to achieve greater peace, prosperity,stewardship of the earth, and minimum standards of human dignity.(2004: 166)
In this vein, Thomas Weiss has lamented the intellectual and politicalshifts in perspective from world government to global governance,arguing that current voluntary associations, organizations andnetworks at the global level are ''so obviously inadequate''to meeting global challenges that we
are obliged to ask ourselves whether we can approach anything thatresembles effective governance for the world without institutions withsome supranational characteristics at the global level. (2009:264)
While many contemporary international relations theorists seem toreject the feasibility, desirability, or necessity of worldgovernment, constructivist theorist Alexander Wendt has argued thatthe ''logic of anarchy'' contains within it the seeds oftransformation towards a ''global monopoly on the legitimate useof organized violence'--a world state'' (2003: 491). UsingAristotelian and Hegelian insights, Wendt offers a teleologicalaccount of the development of world order from an anarchic statessystem to a world state, arguing that
the struggle for recognition between states will have the same outcomeas that between individuals, collective identity formation andeventually a state. (2003: 493)
Technological changes, especially those that increase the ''costsof war'' as well as ''the scale on which it is possible toorganize a state'', affect the struggle for recognition amongstates, undermining their self-sufficiency and making a world state''inevitable'' (2003: 493''4). Wendt draws on the workof Daniel Deudney (1995 and 1999), who argued that the evolution ofdestructive technology makes states as vulnerable as individuals in aHobbesian state of nature:
Hence nuclear one-worldism'--just as the risks of the state ofnature made it functional for individuals to submit to a common power,changes in the forces of destruction increasingly make it functionalfor states to do so as well. (Wendt 2003: 508)
Deudney, however, has recently argued that the world state solution,involving a top-down hierarchical mode of government, is impracticaland conceptually dead; his proposed alternative is a''negarchic'', republican-federalist conception of worldorder that solves the problems of anarchy through the development ofregimes of mutual restraint and obligation, but without the risk ofdespotism or totalitarianism accompanying hierarchical worldgovernment (2019 and 2020).
According to Wendt, however, the path of world state formation isinevitable, and would be characterized by the emergence of ''auniversal security community'', in which members expect toresolve conflicts peacefully rather than through force; a''universal collective security'' system that ensures theprotection of each member should ''crimes'' occur; and a''universal supranational authority'' that can make bindingauthoritative decisions about the collective use of force (2003: 505).Driving this transformation is the struggle for recognition, andthe
political development of the system will not end until thesubjectivity of all individuals and groups is recognized and protectedby a global Weberian state. (2003: 506; for a critique of teleologicalarguments about institutional forms, see Levy 2020)
Wendt recognizes that powerful states enjoying the benefits ofasymmetrical recognition may be most resistant to world stateformation. He argues, however, that with the diffusion of greaterviolence potential to smaller powers (such as al-Qaeda and NorthKorea),
the ability of Great Powers to insulate themselves from global demandsfor recognition will erode, making it more and more difficult tosustain a system in which their power and privileges are not tied toan enforceable rule of law. (2003: 524)
Based on the assumption that systems tend to develop toward stableend-states, a world state in which individuals and
states alike will have lost the negative freedom to engage inunilateral violence, but gained the positive freedom of fullyrecognized subjectivity. (2003: 525)
is the inevitable end-state of the human struggle for recognition. Atthe same time that Wendt sees world state formation as an inevitabletrajectory of the struggle for recognition between individuals andgroups, he argues that a world state could take various forms: whilecollectivizing organized violence, it need not collectivize on aglobal scale culture, economy or local politics; while requiring astructure that ''can command and enforce a collective response tothreats'', it need not abolish national armies, or require asingle UN army; and while it requires a procedure for making bindingchoices,
it would not even require a world ''government'', if by thiswe mean a unitary body with one leader whose decisions are final.(2003: 506)
2.2 The Liberal Rejection of World GovernmentWe now turn to debates about world government among contemporaryliberal theorists. Since the publication of John Rawls'slandmark A Theory of Justice in 1971, liberal theorists suchas Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge have sought to formulate acosmopolitan version of liberalism by extending Rawlsian principles ofdomestic justice to the international realm. According to Beitz, acosmopolitan liberal conception of international morality is
concerned with the moral relations of members of a universal communityin which state boundaries have a merely derivative significance. (1979[1999a: 181''2])
Cosmopolitan liberalism evaluates the morality of domestic andinternational institutions based on ''an impartial considerationof the claims of each person who would be affected'' (1999b:287). A cosmopolitan liberal theory of global justice thus begins witha conception of humanity as a common moral community of free and equalpersons. There is debate among contemporary theorists about therelationship and distinction between moral cosmopolitanism andpolitical or institutional cosmopolitanism in the form of a worldstate or government (Beitz 1994; Dufek 2013; Ypi 2013; Cabrera 2018and 2019).
Contemporary liberal theorists have traditionally argued that worldgovernment, in the form of a global leviathan with supremelegislative, executive, adjudicative and enforcement powers, islargely unnecessary to solve problems such as war, global poverty, andenvironmental catastrophe. World government so conceived is neithernecessary nor sufficient to achieve the aims of a liberal agenda (Yack2012). Even cosmopolitan liberals have not argued that moralcosmopolitanism necessarily entails political cosmopolitanism in theform of a world government.
Although Rawls himself rejects cosmopolitan liberalism, disagreeingwith his liberal critics on several critical issues related to globaldistributive justice, they are united in their agreement that a worldstate is not part of a liberal ideal for world order. In his treatiseon global order, The Law of Peoples, Rawls forwards theconcept of a society of peoples, governed by principles that willaccommodate ''cooperative associations and federations amongpeoples, but will not affirm a world-state'' (1999: 36). Heexplicitly states his reason for rejecting the idea of a world stateor government:
Here I follow Kant's lead in Perpetual Peace (1795) inthinking that a world government'--by which I mean a unifiedpolitical regime with the legal powers normally exercised by centralgovernments'--would either be a global despotism or else wouldrule over a fragile empire torn by frequent civil strife as variousregions and peoples tried to gain their political freedom andautonomy. (1999: 36)
Other liberal thinkers have similarly rejected the desirability ofworld government in the form of a domestic state writ large to coverthe entire globe (Beitz 1999b: 182; Jones 1999: 229; Tan 2000 and2004; Pogge 1988: 285; Satz 1999: 77''8; Risse 2012).
In a related objection, ''communitarian'' liberals, such asMichael Walzer, argue against a centralized world government as athreat to social pluralism. Walzer thus endorses ''sovereignstatehood'' as ''a way of protecting distinct historicalcultures, sometimes national, sometimes ethnic/religious incharacter'', and rejects a centralized global order because hedoes not
see how it could accommodate anything like the range of cultural andreligious difference that we see around us today. '... For somecultures and most orthodox religions can only survive if they arepermitted degrees of separation that are incompatible with globalism.And so the survival of these groups would be at risk; under the rulesof the global state, they would not be able to sustain and pass ontheir way of life. (2004: 172 and 176)
At the same time that distinct communities may constitute intrinsichuman goods, Walzer also endorses social and political pluralism as aninstrumental good: given the diversity of human values, he argues thatthey
are best pursued politically in circumstances where there are manyavenues of pursuit, many agents in pursuit. The dream of a singleagent'--the enlightened despot, the civilizing imperium, thecommunist vanguard, the global state'--is a delusion. (2004:188)
A world of distinct, autonomous communities may be important tocurbing the appetite of a hegemonic or global state to re-make theworld in its own image. Liberal nationalists and communitarians thusobject to world government due to the homogeneityargument'--world government may be so strong and pervasive as tocreate a homogenizing effect, obliterating distinct cultures andcommunities that are intrinsically valuable. Liberal politicalpluralists (Mu±iz-Fraticelli 2014) are concerned that anystate, including a world government, could destroy associative groupsthat constitute legitimate sources of political authority; and bydestroying the rich social pluralism that animates human life (Walzer2004), produce a loss of value (Miller 2007; Valentini 2012).
The liberal rejection of world government, however, does not amount toan endorsement of the conventional system of sovereign states or thecontemporary international order, ''with its extreme injustices,crippling poverty, and inequalities'' (Rawls 1999: 117).Rawls's rejection of a world government does not negate thelegitimacy and desirability of establishing international ortransnational institutions to regulate cooperation between peoples andeven to discharge certain common inter-societal duties. Thus, afterhis rejection of a world state, Rawls goes on to say that in awell-ordered society of peoples, organizations
(such as the United Nations ideally conceived) may have the authorityto express for the society of well-ordered peoples their condemnationof unjust domestic institutions in other countries and clear cases ofthe violation of human rights. In grave cases they may try to correctthem by economic sanctions, or even by military intervention. Thescope of these powers covers all peoples and reaches their domesticaffairs. (1999: 36)
Rawls's vision of global order clearly rejects a world ofatomistic sovereign states with the traditional powers of absolutesovereignty. Instead, his global vision includes ''newinstitutions and practices'' to ''constrain outlaw stateswhen they appear'' (1999: 48), to promote human rights, and todischarge the duty of assistance owed to burdened societies.
Thomas Pogge argues that realizing
a peaceful and ecologically sound future will '... requiresupranational institutions and organizations that limit thesovereignty rights of states more severely than is the currentpractice. (2000: 213)
He sees this development to be possible only when a majority of statesare stable democracies (2000: 213''4). Pogge thus appears toagree with Rawls that the path to perpetual peace (and environmentalsafety) lies in promoting the development of well-ordered states,characterized by democratically representative, responsive andresponsible domestic governments.
As these lines of argument by Rawls and Pogge suggest, liberals havebeen quick to reject framing the choice of world orders as one betweeneither a world of traditional sovereign states or aworld with a global central government. Pogge has asserted thatliberals should
dispense with the traditional concept of sovereignty and leave behindall-or-nothing debates about world government.
Instead, he argues for an
intermediate solution that provides for some central organs of worldgovernment without, however, investing them with [exclusive]''ultimate sovereign power and authority''. (1988: 285)
In this ''multi-layered scheme in which ultimate politicalauthority is vertically dispersed'', states that retain ultimatepolitical authority in some areas would be juxtaposed with a worldgovernment with ''central coercive mechanisms of lawenforcement'' that has ultimate political authority in otherareas (Pogge 2009: 205''6). Debra Satz has also argued thatframing the choice as one between the current states system and''an all-powerful world-state'' poses a false dilemma:
the contrast between a system of sovereign states and a centralizedworld-state is too crude. There are many other possibilities,including a state system restrained by international andintergovernmental institutions, a non-state-based economic system, aglobal separation-of-powers scheme, international federalism, andregional political-economic structures, such as those currently beingdeveloped in western Europe and the Americas (via NAFTA). (Satz 1999:77''8)
Simon Caney has also endorsed a system of international institutionsdesigned to
provide a reliable and effective means of protecting people'sbasis interests (and instrumental consideration) and also to provide afair forum for determining which rules should govern the globaleconomy (a procedural component). (2006: 734)
As the many liberal proposals for moral improvement of the world orderindicate, liberal objections to world government'--whether theytake the form of tyranny/homogeneity arguments and/or theinefficiency/soullessness objections'--are not motivated by acomplacent attitude towards the contemporary world order and itsresulting conditions (Pogge 2000). As Charles Jones has put it, thesevalid and plausible objections to world government do not show that''the status quo is preferable to some alternativearrangement'' (1999: 229). While liberal theorists acknowledgethe tyrannical potential of a world government, they also acknowledgethat ''sovereign states are themselves often the cause of therights-violations of their citizens'' (1999: 229). Kok-Chor Tancharacterizes liberal proposals for world order to involve, therefore,neither world government nor absolute state sovereignty. Instead,liberals have argued consistently for restrictions on the traditionalpowers of sovereignty, as well as for the vertical dispersion ofsovereignty, ''upwards towards supranational bodies, and alsodownwards toward particular communities within states'' (2000:101). In such a world order, states become ''another level ofappeal, and not the sole and final one'' (2000: 101).
David Held argues that this dispersion of sovereignty is inevitablegiven that the nation-state does not exist in an insular world, but ahighly interdependent and complex system: the contemporary realityconsists of a globalized economy, international organizations,regional and global institutions, international law, and militaryalliances, all of which operate to shape and constrain individualstates. Although national sovereignty still has a place in thecontemporary world order,
interconnected authority structures '... displace notions ofsovereignty as an illimitable, indivisible and exclusive form ofpublic power. (1995: 137)
In Held's account of cosmopolitan democracy, the universalrealization of the liberal ideal of autonomy, derived from Kant,ultimately requires long-term institutional developments such as thecreation of a global parliament, an international criminal court, thedemilitarization of states, and global distributive justice in theform of a guaranteed annual income for each individual (1995:279''80). Although cosmopolitan theorists tend to reject thedichotomy posed between a political system of sovereign states and onewith a centralized world government, and have tended to eschew theterminology of the world state in their accounts of global democraticinstitutional reform, William Scheuerman has argued that some of theirproposals of supranational institutions mimic core attributes oftraditional statehood, thus inadvertently bringing the world stateback into liberal cosmopolitan visions of world order (2014). It isthus an open question whether ''statist cosmopolitanism''(Ypi 2011), which considers states as viable agents of cosmopolitanjustice, is feasible, or whether cosmopolitanism requires transcendingthe state system (UlaÅ 2017).
2.3 Republican Nondomination and Global DemocracyDemocratic, republican and critical theorists have become concernedwith the global context of order and justice due to its importance forestablishing protective external conditions for the moral andpolitical achievements of centuries of domestic democratic politicalstruggle. Traditionally, the main global threat was interstate war,thus the projects for perpetual peace. Today, democratic theoristsworry that contemporary processes of globalization are undermining theachievements of democratic societies in the areas of civil and socialrights such as access to education and healthcare, and the economicsecurities provided by the welfare state. From this perspective,economic globalization and the growing power of international andtransnational institutions pose a potential threat to democraticideals of civic equality and self-determination. The task of thedemocratic theorist is to think about how democracies can respond tothese global developments in ways that best help preserve the fragileachievements of domestic democratic justice (Habermas 2004 [2006]; seealso Scheuerman 2008). Increasingly, theorists of global democraticreform envisage the need to develop new institutions and practices ofrepresentation and accountability rather than merely to extendtraditional constitutional models and electoral mechanisms of domesticdemocratic governance (Archibugi 2008; Macdonald 2008; Marchetti 2008;Tinnevelt 2012; Tanyi 2019; Erman 2019).
Key to discussions in democratic, republican and critical theory aboutglobal order and justice is the political ideal of nondomination.Neo-republican theorist Philip Pettit understands commitment to thisideal to entail reducing people's vulnerability to alien controlor the arbitrary power of others to interfere with their choices andtheir lives. In the international context, Pettit has outlined a''republican law of peoples'' that has the twin goals ofensuring that every people is represented by a non-dominatinggovernment in a non-dominating international order (2010). Startingwith a world of states, Pettit argues that a state which is''effective and representative of its people'' fulfills therepublican ideal of nondomination, and ''it would beobjectionably intrusive of other agents in the internationalorder'' to bypass such states and assume responsibility for itsmembers (2010: 71''2). A legitimate international order isone
in which effective, representative states avoiddomination'--whether by another state, or by a non-statebody'--and seek to enable other states to be effective andrepresentative too. (2010: 73)
In an international context, the sources of domination include otherstates; ''non-domestic, private bodies'' such as''corporations, churches, terrorist movements, even powerfulindividuals''; and ''non-domestic, public bodies'' suchas the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (2010: 77). While representative statesrealize nondomination internally for their members, individuals'enjoyment of freedom as nondomination is not secured unless theirstates are protected in their external relations from dominatingstrategies, including ''intentional obstruction, coercion,deception, and manipulation'' as well as''invigilation'', and ''intimidation'' (2010:74).
Pettit's account presupposes the legitimacy of domesticdemocracies that ensure nondomination as a starting point for thinkingabout a legitimate international order, and he explicitly rejects theidea of a world state, modeled on a domestic republican regime, as aninfeasible remedy for the challenges posed by domination in aninternational context (2010: 81; but see Koenig-Archibugi 2011). Thereis no easy solution, but Pettit considers feasible improvements to thecurrent international order can be made by further developingmultilateral
international agencies and forums by means of which states can workout their problems and relations in a space of more or less commonreasons
as well as fostering greater solidarity among subgroups of weakerstates so that they can form rival blocs that can resist domination bymore powerful agents (2010: 84). While Pettit is mostly concerned withthe dominating potential of powerful states, and considersinternational agencies to be less threatening (2010: 86),C(C)cile Laborde adds to Pettit's account not only aconcern for agent-relative domination, but also, and more centrally,systemic domination, which entails a greater awareness of thedominating potential of international organizations such as theInternational Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization and the WorldBank (2010). One of the ways that powerful states dominate weak statesis by ''entrenching and institutionalizing'' their dominantposition through unfair international social structures in areas suchas trade (2010: 57).
Indeed, Nancy Kokaz, in a republican interpretation of Rawls'sLaw of Peoples, argues that ''a global republic cannotbe dismissed by a civic [republican] theory of global justice''(2005: 94). The civic pluralist ideal that is threatened by the adventof global capitalism and ensuing deracination requires ''a globalstate powerful enough to protect local communities'' from thehomogenizing tendencies and ''excesses of globalcapitalism'' (2005: 93). In a further development of republicanideas about global order and justice, James Bohman has argued that arepublican ideal of freedom as nondomination in the new global''circumstances of politics'' requires political struggle inthe direction of transnational democracy (2004 and 2007). According toBohman,
under conditions of globalization, freedom from tyranny and dominationcannot be achieved without extending our political ideals ofdemocracy, community and membership. (2004: 352)
Not only are currently bounded democratic communities ineffective inresisting new global sources and forms of domination, they are also''potentially self-defeating'', constituting
a thousand tiny fortresses in which the oldest form of domination ispracticed at many different levels: the domination of noncitizens bycitizens, or nonmembers by members, using their ability to commandnoninterference much like those who live within gated communities.(2007: 175 and 180)
Daniele Archibugi has termed this
democratic schizophrenia: to engage in a certain [democratic] behavioron the inside and indulge in the opposite [undemocratic] behavior onthe outside. (2008: 6)
Such vicious circles of ''democratic domination'' can onlybe overcome by making borders, membership and jurisdiction thesubjects of democratic deliberation across dªmoi(Bohman 2007: 179). Whether or not democracy serves global justicedepends on the possibility of transnational democratization, andBohman sees two primary agents of such transformation, in democraticstates pursuing ''broadly federalist and regional projects ofpolitical integration'', such as the European Union, and in theless institutionalized activities of ''participants intransnational public spheres and associations'' (2007: 189).While some think that the formal development of regional or globalinstitutions must be democratized in order to realize republicannondomination or democratic agency (Valentini 2012), others argue thatglobal democracy may be justified mainly for its instrumental role inprotecting and promoting
the fundamental interests of all the world's citizens, ratherthan by that of maximizing citizens' democratic agency
at the global level (Weinstock 2006: 10).
Critical theorist Iris Marion Young similarly calls for a globalpolitics of nondomination, that would support ''a vision of localand cultural autonomy in the context of global regulatoryregimes'' (2002: 237). Her model of globalgovernance'--''a post-sovereign alternative to the existingstates system'' (2000: 238)'--entails a ''decentreddiverse democratic federalism'' (2000: 253). While everydaygovernance would be primarily local, it would take place in thecontext of global regulatory regimes, built upon existinginternational institutions, that would be functionally defined to dealwith
(1) peace and security, (2) environment, (3) trade and finance, (4)direct investment and capital utilization, (5) communications andtransportation, (6) human rights, including labor standards andwelfare rights, (7) citizenship and migration. (2002: 267)
Young envisages these global regulatory regimes to apply not only tostates, but also to non-state organizations, such as corporations, andindividuals. In terms of feasibility, Young points to the developmentof a robust ''global public sphere'' (Habermas 1998) ascrucial to bringing about ''stronger global regulatoryinstitutions tied to principles of global and local democracy''(Young 2002: 272).
Increasingly, then, republican and democratic theorists viewtransnational and supranational institutions not as intrinsic threatsto democratic freedom and justice, but as potentially instrumentalinstitutional developments that are necessary to fortify thecapacities of contemporary states to deliver on democratic andrepublican values. In this sense, supporting the development oftransnational democratic institutions is consistent with upholding thevalues of national identity and belonging, and the proper functioningof states, by providing a robust framework to coordinate anddiscipline states into solving problems of human rights and globaljustice in areas such as labor, health, migration, and taxation, in amore fair, equitable, and non-dominating manner (Abizadeh 2008;Ronzoni 2012; Valentini 2012; Dietsch 2015; Fine & Ypi 2016;Cabrera 2018). Paradoxically, it may be that in conditions ofglobalization, only a world state can provide the essential supportingconditions for all states, including democratic ones, to enjoyeffective and legitimate collective self-determination (Lu 2018).Thus, republican cosmopolitanism in the form of a world state may beless of an oxymoron than Pettit suggests.
2.4 Critics of Capitalism and a Neoliberal World StateAn abiding controversy about the contemporary world economy is itspotential to enhance or destroy societal goals of securing justice,freedom, and welfare provision, including the protection of humanrights and democratic politics (Stiglitz 2002; Kinley 2009). CraigMurphy has worried that globalization would
inevitably be accompanied by the anti-democratic government of''expertise'' or by the non-government of marketization atever more inclusive levels. (2000: 800)
Economists have warned that the relationship between global economicintegration, national self-determination, and democratic politics canbe fraught (Rodrik 2011), and that capitalism has a tendency toreproduce and intensify inequality (Piketty 2013 [2014]). In thetwentieth century, Immanuel Wallerstein (2011) developed theworld-systems approach to analyzing the contradictions inherent in acapitalist world-system. Although imperial military competition gaveway to a world of sovereign states in the era of decolonization, henoted that a capitalist world order perpetuates systems of dominationto maintain capitalist interests, at the expense of the developingworld. World-systems theory thus explains how capitalism forms astable set of exploitative relations between core and peripheralstates, resulting in an international division of labor that benefitsthe core at the expense of the periphery.
While world-systems theory posits that ''economic exploitation ofthe periphery does not necessarily require direct political ormilitary domination'' (Kohn & Reddy 2006 [2017]),contemporary postcolonial theorists argue that the rise of neoliberalglobalization can be marked by the establishment of internationaleconomic institutions that have dislocated the power of sovereignstates to make economic decisions, and relocated them in internationaleconomic institutions'--the WTO, IMF and World Bank'--witheffective enforcement powers.
Whereas realist, liberal and republican theorists typically posit thata world state is a possible futuristic institutional development toevolve from anarchy, postcolonial theorists have argued that anarchydoes not accurately describe the global historical institutionalreality. Some also argue that world government is already here, albeitin a nascent form (Albert et al. 2012; Goodin 2013). Critical andpostcolonial theorists argue that the course of capitalist modernityhas produced a nascent world state of neoliberal domination (Chimni2004; Slobodian 2018). In such conditions of structural domination, aworld state may be undesirable as a political project due toestablished and entrenched global hierarchies based on racist,patriarchal, and capitalist domination and exploitation (Robinson1983; Pateman and Mills 2007). As B.S. Chimni has put it,
A network of economic, social and political [InternationalInstitutions] has been established or repositioned, at the initiativeof the first world, and together they constitute a nascent globalstate whose function is to realize the interests of transnationalcapital and powerful states in the international system to thedisadvantage of third world states and peoples. The evolving globalstate formation may therefore be described as having animperial character. (2004: 1''2)
Although fragmented in structure, the future global state, accordingto Chimni, is in the process of congealing to actualize and legitimizea world-view that ultimately serves the transnational capitalist classcomprising the owners of transnational capital. This class allies withthe networks of international law and institutions to undermine thedecision-making powers of states, especially those with weakinstitutional capacities, and to make decisions without transparencyor effective participation of those affected.
While increasingly intrusive, the decisions of international economicand financial institutions remain largely unaccountable. According toSlobodian, neoliberal globalists actively sought to construct theinstitutions of the global economy to evade accountability, ''tocontain potential disruptions from the democratically empoweredmasses'', so that the global economy could be ''protectedfrom the demands of redistributive equality and social justice''(2018: 264). While the Washington Consensus seemed to be based onsound economic principles'--that free markets ''andcompetition enable the efficient allocation of scarceresources'''--and forecast economic growth based onliberalizing trade, investment, and capital flows, its failure toproduce growth or inclusive development in many countries has revealedthe importance of empirical analysis to check ideological distortionsof economic policy (Rodrik 2015). China's economictransformation illuminates global challenges arising from the declineof ''managerial capitalism'', or Fordism, which generatedthe regulatory state-model of governance, and the rise of''neoliberal capitalism'', or post-Fordism, defined by the''hollowing out'' of the state, reduction of centralregulatory capacity, coupled with flexible production processesdisaggregated into production chains and networks, and increasingvulnerability of the peripheral workforce (Dowdle 2016:207''229).
In response to these predicaments of contemporary capitalism, criticaland postcolonial theorists emphasize that there is no option to returnto a mythical world of autarkic or autonomous and insulated stateswith traditional sovereign prerogatives (Winter & Chambers-Letson2015). Instead, globalized domination can only be transformed throughglobalizing transnational labor and social movements that struggle forgreater democratization of the decision-making processes of bothdomestic and international institutions (Chimni 2004). In calling fora revision of the principles that regulate the relationship betweenthe global economy and sovereign states, in order to buttress statepower, especially of Third World states, against internationaleconomic and financial institutions, critical theorists joincontemporary liberal (Isiksel 2020) and republican theorists who viewthe state as continuing to play an important role in securing equalhuman freedom. According to Adom Getachew, ''postcolonialcosmopolitanism'' acknowledges the persistent unequal integrationand hierarchy produced by the world politics of empire, and views thereinforcement of the sovereign state, as well as the dispersion ofsovereignty in regional federations and a redistributive internationaleconomic order, as key to anti-colonial struggles to resist dominationand remake the world (2019: 34).
Given that the Eurocentric narrative of civilizational progressforwarded the nation-state as a marker of civilization, and fatedIndigenous peoples to extinction with the advent of modernity,however, Indigenous political theorists have reason to be ambivalentabout a Weberian state at any level of political organization. SomeIndigenous political theorists have mounted radical challenges to thesettler colonial state as well as the statist international order.Glen Coulthard's critique of the liberal politics ofmulticultural recognition reveals that the struggle for recognitionmay not emancipate, but entrench subjects in the settler colonialsubjectivity offered by the settler colonial state (2014). Followinganti-colonial thinker Frantz Fanon, Coulthard argues that dominatedagents need to struggle to create new decolonized frameworks ofrecognition that they can call their own, and not only seek equalrecognition based on structures of settler colonial power,otherwise
the colonized will have failed to reestablish themselves as trulyself-determining: as creators of the terms, values, and conditions bywhich they are to be recognized. (2014: 139)
Coulthard also understands the political project of Indigenous''resurgence'' to be inextricably linked to the struggle toconstruct alternative social and economic systems to capitalism; thusfor Indigenous resurgence to be successful, ''capitalism mustdie'' (2014: 173). Such Indigenous politics of refusal (Simpson2014) of both statism and capitalism underscore that the struggle forrecognition of Indigenous humanity in conditions of racial capitalistmodernity entails radical structural transformations of global order(Lu 2017 and 2019).
3. ConclusionThe aim of much normative theorizing about global institutions andglobal justice is to interrogate whether a world government isfeasible, desirable, or necessary for realizing human aspirations forjust, inclusive, peaceful, and prosperous relations between thediverse individuals and groups that comprise a common moral communityof humankind. Some think that the idea of world government involves aparadox: however it is conceived institutionally, when the winningconditions exist for establishing a desirable form of worldgovernment'--one that will guarantee human security withindividual liberty, protect the environment, and advance global socialjustice'--it will no longer be necessary (Nielsen 1988: 276). Onceall governments, especially the most powerful ones, are willing to usetheir power to build government networks that promote global peace,justice and environmental protection, and to cede some traditionalrights of sovereignty to supranational institutions in areas such asthe use of military force, the management and protection of theenvironment and natural resources, and the distribution of wealth, theestablishment of a global political authority might seem superfluous.As Alexander Wendt has pointed out, however, a stable end-state ofworld order development requires such ideal conditions, should theyever develop, to become institutionalized into a world state thatenacts ''a global monopoly on the legitimate use of organizedviolence'' (1988: 491); enforcement mechanisms are notsuperfluous, since there is always the possibility of violations byoutlaw states and groups. In a similar vein, the Swedish philosopherTorbj¶rn T¤nnsj¶ has argued that neither voluntarymultilateral cooperation under conditions of anarchy, nor a hybridarrangement of ''shared sovereignty between the worldgovernment and nation-states'', will be effective in resolvingcontemporary challenges in the realms of human security, globaljustice and the environment (2008: 122''125). Since sovereigntyis indivisible, T¤nnsj¶ posits that a world state must haveultimate decision-making authority over nation-states overjurisdictional issues:
Unless there are sanctions available to the central authority to backup a decision as to where a question is to be handled, the system ofstates will be thrown back into a state of nature. (2008:125''6)
From critical and postcolonial perspectives, however, the state ofnature reference point of much of international relations theory is anormatively obscuring myth that occludes the hierarchies of structuraldomination that have pervaded the development of world order (Jahn2000; Lu 2017: 120). Postcolonial and critical theorists often sharethe ethical concerns and moral commitments of normative theorists(Kohn 2013)'--justice, equality, freedom, nondomination'--buttheir theorizing focuses on the diagnostic task of analyzing thecauses and character of contemporary structural and institutionaldevelopments, as well as the global processes and conditions that makethem possible. They view contemporary global order, marked by radicalimbalances and disparities produced by historic and ongoing structuralinjustices based on class, race, and gender, as serving certainfunctions and interests, in terms of what they naturalize, enable,suppress, and obscure. In 2020 and 2021, as a world divided by deeppolitical, social and economic structural inequalities faces pandemicconditions, economic recession, and environmentally deleteriousdevelopments, the questions of whose sense of world communityand whose global needs will define the global politicalagenda and order are more salient than ever.